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This study was an interesting experience.  When Minister Johns and the Ontario Agricultural 
Commodity council asked us to do it, we thought it would be a good test because it gave us a 
chance to see whether what we thought was the case really was true.  In the earlier work we did 
with IBM Business Consulting, we could only do conceptual analysis and a little empirical work 
from 40,000 ft.   
 
With this study, we had access to data from over 11,000 Ontario farms.  We were able, through 
Ontario Ministry personnel to test our conceptual analysis in a big way.  The analysis confirms 
what we thought about the Business Risk Management program.  But it also allowed us to go a 
lot farther and make some suggestions to improve the program. 
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project.  The technical working group of OACC provide considerable input into earlier drafts of 
the report.  Stephen Duff and his colleagues at OMAF were invaluable in using the databases to 
conduct the analysis.  We are grateful to all of them. 
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Executive Summary - Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This report is the result of a study commissioned by the Ontario Minister of Agriculture to 
provide an analysis of the Business Risk Management program (BRM), which is a key 
component of Canada’s proposed Agricultural Policy Framework (APF).  This section 
summarizes the objectives, methods, results, conclusions and recommendations. 
 
Purpose, Objectives, and Approach 
The purpose of this study was to provide an in-depth analysis of the proposed BRM program on 
Ontario agriculture as a complement to the study conducted on behalf of AAFC earlier this year.  
The objectives of the study were the following: 
 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would stabilize individual farm 
incomes in Ontario for the various sectors; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would change the distribution of 
government funds between sectors, regions, and farmers with varying level of income 
decline and impact on the competitive advantage of Ontario producers versus those in other 
regions of Canada; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would reduce program overlap, 
maintain appropriate linkages between government programs and with private risk 
management mechanisms, and support good risk management practices; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would appropriately treat farms with 
supply managed production; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would offset the impact of programs 
in competing jurisdictions; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would incorporate insurance-like 
principles; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would distort production or 
marketing decisions;  
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would reduce the potential for trade 
disputes; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would be easy for farmers to 
understand and participate in, in a cost effective manner; 
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would provide a smooth transition 
from present programming; and  
•  To determine the extent to which the proposed program would contribute to better farm 
management decision making and planning. 
•  To suggest improvements to the proposed program 
 
To answer the questions posed in these objectives, the design of the proposed program was 
described, analyzed conceptually, and tested using data from existing farm programs.  Ontario 
farm data from crop insurance, OFIDP, NISA, and companion programs was used to simulate 
the proposed program, and to compare it with current programs.  In addition, the data was used 
to consider variants of the proposed program. 
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The design and operation of the proposed program is presented in section 2.0.  Section 3.0 
provides the empirical analysis of the proposed program and the comparison with current 
programs.  In section 4.0, the distribution of program payments by farm type and region is 
presented.  Section 5.0 presents a conceptual analysis of incentives and distortions under the 
proposed program.  In section 6.0, the differences in interpretation between simulations using 
cash and accrual accounting are determined.  Section 7.0 provides an analysis of the operation of 
the proposed program for supply managed industries.  The risk of trade retaliation under the 
proposed program is discussed in section 8.0.  Section 9.0 considers the robustness of the 
proposed program to distortionary impacts of agricultural policies in other jurisdictions.  The 
linkages between crop or production insurance and the proposed program are discussed in 
section 10.0.  Program administration under the proposed program is described and analyzed in 
section 11.0.  Section 12.0 provides empirical analyses of some variants on the proposed 
program.  The affordability of the proposed program relative to current programs is analyzed in 
section 13.0.  Section 14.0 provides a discussion and analysis of programming alternatives in the 
period of transition between current and proposed programs.           
 
Conclusions 
The description of the operation of the proposed program in section 2.0 shows a number of 
differences between current programs and the proposed programs:   
 
•  The proposed program provides program payments based on actual losses (with “loss” 
defined as a production margin below the reference production margin); current programs 
(notably NISA, SDRM, and NISA top-up programs) provide an entitlement regardless of 
a “loss” concept.   
•  In order to be eligible for government support, the producer must set aside cash devoted 
to margin loss contingencies; this is unlike the current OFIDP program.   
•  Aspects of the proposed program are confusing; notably, the concept of “coverage” under 
the proposed program is entirely misleading.  The concept of “deposit level” is far more 
intuitive.   
•  Reference to the proposed program as “New NISA” is also confusing because it brings to 
mind “old NISA”.  The proposed program is in fact very different from NISA. 
 
Section 3.0 provides extensive empirical analysis and testing of the proposed program relative to 
current programs.  The analysis applied data from applicants to the OFIDP program from 1998-
2001, data from NISA participants from 1998-2001 for whom links to crop insurance and 
companion programs could be made, and data from continuous OFIDP applicants from 1998-
2001.  These data were sorted by farm type, and where possible, size.  In all three data sets, the 
level of program payments that would have been made under the proposed program was 
compared with actual payments under current programs; for those in which a time series was 
available (the NISA participants and continuous OFIDP applicants), measures of stability in 
gross and production margin were made. 
 
The results were surprisingly unanimous across datasets of farm records: 
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•  The proposed program would have provided greater support in Ontario than did current 
programs. 
•  Program funding according to farm type is generally not dramatic, although it appears 
cash crops, cow-calf, and feedlots would have received significantly more funding, while 
the fruits and vegetable, and greenhouse segments would have received less funding.  
•  These general comments do not hold across all farm sizes.  There is a tendency for the 
greatest benefits to accrue to smaller and larger farms, but even this generalization does 
not hold across all farm types.   
•  The analysis overstates the benefits of the current programs because special measures 
increased payments, especially for hog producers, in 1998/99. Moreover, the time period 
included in the analysis saw tremendous expansion in the hog, fruit and vegetable, and 
greenhouse industries. Expanding farms were able to increase their funding under 
structural adjustment procedures of the current programs.  While the proposed program 
includes structural adjustment procedures, it cannot be included in our analysis. 
•  Production margin is almost universally more variable than gross margin, so it is a more 
sensitive trigger for program payments than gross margin. 
•  The proposed program does a much better job of stabilizing either gross margin or 
production margin than current programs.  This result was robust across farm types and 
sizes. 
 
Section 4.0 provides an analysis of program payment shares across commodities.  It shows that: 
 
•  Funding shares in Ontario are relatively stable comparing current with the proposed 
program, with slightly larger shares going to grains and beef under the proposed program.  
It appears that the share of program payments going to horticultural farms would 
decrease.   
•  Nationally, the share of funding to Saskatchewan would increase and other provinces’ 
funding shares would decrease slightly, although this observation should be treated with 
caution because crop insurance data were excluded and data for Quebec was largely 
unavailable. 
 
Section 5.0 considers the potential for the proposed program to convey incentives that would 
influence farm management decisions.  The analysis suggests that the use of the “Olympic” 
average concept in the reference margin could produce incentives to periodically magnify losses.  
This stems from the fact that the reference margin effectively excludes the minimum of the 
previous five years margins.  As such, it could create perverse incentives that a simple moving 
average would not.  
 
In section 6.0, a comparison is made between the payments that would have been paid out under 
the proposed program using cash-basis farm records relative to those under accrual farm records.  
This is an important consideration because the proposed program uses modified accrual farm 
records, but almost all of the time-series data used to simulate the program is based on cash farm 
records.  Based on the set of farms that continuously applied to OFIDP from 1998 to 2001 (most 
of which were cash crop farms), the results show that: 
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•  Using cash basis data as a proxy for accrual data (which is what was done in the analysis 
using the NISA data base in section 3.0) understates the actual program payments - by 
about 18% on the sample farms.   
•  This reinforces the observations on section 3.0 that the proposed program will pay more 
to farmers than the current programs. 
 
Section 7.0 considers the proposed program as it relates to supply management.  The conclusions 
are: 
 
•  Farms with supply managed sales are sufficiently diversified in the production of other 
products to need farm risk management protection in addition to that provided by supply 
management.   
•  The proposed program for supply management contains some significant design flaws.  
Specifically, the pro-rating of claims in the stabilization tiers according to the proportion 
of non-supply managed sales, combined with the lifting of all pro-rating once claims 
penetrate the disaster layers creates a significant incentive for farmers to intentionally 
magnify losses.   
 
The prospect of trade retaliation by other countries due to the proposed program is investigated 
in section 8.0.  Two issues are considered; a WTO challenge to the level of green box payments 
under the proposed program, and the potential for bilateral countervailing trade action by the US.  
As to the first issue, the methodology used by AAFC to determine green box payments gives a 
much higher level of “green” box payments than under current programs.   
 
•  Even if the methodology applied by AAFC were challenged (which has never occurred), 
the proposed program would have higher green box payments its in disaster portion.  
Thus, with regard to aggregate measures of support, it appears that the proposed program 
is at least as resistant (if not more resistant) to trade challenge as current programs.   
 
In the second case, the relevant question is whether the payments under the proposed program 
accrue disproportionately to a given commodity.   
   
•  The evidence on the proposed program shows that there is little change in the share of 
program payments across commodities relative to current programs.  Moreover, the 
proposed program with integrated disaster and stabilization components may be less 
vulnerable if the so-called Peace Clause does not appear more likely to trigger US 
countervail than current programs. 
 
The ability of the proposed program to protect against the market distortions of farm programs in 
other countries is considered in section 9.0.  The conclusions are: 
 
•  It is not possible to conclude whether the proposed program is better or worse over time.   
•  The analysis shows that during 1994 – 2001 there was essentially no correlation between 
corn, soybean, and wheat prices and the production margins on Ontario cash crop farms.  
At the same time, there was a positive correlation between production margin and gross 
sales.  Therefore, during this period, payments triggered by losses in the production   v
margin would have had a greater stabilizing effect, which is what was found in section 
3.0. 
•  In other words, reductions in production cost more than compensated for any decreases in 
income caused by declining prices.  This suggests that reference production margins 
would provide some relief when foreign farm policies depress prices.   
•  But, at the limit, this result cannot always apply.  In the final analysis, since a wide range 
of factors affect grain prices and costs, the effectiveness of the proposed program in this 
regard likely depends on the pattern of price variation.  
 
Section 10.0 considers the role of expanded production insurance and its linkage to the proposed 
program.  There is potential to expand production insurance to include: 
 
•  Livestock mortality insurance 
•  Negative margin insurance, especially for finishing livestock, but also for other products 
if feasible. 
•  Weather (e.g. rainfall, temperature) insurance for horticulture 
•  Additional crop insurance products for horticulture 
•  An insurance product to replace the current Market Revenue Insurance  
•  An option that would call farmers’ deposits from the option provider when the farmer has 
a claim against the proposed program. 
 
In addition, we suggest in this section that there may be no need to use deposits, and that an 
alternative would be to establish fees based on risk and frequency of claim.  At the limit, 
especially if the same organization that administers the program is also the insurance provider, 
this and the option above converge at least in the sense of calculating the cost. 
 
A number of alternatives exist for linkage between the proposed program and crop/production 
insurance.  Based on our analysis and observations: 
 
•  The current concept of linking BRM payments to production insurance by counting 
insurance payouts as income and insurance premiums as costs is a good start. 
•  But, in order to provide an incentive for farmers to maximize use of production 
insurance, their premiums should be rebated to farmers when PI saves payments from 
BRM.   
•  In the case of processing vegetables, the Ontario Board believes PI should be required 
for a producer to be eligible for BRM. 
 
Administration under the proposed program is analyzed in section 11.0.  The proposed program 
will carry a processing fee, which is nominal.  Unlike current disaster programs, producers will 
not apply when they believe they can trigger a payment; rather, filings will occur every year.  
Because of this feature, it is likely that as the program runs, the understanding of it will improve 
and compliance will become easier.  In contrast, under current programs a greater variety of 
forms and potential confusion is involved.   
Administratively, the proposed program will require producers to file accrual accounting figures 
every year.  This means a slightly higher cost to participate.  Two timelines have been discussed 
for producer filing, the first by OMAF and the second by AAFC:  vi
 
•  OMAF approach: 
o  Mar. 31: Signup, choice of deposit level, deposit due, accruals due for past year 
o  Cheques issued by September  
•  AAFC approach 
o  Mar. 31: Signup, choice of deposit level 
o  Dec. 31: one third of deposit due, accruals due 
o  Cheques issued following December. 
•  Because the OMAF approach puts little additional pressure on the producer in terms of 
timing or affordability, substantially reduces administrative costs, and would return 
payments more quickly, it appears that the OMAF approach is preferred.  
 
Section 12.0 provides analysis of variations on the proposed program.  These variations include 
moving hired labour into the category of ineligible expenses, combining the two stabilization 
layers into a single layer funded 40% by producer deposits and 60% by government, and the 
analysis of the relative effect on the “assets” of producers under the proposed program compared 
to the NISA program.  In all cases, analyses were conducted using the NISA database.  The 
conclusions are: 
 
•  Excluding hired labour as an eligible expense increased aggregate program payments 
slightly to most farm types and sizes.   
•  However, for fruit and vegetable farms and greenhouses, making hired labour ineligible 
reduces program benefits quite substantially for the largest farms, but provides greater 
benefit for most size categories. 
•  Combining the two stabilization layers results in a slight increase in aggregate program 
payments, and has no clear impact on stability.   
 
The industry proposal (NISA 1-2-3) consisted of coverage below 70% of reference production 
margin entirely financed by government, with companion programs maintained and the 
maintenance of a NISA-type program with government matching of producer contributions up to 
3% of eligible net sales with no cap.  To compare the asset-building and entitlement aspects of 
NISA 1-2-3 relative to the proposed program, the government matching contributions under the 
industry proposal were compared with payments in the stabilization layers of the proposed 
program using the NISA database.    
 
•  The results are that aggregate payments in the stabilization tier of the proposed program 
would have been about $50 mil greater to Ontario farmers during 1998 – 2001 than under 
NISA.  
•  All farm types triggered more payments under the proposed program, except for fruits 
and vegetables, greenhouse (who would have lost SDRM), and dairy. 
 
The issue of affordability of the proposed program is addressed in section 13.0. The issue of 
affordability is not one of cost: the cost to producers is an annual $50 registration fee and interest 
on the deposit.   
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The real issue is whether the cash tied up in deposits is a wise use of cash. One issue is how 
many farmers in Ontario have sufficient balances in their NISA accounts to fund their deposit 
requirements for the proposed program. To consider the extent to which farmers have access to 
the cash required to fund their required BRM deposits under the proposed program, current 
NISA balances were compared with minimum and maximum deposits required under the 
proposed program.  A related issue is whether there are alternative ways to provide the deposit 
requirement, or whether a deposit is the most appropriate way to encourage farmers’ 




•  63-68% of producers had sufficient Fund 1 (non-taxable) NISA balances to fund 
minimum deposits under the proposed program.   
•  Counting Fund 2 (the tax deferred portion), 72-75% of producers had sufficient funding 
for deposits.  The only commodity groups that showed a significant lack of funding from 
NISA sources were farms in supply management.   
•  What the foregoing means is that a substantial amount of additional cash will be required 
for deposits. 
•  At least three additional methods could be used to provide the deposits 
o  Financial institutions believe the proposed program has so much merit that they 
would, in general, be willing to loan farmers their deposit money, usually above 
normal line of credit limits.  This would make the cost to farmers who have the 
cash available, the spread between the borrowing rate and the savings rate. 
o  By the same token, as a way to reduce the amount of cash tied up (and likely the 
cost), the loan could be made as guaranteed Letter of Credit that would be drawn 
only when there is a claim under the BRM. 
o  The derivative discussed in section 10.0 that could be a product of an insurance 
provider could be used for the deposit, with the derivative’s premium being based 
on risk and frequency of use. 
•  We do question whether a deposit is the appropriate way to handle farmers’ commitments 
to risk management, the stated reason for the deposit in the first place.  A deposit 
provides no incentives to improve private risk management.  A fee structure, based on 
insurance principles would provide an incentive if the fee was based on individual and 
aggregate risk.  This is entirely possible to do with the history that is available from the 
NISA database.  Either a fee calculated and charged by the administering agency or the 
derivative discussed above are the only two alternatives that would provide risk 
assurance, but encourage farmers individually and in the aggregate, to privately manage 
risk better.  
 
Section 14.0 addresses the transition from current programs to the proposed programs.  The so-
called “wedge” funding available for transition is less than what would have been spent on MRI, 
SDRM, NISA top-ups and the miscellaneous small programs, so some choices will need to be 
made.  The observation that emerges is that some of this transition funding would be well used to 
help establish new products that can be used to replace those that are being phased out, 
particularly with respect to MRI.  With specific regard to SDRM transition, several options were 
suggested:  viii
 
•  Issue cheques in the amount of NISA top-up money that would have been paid had NISA 
been continued. 
•  Create new matching accounts to which SDRM funds would be paid, with withdrawal 
triggers based on specified perils. 
•  Roll the SDRM portion of NISA accounts forward, and carry the funding (or some 
proportion of it) forward through the transition period. 
 
Gaps and Overlaps 
Based on the foregoing, there are some gaps and overlaps evident under the proposed program.  
These are the following: 
 
•  As it has been put forward, the language used to describe the proposed program 
(particularly the use of the terms “New NISA” and “coverage”) is needlessly confusing.  
This creates a gap in understanding between government and producers. 
•  A major caveat that should be added to conclusions about the efficacy of the proposed 
program is that, as designed, it cannot deal well with substantial disasters such as the 
current BSE problem.  In this case, we have a major export product for which access to 
the export market was lost.  If this occurs for a protracted period of time, the program 
will run out of money and many producers will have negative margins.  As we indicated 
in the text, there are disasters and there are disasters.  Disasters of the magnitude that 
BSE can be if borders are not reopened will require more resources than are available in 
the BRM, if it is the public’s goal to support the industry. 
•  Horticultural and greenhouse producers are worse off under the proposed program if 
market conditions remain as during 1998-2001 because it does not adequately replace 
SDRM. 
•  The Olympic average applied in the reference margin calculation creates an opportunity 
for producers to periodically magnify losses without a reduction in future reference 
margin.  This represents an incentive gap in the proposed program.  Similarly, it creates a 
huge moral hazard for supply managed industries. 
•  The proposed program, as it would apply to farms with supply managed sales, is simply 
poorly designed.  It represents an incentive and coverage gap in the proposed program. 
•  As it is currently designed, with production insurance premiums as eligible expenses and 
indemnities as eligible revenue, the proposed program has some overlap with 
crop/production insurance.  But this is an overlap that is good and needs to be extended. 
•  Under the proposed program, Market Revenue Insurance would be terminated.  However, 
the proposed program does not respond to changes in the prices of grains and oilseeds in 
the same way that MRI did.  Thus, a gap exists. 
•  The design of the proposed program calls for producers to make cash deposits.  However, 
as suggested above, there are several alternatives to cash deposits that suggest they are 
likely redundant uses of capital. 
•  With producers liquidating their NISA accounts over the next five years, being eligible 
for payments under the BRM, and with transition funds available, there will be three 




Based on the above, the following recommendations emerge: 
 
•  Numerous tests and simulations suggest that the proposed program operates at least as 
well as a stabilization program as the current programs do (with the exception of the 
horticulture and greenhouse industries).  This is evident from the analysis of payments 
and margin stability, using a number of different data sets.  We believe it is conceptually 
a good program given the policy objectives.  It can be better if the gaps and overlaps 
identified above can be overcome.  Therefore, the following recommendations should be 
implemented along with the basic program 
•  A clear policy position needs to be developed regarding disasters such as BSE, in which 
trade is curtailed and major losses are incurred by an industry.  This may not be a unique 
occurrence; a long term disease and market disaster policy needs to be developed in 
addition to the stabilization policy.  
•  In the short term, the BSE situation underlines the need for a commitment regarding the 
current situation in the beef industry, as well as a commitment to develop means of 
insuring against negative margins, especially in the livestock industry. 
•  As described above, the language applied in the proposed program is needlessly 
confusing.  An alternative name for the program, which makes no reference to NISA, 
should be devised (this has apparently been done).  The “coverage” terminology should 
be replaced with “deposit”, “proportional deposit”, or some other alternative which 
reflects the actual operation of the program. 
•  The use of the Olympic average as part of the reference margin adjustment mechanism 
could lead to manipulation of the program by some.  A useful improvement to the 
program would be to replace the Olympic average with a simple five-year average in the 
reference adjustment formula. 
•  The proposed program is not well designed for supply management.  We recommend that 
either the industries’ proposal to make supply managed commodities ineligible for the 
program be accepted, or at least revert to the former approach making it available in the 
disaster portion and then pro-rating in the stabilization portion. 
•  Link the proposed program and crop/production insurance by maintaining the current 
linkage, and add a rebate of up to the amount of the premium when production insurance 
saves the BRM money.  There is also a case for making production insurance mandatory 
for processing vegetables. 
•  The proposed program does not serve to replace Market Revenue Insurance.  We 
recommend that a successor to MRI should be developed as an insurance product along 
the general lines of the Alberta product. 
•  Cash deposits for the producer portion is a very poor use of capital.  We recommend that 
alternatives to cash deposits be developed.  Our preference would be a fee based one, on 
risk and use.  The second alternative is a derivative that provides the deposit when there 
is a claim.  Letters of Credit and loans from financial institutions are less preferred 
alternatives, but are much better than tying up farmers’ money. 
•  The timing of activities under program administration will be critical in making the 
program transparent, and in providing producers with timely payment.  We recommend   x
that the schedule of activities suggested by OMAF staff be implemented in program 
administration. 
•  The transition period during which current programs will be phased out will be important.  
Transition funds can flow to farmers, along with other sources of funding.  Alternatively, 
a portion of the transition funds can be used to build devices that have a positive longer 
term impact.  In order to maximize the value of the transition funds, we recommend that 
consideration be given to the following: 
o  The fruit/vegetable and greenhouse sector appears to receive less in terms of 
program payments under the proposed program than under current programs.  
This may be because these sectors did not experience major perils in the period of 
time of the analysis, or because the proposed program does not fully replace 
SDRM.  In either case, we recommend that these sectors be prioritized under the 
transition, and that alternatives to SDRM be developed, especially insurance 
products that are tailored to the industry’s needs. 
o  Development of an insurance product to replace MRI. 
o  Determine whether it is feasible to delay part of the income for transition 
programs until after the programs cease to exist.  In other words, if a program will 
be phased out over three years, then income from that program may be delayed 
until the beginning of the fourth year in order to spread the income over more tax 
years.   
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Impact of the APF-Business Risk Management Programs on Ontario 
Agriculture 
 





The Business Risk Management (BRM) program that is proposed under the Federal-Provincial 
Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) presents a fundamental change from existing safety net 
programming. It shifts programming from a blend of programs, provincial and national, to one 
with only two national components after a three-year transition period. Effectively, this will 
eliminate region-specific programming.  The proposed program will also firmly establish 
producer participation (through cash deposits), and will be governed under a firmer funding 
envelope than previously. 
 
At a broad level, the proposed BRM program has been reviewed by a third party (Martin, 
Brown-Andison, Stoddart, Mussell) and found to be consistent with the objectives laid out for 
safety net programs by the federal and provincial ministers of agriculture.  Based on the 
information and terms of reference presented to them, the third party review concluded that the 
proposed BRM program is likely to obtain the objectives laid out by the agriculture ministers at 
least as well, if not better, than current safety net programming. 
 
However, while the third party analysis provides an assessment of the proposed programs at a 
broad level, it contains gaps that can be only be filled with additional applied research.  These 
include: 
•  Impact of the proposed BRM program on specific commodity segments in Ontario 
agriculture 
•  Impact of the proposed BRM program on trade disputes, and the potential for program design 
to mitigate trade disputes 
 
Thus, the purpose of this project is to build on the recently completed third party analysis to 
consider issues that are important to Ontario agriculture.  
 
1.1 Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to determine the impact of the proposed Business Risk 
Management Program on Ontario agriculture, given the objectives agreed to by the federal and 
provincial ministers, and the terms of reference specified by OMAF in conjunction with 
Ontario’s farm commodity organizations.  Thus, the general objective is to identify the potential 
effects on specific segments of Ontario agriculture, to test whether some program parameters can 
affect those impacts, and recommend changes to the proposal that would improve program  
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performance.  The specific objectives are to analyze the extent to which the proposed programs 
would:  
 
•  Stabilize individual farm incomes in Ontario for the various sectors; 
•  Change the distribution of government funds between sectors, regions, and farmers with 
varying level of income decline and impact on the competitive advantage of Ontario 
producers versus those in other regions of Canada; 
•  Reduce program overlap, maintain appropriate linkages between government programs and 
with private risk management mechanisms, and support good risk management practices; 
•  Appropriately treat farms with supply managed production; 
•  Offset the impact of programs in competing jurisdictions; 
•  Incorporate insurance-like principles; 
•  Distort production or marketing decisions;  
•  Reduce the potential for trade disputes; 
•  Be easy for farmers to understand and participate in, in a cost effective manner; 
•  Provide a smooth transition from present programming; and  
•  Contribute to better farm management decision making and planning. 
 
1.2 Approach 
To meet the above objectives, the following approach is employed.  
 
A brief description of the proposed program is developed.  The conceptual basis for the program, 
and an illustration of how the program would perform on a stylized farm is presented to provide 
context.  
 
To determine the empirical implications of the proposed program on income stabilization, 
Ontario data from the NISA and OFIDP programs are used in models constructed to simulate the 
proposed BRM program and current programs.  The results of these simulations are interpreted 
in the context of average farm incomes and appropriate measures of risk in farm incomes across 
commodities, and farm sizes.  In addition, multi-year data from individual farm records are 
analyzed to understand the implications of the proposed program at a detailed level. 
 
The results of the above analysis are aggregated to determine the anticipated cost of the proposed 
BRM program.  This is compared with the funding envelope that is available, and the cost of 
current programs.  The results are interpreted in the context of total funding received by 
individual commodity segments under the current and proposed BRM program.  In particular, 
very little is known about how well the proposed program will perform as a replacement for 
SDRM in the horticultural industry. One aspect of the analysis will be to specifically compare 
the two and compare the proposed program with and without hired labour as an eligible expense.   
 
A conceptual analysis of the impact of the proposed BRM program on farms with supply 
managed products will be conducted. This will be done to understand the impacts on supply 
managed and non-supply managed products produced on the same farm, and the relative ease of 
reporting supply managed earnings separately from non-supply managed earnings.  This will be  
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bolstered by empirical examples drawn from farm records on farms with supply managed and 
non-supply managed income. 
 
In addition, one issue is whether the BRM program meets the objectives of supply-managed 
industries from the perspective of potential international trade conflicts.  This will be addressed 
in the research, at least to the extent of understanding the amount of government money that 
would support supply management. 
 
The BRM is intended to be a risk management program.  It contains production insurance and 
has the intent of developing additional “production insurance” products.  In addition, there is 
interest in adding “insurance-like” principles to the transfer payment component.  One possibility 
is to replace the deposit with an insurance or option instrument.  The study considers potential 
extensions of insurance products, and an option concept to replace the deposit. 
 
Distortion of production, marketing, and farm structure decisions relates to the extent to which 
the proposed BRM program influences decisions made by farmers on intensity and scale in the 
production of a product, or on which products to produce.  A conceptual analysis will be 
completed of the incentives in the proposed BRM program to distort these decisions, building on 
the analysis in the recent third party review. 
 
To assess the extent to which the proposed BRM program could cause trade disputes, payouts by 
various components of the program and by commodity sector over the past five years are 
estimated. This is done to determine the distribution of payments under the green and amber 
aspects, and by industry to test the possibility of triggering a dispute.   
 
Less is known about the specifics of the design of safety net programs during the transition 
period between the current programs and the proposed BRM program.  To assess alternatives for 
the design of the transition programming, focus groups will be conducted with the working 
group on companion programs and OMAF administrators to understand the alternatives, 
constraints, and funding issues that will occur in the transitional period.  The findings of these 
focus groups will be documented and assessed.  Based on the results, alternatives for transitional 
programming will be developed.  If appropriate, the databases described above will be used to 
simulate the impact and cost of the transitional funding.  
 
Similarly, the proposed program promises to broaden and enhance the range and depth of 
production insurance.  Moreover, government has promised to “link” production insurance and 
payments under the Business Risk Management program.  We will conduct interviews with 






1.3 Organization of the Report 
Section 2.0 of the report provides an overview and description of the mechanics of operation of 
the proposed program.  Section 3.0 provides a summary and analysis of the distribution of 
support under the proposed program relative to current programs. Section 4.0 provides an 
analysis of the effectiveness of the proposed program in stabilizing farm income.  The impact of 
the proposed programs in conveying incentives for risky farm enterprises is presented in Section 
5.0.  Section 6.0 considers the differences between cash-basis and accrual accounting in 
interpreting the comparison between the proposed program and current programs.  Section 7.0 
provides a description and analysis of the proposed program as it will operate for farms with 
production of supply managed products.  The potential for the proposed program to trigger trade 
disputes is assessed in Section 8.0.  Section 9.0 discusses the impact of other jurisdictions’ farm 
policies on the effectiveness of the proposed program. Section 10.0 considers the linkage 
between the proposed program and crop/production insurance programs.  Section 11.0 considers 
the impact of the proposed program on farmer decision-making and the costs of application and 
compliance.  Section 12.0 provides an analysis of alternatives for transition programming 
between current and proposed programs.  Finally, Section 13.0 provides observations, 
suggestions for improvement, and conclusions of the study.      
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2.0 The Proposed Business Risk Management Program
1 
 
The proposed BRM program has two components.  One is production insurance.  It consists of 
currently existing production insurance products, as well as still-to-be-defined additional 
production insurance products. The second is a transfer payment component – i.e. a program that 
transfers money from government (shared by producers) when producers experience a loss of  
“income” as defined by an accounting margin.  
Potential new insurance products will be discussed in later sections of this report.  In the 
evaluation of the program in this and the next three sections, we assume that the existing 
production insurance programs remain in place, and that their payouts are not affected by the 
transfer component. 
The proposed BRM transfer component differs from the current suite of programs in several 
ways: 
•  The suite of disaster, income stabilization and companion programs is replaced by a single 
mechanism with both “disaster” and “stabilization” components. 
•  The measure of income that is used to trigger government payments differs from the suite 
that is currently being used.  
•  The cost sharing relationship between governments’ and farmers’ contributions differs 
between the proposed program and current programs. 
•  The producer financing of program payments differs between the proposed program and 
current programs. 
The remainder of section 2.0 explains the transfer component of the proposed BRM. 
2.1 The Measure of Producer Income  
Under the proposed program, the measure of income that is used to trigger payments is the 
production margin, calculated using modified accrual accounting procedures.  Payments can 
occur in a year when an individual farmer’s production margin falls below a reference margin 
(explained in section 2.2).  With the BRM, there will be only one triggering mechanism.  It will 
replace the current suite of programs that have a variety of triggering mechanisms: 
•  The disaster (OFIDP in Ontario) program triggers payments with a gross margin, also based 
on modified accrual accounting, but somewhat different than the modification in BRM. 
•  NISA triggers government contributions into a fund, to a limit based on net sales, that match 
producer contributions.  A producer can access the government contribution when they 
experience a loss measured by a gross margin calculated using cash accounting, or when the 
                                                 
1 Portions of this section are adapted from the Third party Review by Martin, Brown-Andison, Stoddart, Mussell   
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producer retires. Therefore, the “entitlement” Appendix 1 provides a detailed list of expense 
items that are deductible under the proposed program, and of the relationship between NISA 
gross margin and production margin. 
•  Self-Directed Risk Management (SDRM) is a companion program available to the 
horticultural industry in Ontario.  It is a top up to NISA that allows horticultural producers to 
have a higher limit than other producers.  This was done as a substitute for what is perceived 
as inadequate production insurance for that industry.  The top up was based on the 
government portion of production insurance premiums.   
•  Market Revenue Insurance (MRI) is a companion program focused specifically on the grain 
and oilseed industry in Ontario to protect them from price declines.  The triggering 
mechanism is a decline below a 15-year moving average of the price of the grain.  
2.2 Trigger Mechanism of Proposed Program 
Program payments with the BRM will be triggered if the production margin in the current year 
falls below the reference 5-year Olympic average
2 production margin.  This situation represents a 
“loss” under the BRM.   
The specific size of the claim and the cost share associated with it is determined by the 
magnitude of the production margin loss and the amount that the producer has on deposit. 
Payments covering the first 15% of income loss would be funded equally from producer deposits 
and government contribution; the next 15% of loss (between 85% and 70% of reference) would 
be funded 30% from producer deposits and 70% by government.  Income losses of greater than 
30% (less than 70% of reference) would be covered 20% by producer deposits and 80% by 
government. 
2.3 Operation of the Proposed Program 
The proposed BRM would operate as follows: 
•  Farmers would choose to place funds on deposit in the program.  The deposit would be 
proportional to a particular percentage of the historic production margin, ranging from 14% 
to 26%.   
•  The farmer could take up to three years to cash flow the desired deposit. 
•  Under the proposed program there are “layers” of income loss: two stabilization layers and 
one disaster layer.  The relevant components, from an eligibility perspective, are 70%, 85%, 
and 100% of the five-year average Olympic average Production Margin.  In essence, the 
                                                 
2 The Olympic average is computed by dropping the high and the low production margin in the past five years, and 
then averaging the remaining 3 years  
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smaller the decline in production margin, the smaller the governments’
3 share of payments.  
As the loss in production margin increases, the governments’ share of the coverage increases. 
To understand the program better, consider a farm with an Olympic average Production Margin 
(i.e. a reference margin) of $100,000.  The farm will have the choice to contribute anywhere 
from 14% to 26% of its reference margin.  The percentages result from the three tiers of cost 
sharing, which are referred to in program descriptions as “coverage” levels, although this is a 
misnomer.  We prefer to think of them as simply bench marks used to calculate producers’ 
deposits.  With this example: 
 
•  If the farmer chooses 14%, then obviously the deposit is $14,000.  This comes from the fact 
that the cost-shares are 20/80 below 70% of the reference margin.  The farmer’s 20% is 
$14,000.  Looked at differently, if a farm whose reference margin is $100,000 had $0 in a 
given year, then the farm’s deposit of $14,000 would be matched 4:1 by the government in 
the disaster tier, and the farm would be restored to $70,000 of margin.   
•  If the farmer chooses 18.5% deposit, then the farmer’s deposit is $18,500.  If this farm had a 
complete loss to $0 margin in a year, then the farm would be restored to 85% of the reference 
margin  - $70,000 as above, and $15,000 from the lower stabilization tier.  Of this $15,000, 
$4,500 is from the producer deposit, $10,500 is from the government, and the ratio is 30/70.  
If the farmer chooses 100% coverage, (i.e. $100,000) then the farmer’s deposit is $26,000 
(i.e. $18,500 from above and 50% of the next $15,000). 
•  If the farmer chooses the 26% deposit, (i.e. a $26,000 deposit), and if the farm has a complete 
loss of the reference margin, then the farm should be restored to 100% of the reference 
margin, 85% as above and the remainder shared half and half between the farmer and the 
government.  However, one of the interesting aspects of the BRM is that the total 
government payment is limited to 70% of a farmer’s loss.  This is to comply with WTO 
requirements.   
Whichever level of coverage the farmer chooses, the farmer’s initial obligation is to deposit one 
third (1/3) of the amount.  The other two thirds (2/3) must be deposited by the end of the third 
year.  Of course, the reference margin will change each year, so the deposit may also change.   
It is important to understand that, except for changes in the reference margin, deposits do not 
change until there is a claim: in other words, the deposit is not a premium.  If there is no claim 
for ten years, and the reference margin stays at $100,000 for the entire time, the farmer’s total 
deposit is a one-time total of $14,000 (assuming the 14% deposit). 
 
An important aspect of the proposed program design is that payouts will be done on a “bottom 
up” basis.  Payments start at the level of loss and work up until either the producer’s deposit is 
used up or the producer’s margin is brought back up to the reference margin.  This means that 
the greatest proportion of government risk sharing is accessed first.  Returning to the example 
farm above, assume in a given year, the farm’s production margin is 60% of the reference (i.e. 
                                                 
3 In all cases, the federal government will pay 60% and provincial governments will pay 40% of government costs.  
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the farm has a 40% loss), which in this example is a $40,000 loss.  How much will a farmer 
receive with 14, 18.5 and 26% deposits? 
 
•  The farmer with a 14% deposit will receive $26,000 (or 65% of the total loss) in government 
payment and receive the return of the entire $14,000 of his or her own deposit.  This is 
calculated as follows: 
•  For the $10,000 loss between 60% and 70%, the producer’s share is $2,000 (20%), and 
the government’s is $8,000. 
•  For the $15,000 loss between 70% and 85%, the producer’s share is $4,500 (30%) and 
the government’s share is $10,500. 
•  At this point, the producer has received $6,500 of the original deposit, thereby leaving 
$7,500.  Therefore, government pays another $7,500 to match this part between 85% and 
100%.   
•  The total government contribution from the three portions is $26,000, while the farmer’s 
share is $14,000, and all of the loss is covered. 
•  Farmers with 18.5% and 26% deposits would not need to use their additional deposits.  
Therefore, they could be used to secure subsequent levels of protection.  In this example, a 
farmer with an 18.5% deposit has $4,500 left on deposit, while the farmer with a 26% deposit 
has $12,000 left.  This money can then be used as part or all of the deposit for subsequent 
years’ coverage under the program. 
Thus, the proposed program is significantly different than the NISA, OFIDP, and companion 
programs currently in use.    
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3.0 Relative Effectiveness of the Proposed Program 
 
This section describes the databases, analyses, and results of analyses comparing the proposed 
program with current programs.  Section 3.1 provides a description of the OFIDP database and 
how it is used to analyze the proposed program.  Section 3.2 presents and interprets the results of 
OFIDP simulations.  Section 3.3 provides a description of the NISA database and how it is used 
to analyze the proposed program.  Section 3.4 presents the results of the NISA simulations and 
interprets their results.  The description, analyses, and results using individual farm data are 
contained in Section 3.5.  
 
3.1 Analyses of Proposed Program Using OFIDP Database 
OFIDP provides payments to producers when their accrual gross margin falls below 70% of the 
five-year moving average gross margin.  Applicants apply when they believe they have suffered 
a loss of that magnitude.  The sample of farms that apply to OFIDP changes from year to year 
because only farms with greater than a 30% gross margin loss are eligible.  The implication is 
that it is inappropriate to consider data from OFIDP in a time series; i.e. different farms are in the 
base from which data are drawn in each year.  It should be noted that the data accessed are 
derived from OFIDP applicants, not strictly those that were approved for payment.  The database 
of applicants therefore contains farms that experienced more than a 30% gross margin loss, and 
others that applied but were found not to have experienced a 30% gross margin loss.  Hence it 
represents a very large sample.  It is therefore quite useful so long as it is treated as a cross 
section (not a time series).  
 
Applicants to OFIDP submit accrual farm records. For the purposes of analysis, these records 
were associated with applicants’ NISA government contributions, MRI payments, SDRM 
benefits, and crop insurance through the OMAF database.  The aggregate data were broken down 
into farm types according to the dominant percentage of sales.  The analysis was undertaken 
under the following assumptions: 
 
•  NISA government matching contributions were measured as government assistance under 
NISA; this includes SDRM benefits and any other NISA top-ups. 
•  Crop insurance benefits were assumed the same under current and proposed programs 
•  Beef operations were divided into cow-calf and feedlot, by sorting “cattle” farms into those 
with sales greater than $1 million into a feedlot category, and those with sales less than $1 
million into the cow-calf category. This division will undoubtedly mean that a few feedlots 
will be included in the cow-calf category.  But at recent prices, this division would place any 
farm with over approximately 900 head per year in the feedlot category.   
•  "Mixed" farms had no enterprise that represented more than 50% of sales. 
•  The proportion of support paid out as “green” payments was taken as the magnitude of 
government payments triggered by losses of 30% relative to reference or more. 
•  In 1998 and 1999, additional payments outside the set program parameters were made under 
the auspices of OFIDP.  This included a rebate of 3% of eligible net sales and coverage for 
negative margins for the federal government portion of funding.  For the purposes of 
comparison between current and proposed programs, these were removed.  
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•  Under OFIDP, adjustments were made for farm expansions of 15% or more.  These 
adjustments were not removed from current programs, and the simulation of the proposed 
program did not contain provisions for expansions.  Thus, as it pertains to farm expansions, 
the comparison is somewhat biased in favour of current programs.    
 
3.2 Comparison of Current and Proposed Programs 
Based on the above assumptions and data, analyses were conducted of the current programs in 
each of 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, with the proposed program simulated over the same period.  
Table 3.1 presents a description of the farms in the database in each year.  It shows that cash crop 
farms were heavy applicants in each year; other farm types are cyclical applicants, such as hogs, 
which were significant applicants in 1998 and 1999, but applied much less frequently in 2000 
and 2001.   
 
The results of the analysis across all farm types are reported in Table 3.2 below.  The relevant 
basis for comparison between current programs and the proposed program is within a given year 
(as explained above); thus the comparisons are made across columns rather than rows in the 
table.  Table 3.2 presents the levels of payments made under each of the programs currently in 
operation; the sum of these payments is given in the first bolded column.  The government share 
of payments given under the proposed APF-BRM program is given, with the sum of these 
payments and crop insurance given in the second bolded column.  Thus, the bolded columns are 
the basis on which to interpret total government payments paid under current and proposed 
programs.   
 
Table 3.2 shows that, in aggregate, in 1998, more support was paid out to OFIDP applicants 
under the current programs than would have been paid out under the proposed programs.  In 
1999, 2000, and 2001, the opposite result was observed.   
 
Tables 3.3-3.14 below provide comparisons of average payments per farm under the proposed 
program relative to current programs for specific commodities.  The tables interpret the 
aggregate results in Table 3.2 on the basis of average payments per farm for farms that received 
payments.  The specific impacts on farms in each commodity type are diverse; however, the 
following observations can be made: 
 
•  The average payment per farm is at least as high under the proposed program as it is under 
the current programs (i.e. in the majority of the years analyzed, the proposed program would 
have paid out more to producers) for the following commodities: 
 
  Apples 
  Cow-calf 
  Dairy 
  Feedlot 
  Mixed farms 
  Hogs 
  Tobacco 
  Other horticulture  
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  Other livestock. 
•  The total amount of support paid out appears similar (or cannot clearly be ranked as either 
higher or lower) under the proposed program as it is under the current programs for the 
following: 
  Cash crop 
  Greenhouse crops 
  Poultry 
 
Table 3.1 Composition of Farms in OFIDP Applicant Database, 1998-2001 
 
  1998 1999  2000  2001 
Apples  85 144 215 200
Cow Calf  958 813 750 736
Feedlot  46 54 38 35
Dairy  228 108 206 253
Cash Crop  2,222 2,383 3,279 3,045
Greenhouse  28 88 150 180
Mixed  1,863 736 853 879
Other Horticultural   212 412 448
Other Livestock   42 47 40
Poultry  45 32 45 30
Hog  1,180 1,065 430 326
Tobacco  129 192 618 545







Table 3.2 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- All Farm Types, 1998-2001 
 
Crop 

















1998  $7,916,305 $93,190,085 $1,966,487 $21,920,023 $124,992,901 $106,734,851 $114,651,155 $98,318,021
1999  $7,394,053 $78,137,816 $13,177,478 $11,064,806 $109,774,154 $125,861,774 $133,255,827 $116,620,628
2000  $18,335,828 $75,905,252 $31,773,282 $23,333,283 $149,347,644 $145,518,169 $163,853,997 $133,971,724
2001  $50,434,776 $53,140,143 $29,569,408 $26,250,509 $159,394,835 $125,081,206 $175,515,982 $114,647,853 
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Table 3.3 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Apple Farms, 1998-2001 
 














1998  $109,588 $123,699  $4,242 $40,304 $81 $9,543 $54,171 $40,073 $44,315
1999  -1,335 $60,219 $4,673 $15,863 $576 $3,915 $25,028 $43,800 $48,473
2000  54,092 $152,231  $7,287 $10,506 $658 $6,379 $24,830 $25,617 $32,904
2001  84,162 $115,457 $12,497 $11,684 $3,310 $7,406 $34,896 $24,541 $37,038
 
 
Table 3.4 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Cow-Calf Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM Total  APF 
1998  -$61 $10,873  $386 $10,628 $91 $1,416 $12,521  $11,838 $12,224
1999  $4,348 $18,739  $415 $8,344 $861 $1,228 $10,847  $11,278 $11,693
2000  $21,205 $21,287  $594 $7,442 $2,239 $1,340 $11,615  $12,653 $13,247
2001  $32,004 $37,822  $1,970 $5,798 $1,706 $1,827 $11,301  $11,007 $12,977 
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Table 3.5 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Feedlot Farms, 1998-2001 
 














1998  $89,006 $151,026  $514 $76,565 $1,190 $9,430 $87,699  $225,361 $225,875
1999  $129,064 $139,303  $250 $54,730 $5,127 $2,782 $62,890  $82,646 $82,896
2000  $150,186 $284,567  $957 $41,751 $13,993 $5,640 $62,341  $72,576 $73,532
2001  $169,574 $193,488 $29,716 $19,745 $14,050 $5,682 $69,192  $31,068 $60,783
 
 
Table 3.6 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Dairy Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM  Total  APF 
1998  $37,252 $60,918  $777 $6,360 $44 $649 $7,830  $18,313 $19,090
1999  $45,127 $105,054  $295 $12,136 $1,298 $958 $14,687  $18,234 $18,529
2000  $73,368 $94,246  $819 $8,284 $3,289 $999 $13,391  $25,620 $26,439
2001  $64,364 $79,211 $3,754 $7,769 $2,826 $1,004 $15,353  $21,868 $25,623
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Table 3.7 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Cash-crop Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM Total  APF 
1998  $42,999 $67,067  $2,720 $8,173 $6,836 $2,366 $20,095  $16,575 $19,295
1999  $27,172 $42,225  $1,233 $8,451 $3,053 $1,693 $14,431  $15,018 $16,251
2000  $42,999 $67,067  $2,720 $8,173 $6,836 $2,366 $20,095  $16,575 $19,295
2001  $38,970 $53,517  $7,390 $5,435 $6,102 $2,734 $21,661  $14,532 $21,922
 
 
Table 3.8 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Greenhouse Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM  Total  APF 
1998  $161,443 $213,684  $1,899 $30,170 $103 $8,662 $40,834  $22,337 $24,236
1999  $95,942 $177,023  $3,883 $17,852 $9,546 $4,283 $35,564  $31,576 $35,458
2000  $111,345 $160,617  $3,948 $20,266 $1,955 $8,163 $34,332  $55,698 $59,646
2001  $117,316 $167,715  $8,930 $17,143 $4,246 $11,774 $42,093  $41,469 $50,399
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Table 3.9 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Mixed Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM Total  APF 
1998  $16,789 $31,781  $693 $11,905 $180 $2,860 $15,638  $5,963 $6,656
1999  $19,014 $58,230  $1,388 $11,215 $1,863 $1,586 $16,052  $16,876 $18,264
2000  $37,063 $50,224  $2,601 $9,402 $3,594 $2,918 $18,515  $17,454 $20,054
2001  $38,671 $62,115  $7,576 $7,983 $3,811 $3,669 $23,039  $15,752 $23,328
 
 
Table 3.10 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Hog Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM Total  APF 
1998  $41,134 $69,878  $684 $27,111 $195 $3,428 $31,418  $18,669 $19,353
1999  $31,293 $79,445  $784 $25,964 $2,160 $2,084 $30,991  $36,509 $37,293
2000  $51,826 $83,384 $1,723 $10,219 $4,420 $2,617 $18,979  $22,225 $23,948
2001  $58,366 $139,316  $5,387 $6,486 $4,273 $3,611 $19,756  $18,436 $23,823
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Table 3.11 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Poultry Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM  Total  APF 
1998  $8,999 $24,671  $284 $6,071 $23 $504 $6,883  $13,421 $13,705
1999  $26,359 $41,908  $256 $4,896 $211 $802 $6,165  $5,229 $5,485
2000  $66,451 $122,242  $242 $12,264 $4,710 $3,964 $21,180  $16,324 $16,567
2001  $47,290 $71,476  $918 $7,788 $2,973 $711 $12,389  $22,411 $23,328
 
Table 3.12 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Other Livestock Farms, 1999-2001 
 











Current BRM  Total  APF 
1999  $12,531 $37,137  $9,299 $20,122 $243 $993 $30,656  $26,833 $36,132
2000  $11,942 $27,217  $47 $5,344 $1,159 $1,631 $8,179  $5,794 $5,840
2001  $13,741 $45,102  $636 $5,003 $232 $1,305 $7,176  $9,569 $10,205
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Table 3.13 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Tobacco Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM Total  APF 
1998  $93,357 $119,839  $1,838 $9,792 $23 $4,631 $16,284  $7,864 $9,702
1999  $44,092 $132,852  $1,708 $15,193 $489 $3,154 $20,544  $31,210 $32,918
2000  $77,058 $97,947 $4,214 $22,850 $554 $5,676 $33,294  $37,768 $41,982
2001  $90,716 $104,918 $17,841 $13,795 $626 $6,230 $38,493  $25,557 $43,398
 
 
Table 3.14 Payments Made Under Current and Proposed Programs, OFIDP Database- Other Horticultural Farms, 1998-2001 
 











Current BRM Total  APF 
1999  $75,219 $117,111  $2,242 $15,422 $376 $3,666 $21,705  $32,066 $34,308
2000  $102,911 $187,236  $2,499 $18,434 $1,118 $10,136 $32,188  $26,671 $29,170
2001  $105,385 $177,001  $4,897 $15,986 $4,278 $10,396 $35,557  $42,185 $47,082 
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3.3 Analyses of Proposed Program Using the NISA Database 
Farmers participating in NISA make deposits (up to 3% of eligible net sales) that are matchable 
by government, and can be withdrawn as program payments when the current year’s gross 
margin falls below the five-year average gross margin.  Individual NISA accounts are maintained 
on an ongoing basis, with deposits, government matching, and withdrawals occurring over a 
period of years.  Thus, the government matching contribution (which is the government 
stabilization assistance paid out under the program) can be tracked for a sample of individual 
farms over time. 
 
Applicants to NISA typically submit cash-basis information from which gross margins and 
production margins can be calculated.  For the purposes of analysis, a group of NISA 
participants that continuously participated in NISA, between 1994 – 2001, and can be accurately 
linked to the crop insurance and market revenue insurance databases were isolated.  In many 
cases, individual farms were split into multiple NISA accounts; in the analysis, multiple accounts 
for the same farm were combined so that each record represents a farm.  This gave 11,034 farm 
records.  Based on this sample, total payments for 1998 to 2001 under the current programs were 
calculated, with total payments for the period simulated under the proposed program.  Table 3.15 
presents the distribution of this sample according to farm type. 
 
3.4 Comparison of Current and Proposed Programs 
Table 3.16 below presents the results of the analysis described above.  The rows in the table refer 
to commodity groups, with the columns giving the payments under current and proposed 
programs.  The bottom row in the table gives the total payments under current and proposed 
programs.  It shows that the proposed program would provide more funding overall than the 
current programs.  The table shows that, over the four-year period, total funding would have 
increased to $669 million from $643 million.  Within this increase, total funding for safety net 
program payments would increase within the cash crop, poultry, cow-calf, feedlot, and tobacco 
segments.  Less funding would be available for fruits and vegetables, greenhouse crops, dairy, 
and swine.  The results are restated on a four-year cumulative average per farm basis in Table 
3.17. 
  
Table 3.16 presents some results that are surprising.  It is surprising that, with higher payment 
caps under the proposed program, swine and horticultural operations receive less support under 
the proposed program.  This is particularly notable for hogs when feedlots, which face similar 
issues to hog and large horticultural operations with regard to contribution and payment caps 
under current programs, receive significantly higher payments under the proposed program.   
 
A large part of the reason for this is the expansions that occurred over the period of the analysis, 
which are accounted for under current programs but not under the proposed program.  
Particularly for hogs and greenhouse vegetables, expansions were significant.  Under current 
programs, structural change adjustments are made for expansions of greater than 15%.  This 
materially increases the reference margins for farms that expand. The database does not provide 
enough information to simulate structural adjustment under the proposed program. Therefore, the  
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results are biased in favour of the current programs.  Interestingly, under the proposed program, 
structural change adjustments would apply for expansions over 5%.   
 
A second reason for the result in swine is that in the OFIDP program, there was a change made 
during 1998 and 1999 to allow modified accrual adjustments to take place. The change during 
those two years was for those producers whose cash accounting data understated their loss in 
financial position either because of expansion or significant accrual changes from the beginning 
to the end of the reference period. A large portion of this adjustment was used by hog producers, 
and it increased payments under the current programs by about $40 mil.  
 
These two factors can easily explain the apparent decline in support for hogs for the proposed 
program.  Given these matters as well as the results of the other two aspects of the analysis, we 
do not believe that the hog industry would have been worse off under the proposed program.   
 
Table 3.15 Composition of Farms in the NISA Database  
 
Farm Type  Number of Farms 
Field Crops  6,158
Vegetables and Fruit  993










A caveat to observe in interpreting the above observations relates to the effect of cash rather than 
accrual margins.   In order to complete the analysis it is necessary to consider cash-basis data in 
triggering the proposed program, along with OFIDP under the current program.  Since margins 
on a cash-basis are likely to be less volatile than they are on an accrual basis, the use of cash 
basis information probably understates the true advantage of the proposed program over the 




Table 3.16 Total Payments by Segment, 1998-2001, Current and Proposed Programs 
 
  Current Programs    Proposed Program 
 
Crop 





Field Crops  $93,225,668 $49,732,391 $89,942,910 $89,704,066 $322,605,036  50.2% $249,747,398 $342,973,066 51.2% 
Vegetables and Fruit  $13,138,856 $10,956,210 $1,897,539 $65,517,663 $91,510,268  14.2% $70,716,123 $83,854,979 12.5% 
Greenhouse (F&V)  $1,171,658 $1,315,056 $301,323 $8,859,236 $11,647,273  1.8% $9,497,083 $10,668,740 1.6% 
Poultry  $732,672 $541,620 $1,021,671 $928,525 $3,224,488  0.5% $4,418,989 $5,151,661 0.8% 
Dairy  $3,536,712 $941,981 $4,136,828 $4,612,271 $13,227,791  2.1% $6,095,634 $9,632,345 1.4% 
Swine  $11,437,022 $29,039,255 $11,069,979 $30,954,171 $82,500,427  12.8% $57,383,239 $68,820,261 10.3% 
Cow-Calf  $8,390,176 $12,970,158 $9,352,226 $15,764,137 $46,476,698  7.2% $45,952,207 $54,342,383 8.1% 
Feedlot  3,996,673 6,589,010 3,301,125 7,598,712 $21,485,520  3.3% 31,819,045 $35,815,718 5.3% 
Tobacco  $9,568,405 $11,713,938 $734,103 $27,903,888 $49,920,335  7.8% $49,263,702 $58,832,107 8.8% 
Total 145,197,842  123,799,619 121,757,705 251,842,670 642,597,835 100.0% 524,893,420 670,091,261 100.0% 
 
Table 3.17 Average Payment per Farm by Segment, 1998-2001, Current and Proposed Programs 
 
Current Programs  Proposed Program 
Crop 
Insurance OFIDP  MRI  NISA  Total 
BRM 
Payments 
Total (including Crop 
Insurance) 
Field Crops  $15,139 $8,076 $14,606 $14,567 $52,388  $40,557 $55,696
Vegetables and Fruit  $13,231 $11,033 $1,911 $65,980 $92,155  $71,215 $84,446
Greenhouse (F&V)  $9,526 $10,692 $2,450 $72,026 $94,693  $77,212 $86,738
Poultry  $7,254 $5,363 $10,116 $9,193 $31,926  $43,752 $51,007
Dairy  $8,130 $2,165 $9,510 $10,603 $30,409  $14,013 $22,143
Swine  $12,708 $32,266 $12,300 $34,394 $91,667  $63,759 $76,467
Cow-Calf  $5,778 $8,933 $6,441 $10,857 $32,009  $31,648 $37,426
Feedlot  $24,519 $40,423 $20,252 $46,618 $131,813  $195,209 $219,728
Tobacco  $13,496 $16,522 $1,035 $39,357 $70,409  $69,483 $82,979
Total 13,159  11,220 11,035 22,824 58,238  47,571 60,730 
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3.5 Current and Proposed Programs Across Farm Size Ranges 
The NISA database analyzed in section 3.4 above was fragmented according to participant sales 
level to determine the impact of the proposed program across farm sizes.  Applicants were 
classified into the following sales ranges: 0-25,000, 25,000-50,000, 50,000-100,000, 100,000-
250,000, 250,000-500,000, 500,000-1,000,000, and over 1,000,000.  This provided a comparison 
of current and proposed programs across both farm type and size. 
 
The results are presented in Tables 3.18 to 3.25.  The tables reflect the general trend illustrated in 
Table 3.16, with discrepancies within certain sales ranges.  As a general observation, the greatest 
advantage of the proposed program over the current programs occurs at the lower and higher 
income ranges.  The current programs either provide more support, or are at the least 
disadvantage in the mid-size farm ranges.   
 
General interpretations of the relative benefit of the proposed program across sales ranges are 
difficult because, the payments are determined by a mix of the following considerations: 
 
•  Under current programs, the benefit from NISA is determined by eligible net sales up to the 
$250,000 cap; no reference is made to actual losses.  Thus, the benefit of the proposed 
program should increase with farm size up to the cap.   
•  Under the proposed program, farms must trigger a loss to receive a government payment.  
Thus, if a given farm size experiences a greater frequency or severity of losses, it will tend to 
receive relatively more payment than other farm sizes under the proposed program.  OFIDP 
is similar to this under current programs, however it does not provide payment for the first 
30% of gross margin losses. 
 
Thus, there is a trade-off between eligibility for NISA matching under the current program and 
the frequency and size of production margin losses 
 
Based on the above, the following interpretation of the results across farm sizes is evident: 
 
•  Smaller farms have less eligibility to contribute to NISA.  If they commonly experience 
production margin losses, they are likely to receive more benefit under the proposed 
program. 
•  Larger farms have more eligibility to contribute to NISA.  If they do not commonly 
experience production margin losses, they are likely to receive more benefit under the current 
program. 
•  The largest farms are limited in their ability to contribute to NISA by the $250,000 ENS cap. 
If they commonly experience production margin losses, they are likely to receive more 
benefit under the proposed program. 
 
The data indicate that the relative outcomes for the various sizes and types of farms are 
dependent on the situations for farms.  In some industries, smaller farms receive more from the 
proposed program, while in others, larger farms receive more.  No discernible relationship  
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between size and the relative benefits is clear – it would appear that the proposed program pays 
out when there is a need, which is its intent. 
 
Table 3.18 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs, Field Crop Farms, 1998 - 2001 
 
   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
Income 
Range Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match Total    BRM  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  1,761 $5,639,647 $7,707,588 $7,192,403 $5,734,468 $26,274,107  $29,414,814 $35,054,461
$25,000 - 
$50,000  1,358 $9,999,926 $8,379,879 $12,027,179 $9,469,236 $39,876,220  $36,432,102 $46,432,028
$50,000 - 
$100,000  1,334 $18,126,032 $11,444,112 $19,798,999 $16,590,495 $65,959,638  $45,902,080 $64,028,112
$100,000 - 
$250,000  1,186 $31,031,369 $12,874,418 $28,001,934 $29,105,305 $101,013,026  $71,178,306 $102,209,675
$250,000 - 
$500,000  348 $14,604,419  $5,517,272 $12,813,558 $15,979,193 $48,914,442  $35,965,405 $50,569,824
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  128 $11,101,799  $3,100,833 $8,505,090 $8,626,912 $31,334,633  $19,295,764 $30,397,563
>$1,000,000  43 $2,722,476  $708,289 $1,603,747 $4,198,458 $9,232,970  $11,558,928 $14,281,404
 
 
Table 3.19 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs, Fruit and Vegetable Farms 
 
   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
 Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match  Total   BRM  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  138 $474,364 $378,021 $64,894 $982,803 $1,900,083  $4,579,225 $5,053,589
$25,000 - 
$50,000  101 $420,359 $433,270 $83,037 $1,155,874 $2,092,541  $3,279,131 $3,699,490
$50,000 - 
$100,000  137 $1,665,576 $1,046,035 $206,856 $2,739,749 $5,658,216  $3,652,305 $5,317,882
$100,000 - 
$250,000  232 $3,756,754 $2,137,960 $495,354 $10,532,836 $16,922,905  $10,746,013 $14,502,768
$250,000 - 
$500,000  146 $3,701,982 $1,443,830 $465,977 $12,090,736 $17,702,525  $8,265,504 $11,967,485
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  130 $2,059,731 $3,530,167 $288,522 $17,292,997 $23,171,416  $13,298,777 $15,358,507
>$1,000,000  109 $1,060,090 $1,986,927 $292,899 $20,722,667 $24,062,582  $26,895,168 $27,955,258
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Table 3.20 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs, Greenhouse Fruit and 
Vegetable Farms 
 
   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
 Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match Total   BRM  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  16 $22,246 $24,866 $3,946 $133,196 $184,254  $687,278 $709,524
$25,000 - 
$50,000  10 $106,669  $21,477 $72,312 $127,584 $328,041  $391,231 $497,899
$50,000 - 
$100,000  23 $157,325 $125,885 $27,551 $473,564 $784,326  $638,087 $795,411
$100,000 - 
$250,000  19 $97,637 $93,585 $11,245 $1,035,825 $1,238,291  $1,114,378 $1,212,015
$250,000 - 
$500,000  21 $663,370 $435,913 $136,948 $1,901,305 $3,137,536  $2,312,607 $2,975,977
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  17 $124,412 $134,467 $14,855 $2,419,622 $2,693,356  $2,013,486 $2,137,898
>$1,000,000  17 $0  $478,863 $34,465 $2,768,140 $3,281,468  $2,340,015 $2,340,015
 
 
Table 3.21 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs, Poultry Farms 
 
   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
 Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match  Total   BRM  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  9 $2,568  $79,226 $9,812 $25,529 $117,135  $616,807 $619,375
$25,000 - 
$50,000  5 $5,041  $74,025 $40,132 $22,639 $141,838  $290,589 $295,630
$50,000 - 
$100,000  5 $10,343 $30,422 $110,693 $43,289 $194,747  $847,214 $857,557
$100,000 - 
$250,000  23 $165,672  $33,151 $239,751 $152,841 $591,415  $546,843 $712,515
$250,000 - 
$500,000  28 $172,302 $133,376 $247,802 $298,865 $852,346  $1,019,979 $1,192,281
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  27 $358,889 $191,420 $359,425 $320,640 $1,230,374  $1,074,722 $1,433,610










Table 3.23 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs, Hog Farms 
 
   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
 Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match Total    BRM  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  20 $96,341 $89,444 $112,718 $114,564 $413,068  $1,090,069 $1,186,411
$25,000 - 
$50,000  33 $111,377 $265,995 $159,717 $176,235 $713,325  $973,538 $1,084,916
$50,000 - 
$100,000  71 $286,270 $966,495 $446,816 $630,495 $2,330,076  $2,176,417 $2,462,687
$100,000 - 
$250,000  243 $2,020,418 $5,866,586 $2,461,667 $4,259,467 $14,608,138  $10,016,009 $12,036,427
$250,000 - 
$500,000  252 $3,660,443 $6,622,823 $3,337,669 $8,186,714 $21,807,649  $12,967,464 $16,627,907
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  158 $3,004,854 $6,236,777 $2,407,743 $8,225,866 $19,875,239  $11,812,035 $14,816,888






   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
 Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match Total   BRM  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  4 $0  $4,037 $18,122 $13,448 $35,607  $283,673 $283,673
$25,000 - 
$50,000  6 $44,357  $0 $24,870 $20,887 $90,114  $244,614 $288,970
$50,000 - 
$100,000  25 $56,330 $34,213 $146,727 $85,446 $322,716  $274,248 $330,578
$100,000 - 
$250,000  147 $865,001 $524,581 $1,275,156 $838,388 $3,503,126  $2,737,832 $3,602,833
$250,000 - 
$500,000  167 $1,588,553  $230,690 $1,808,808 $1,667,000 $5,295,051  $1,428,877 $3,017,429
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  70 $982,471 $123,069 $709,442 $1,419,455 $3,234,436  $432,782 $1,415,252
>$1,000,000  16 $0  $25,391 $153,704 $567,646 $746,740  $693,609 $693,609 
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Table 3.24 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs, Beef Farms 
 
   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
 Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match Total    BRM  Total 
$0 - $25,000  206 $450,728 $537,688 $539,679 $574,871 $2,102,966  $4,026,332 $4,026,332
$25,000 - 
$50,000  256 $483,826 $768,896 $597,198 $1,240,816 $3,090,736  $3,827,608 $3,827,608
$50,000 - 
$100,000  308 $992,673  $1,367,295 $1,330,273 $2,423,295 $6,113,537  $6,019,378 $6,019,378
$100,000 - 
$250,000  394 $2,440,795 $3,982,683 $3,170,635 $5,087,980 $14,682,093  $14,655,054 $14,655,054
$250,000 - 
$500,000  197 $2,788,049 $3,707,648 $2,383,627 $3,973,238 $12,852,561  $10,797,093 $10,797,093
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  91 $1,234,106 $2,605,948 $1,330,814 $2,463,938 $7,634,806  $6,626,742 $6,626,742
>$1,000,000
4  163 3,996,673  $6,589,010 $3,301,125 $7,598,712 $21,485,520  $31,819,045 $35,815,718
 
 
Table 3.25 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs, Tobacco Farms 
 
   Current Programs  Proposed Program 
 Number  Crop  Ins  OFIDP  MRI 
NISA 
Match  Total   BRM  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  47 $221,310 $160,780 $26,688 $535,316 $944,094  $4,182,153 $4,403,463
$25,000 - 
$50,000  33 $221,558 $270,044 $19,566 $458,765 $969,933  $2,006,944 $2,228,503
$50,000 - 
$100,000  83 $865,665  $1,145,080 $88,277 $1,708,159 $3,807,181  $4,744,689 $5,610,354
$100,000 - 
$250,000  297 $4,658,039 $4,760,027 $283,717 $9,806,148 $19,507,930  $18,002,802 $22,660,842
$250,000 - 
$500,000  195 $2,822,157 $4,006,986 $242,930 $10,215,220 $17,287,293  $13,346,919 $16,169,076
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  48 $426,331  $1,187,877 $52,284 $4,199,151 $5,865,643  $5,462,523 $5,888,853
>$1,000,000  6 $353,345 $183,145 $20,640 $981,130 $1,538,261  $1,517,671 $1,871,016
                                                 
4 Sales above $1,000,000 are used as the definition for feedlots (as distinct from cow-calf operations)  
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3.5 Margin Stability Under Current and Proposed Programs 
The above analyses considered the level of payments made to farmers under current and 
proposed programs.  As such, it provides a necessary measure of government transfers to support 
margins under programming alternatives.  However, it does not provide the timing context 
necessary to understand the income stabilizing value of the proposed program relative to current 
programs.  That is, it does not measure the extent to which either current programs or the 
proposed program provided payments to farmers at times of adversity (rather than providing 
payments in periods when margins are high).  To the extent that a program matches payments 
with the timing and severity of margin losses, it will stabilize margins over time. 
 
The best measure of a program’s stabilization ability is the extent to which it decreases variation 
in margins below the average.  It is less relevant to measure the overall variation in margins 
(using a measure such as variance or standard deviation) because variations in margins above the 
average have the same influence on the measure as variations in margin below the average; 
meaningful stabilization relates to reduction in variation below the average.   
 
As such, the measure of stabilization used to compare current and proposed programs considers 
variation below the average.  The measure used here is a variant of semi-variance in which the 
standard deviation of the semi-variance is computed to give a result measured in dollars (rather 
than dollars squared); this measure is referred to as semi-deviation.  This semi-deviation is 
measured relative to average margins with no programs.  Thus, the comparison of stabilization 
between current and proposed programs starts with the average margin with no programs.  Using 
this benchmark, the semi-deviation with no programs, with current programs, and with the 
proposed program is calculated.  The program that gives the smallest semi-deviation provides the 
best level of stabilization. 
 
Using the above approach, the information from the NISA database, with data fragmented to the 
level of farm type and size, was used to compare stabilization under the current and proposed 
programs.  The analysis was related back to both average production margin and average gross 
margin.  We measured both because it is important to understand what is being stabilized.  The 
proposed program triggers payments with variations in the production margin, while the current 
programs tend to be triggered by variations in gross margin.  Gross margin is likely a better 
proxy for net income.  Therefore it is of interest to determine whether a program triggered by 
production margin stabilizes gross margin.   
 
The results are presented in Tables 3.26-3.34.  In each of the tables, the top panel provides a 
comparison between current and proposed programs on a gross margin basis
5, with the bottom 
panel providing the comparison on the basis of production margin.  As indicated in the tables, the 
additional payments made under OFIDP in 1998 and 1999 have been excluded from the analysis.  
The proposed program is labeled as “BRM” in the tables.    
 
                                                 
5 The program payments were related back to farm gross margins; current programs operate as they do currently and 
payments under the proposed program were determined on the basis of production margin  
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The tables show that, across a broad section of farm types and sizes, production margin is more 
variable than gross margin.  This can be seen by comparing “normal deviation below average, no 
programs”, for a given sales level under gross margin, with its counterpart under production 
margin. This is a critical finding because, in order for the trigger in the proposed program to be 
more sensitive than under OFIDP or NISA, production margin must be more variable than gross 
margin.  There were sporadic sales levels at which gross margin was more volatile than 
production margin, notably in fruits and vegetable.  However, these were exceptions to a visible 
trend.  
 
In almost all cases, the proposed program gives a much lower normal deviation below the 
average margin than either no safety net programs or the current program.  This observation 
holds with few exceptions across both gross margin and production margin – i.e. gross margins 
are stabilized by the BRM program.   
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       Table 3.26 Margin Stability, Cash Crop Farms 
Cash Crops  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $4,181  $7,532  $10,569  $4,824  $3,165  $844 
$25,000 - $50,000  $9,967  $17,139  $18,530  $7,126  $3,627  $1,284 
$50,000 - $100,000  $22,360  $34,478  $34,360  $10,542  $4,520  $1,963 
$100,000 - $250,000  $50,771  $72,064  $71,262  $19,595  $8,820  $3,702 
$250,000 - $500,000  $110,913  $146,053  $145,446  $37,622  $19,845  $9,405 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $197,773  $258,974  $252,261  $64,154  $30,989  $14,283 
>$1,000,000  $405,806  $459,486  $488,837  $132,939  $100,466  $49,441 
          
Cash Crops  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP   BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $10,553  $13,912  $16,949  $4,692  $3,100  $411 
$25,000 - $50,000  $20,736  $27,893  $29,284  $6,973  $3,580  $782 
$50,000 - $100,000  $37,532  $49,650  $49,532  $10,363  $4,585  $1,274 
$100,000 - $250,000  $73,211  $94,503  $93,702  $18,640  $8,296  $2,332 
$250,000 - $500,000  $149,238  $184,378  $183,771  $34,620  $17,480  $5,978 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $248,236  $309,437  $302,724  $62,865  $30,794  $9,812 
>$1,000,000  $474,829  $528,509  $557,861  $121,689  $90,094  $25,590 
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Table 3.27 Margin Stability, Fruit and Vegetable Farms 
Fruit & Veg  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP   BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP   BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $6,329  $9,771  $15,484  $7,946  $6,562  $1,694 
$25,000 - $50,000  $8,564  $13,743  $17,721  $8,153  $4,984  $2,494 
$50,000 - $100,000  $21,222  $31,547  $30,926  $11,695  $6,838  $5,107 
$100,000 - $250,000  $44,681  $62,917  $60,309  $22,704  $13,366  $9,617 
$250,000 - $500,000  $89,088  $119,401  $109,580  $36,378  $20,346  $18,456 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $189,532  $234,093  $219,068  $69,829  $42,360  $39,214 
>$1,000,000  $518,523  $573,713  $582,641  $207,097  $166,540  $142,448 
          
Fruit & Veg  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $15,168  $18,610  $24,323  $8,387  $7,027  $1,272 
$25,000 - $50,000  $25,565  $30,744  $34,722  $8,157  $5,455  $2,024 
$50,000 - $100,000  $41,679  $52,004  $51,383  $11,156  $6,601  $3,827 
$100,000 - $250,000  $88,632  $106,868  $104,260  $24,274  $14,794  $9,161 
$250,000 - $500,000  $162,586  $192,899  $183,079  $35,531  $19,639  $16,086 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $338,490  $383,050  $368,025  $65,693  $39,952  $32,634 








Table 3.28 Margin Stability, Greenhouse Farms 
 
Greenhouse  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP   BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $8,557  $11,436  $19,643  $6,497  $5,133  $1,367 
$25,000 - $50,000  $21,142  $29,343  $33,590  $11,445  $9,081  $1,587 
$50,000 - $100,000  $17,784  $26,309  $26,430  $8,240  $4,241  $2,767 
$100,000 - $250,000  $60,515  $76,808  $76,463  $28,483  $19,215  $14,312 
$250,000 - $500,000  $86,644  $123,996  $122,073  $36,923  $15,353  $10,652 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $177,964  $217,572  $209,403  $63,743  $38,577  $32,238 
>$1,000,000  $587,646  $635,903  $622,058  $161,666  $126,848  $125,864 
          
Greenhouse  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $18,596  $11,436  $19,643  $8,598  $12,725  $6,620 
$25,000 - $50,000  $33,722  $29,343  $33,590  $11,841  $17,804  $9,077 
$50,000 - $100,000  $38,396  $26,309  $26,430  $8,660  $18,245  $16,728 
$100,000 - $250,000  $104,376  $76,808  $76,463  $32,177  $51,459  $47,270 
$250,000 - $500,000  $160,036  $123,996  $122,073  $39,895  $65,718  $59,790 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $305,314  $217,572  $209,403  $64,626  $128,258  $126,278 
>$1,000,000  $971,408  $635,903  $622,058  $188,898  $433,321  $437,092  
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Table 3.29 Margin Stability, Poultry Farms 
 
Poultry  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $1,395  $4,649  $18,600  $8,123  $6,572  $517 
$25,000 - $50,000  $32,950  $40,042  $47,731  $19,774  $16,398  $6,180 
$50,000 - $100,000  $40,421  $50,158  $83,299  $16,854  $11,095  $1,240 
$100,000 - $250,000  $55,748  $62,176  $63,493  $9,873  $6,896  $4,971 
$250,000 - $500,000  $101,899  $109,509  $112,544  $26,099  $21,174  $17,885 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $177,733  $189,126  $191,008  $32,662  $24,198  $18,987 
>$1,000,000  $398,815  $404,855  $401,359  $69,911  $67,556  $68,732 
          
Poultry  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $12,349  $15,602  $29,553  $8,401  $7,058  $68 
$25,000 - $50,000  $51,894  $58,986  $66,675  $21,162  $17,633  $5,083 
$50,000 - $100,000  $63,894  $73,631  $106,772  $23,421  $18,022  $1,691 
$100,000 - $250,000  $85,748  $92,176  $93,492  $11,763  $8,748  $4,822 
$250,000 - $500,000  $147,594  $155,204  $158,239  $23,449  $19,446  $14,303 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $259,954  $271,347  $273,228  $36,943  $29,646  $21,399 







Table 3.30 Margin Stability, Dairy Farms 
 
Dairy  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $28,307  $30,532  $46,036  $13,862  $12,306  $2,341 
$25,000 - $50,000  $32,581  $36,336  $44,621  $10,359  $9,258  $1,147 
$50,000 - $100,000  $37,516  $40,743  $40,821  $6,102  $4,187  $2,874 
$100,000 - $250,000  $66,127  $72,085  $72,254  $10,207  $6,936  $5,866 
$250,000 - $500,000  $126,289  $134,216  $130,806  $16,700  $12,136  $12,938 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $221,070  $232,622  $226,125  $26,029  $19,765  $21,955 
>$1,000,000  $453,408  $465,076  $464,246  $67,446  $59,513  $51,403 
          
Dairy  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP   BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $42,495  $44,720  $60,224  $19,817  $18,574  $759 
$25,000 - $50,000  $48,219  $51,973  $60,259  $15,923  $14,809  $1,365 
$50,000 - $100,000  $53,503  $56,730  $56,809  $6,895  $5,271  $3,049 
$100,000 - $250,000  $102,488  $108,446  $108,615  $10,495  $7,477  $5,431 
$250,000 - $500,000  $196,716  $204,643  $201,233  $17,289  $13,356  $13,226 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $341,979  $353,531  $347,034  $27,531  $22,391  $23,255 
>$1,000,000  $758,944  $770,612  $769,781  $79,563  $73,448  $61,124 
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Table 3.31 Margin Stability, Hog Farms 
Hogs  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $9,402  $14,565  $24,232  $7,370  $5,014  $189 
$25,000 - $50,000  $6,054  $11,458  $14,273  $6,032  $4,314  $1,447 
$50,000 - $100,000  $14,844  $23,048  $23,515  $9,337  $5,552  $1,968 
$100,000 - $250,000  $32,111  $46,420  $44,494  $12,740  $6,091  $2,929 
$250,000 - $500,000  $66,399  $88,034  $82,895  $22,021  $11,865  $7,400 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $112,574  $144,023  $136,019  $44,692  $28,468  $20,155 
>$1,000,000  $314,838  $359,052  $356,719  $143,412  $115,094  $87,351 
          
Hogs  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $17,885  $23,049  $32,716  $9,226  $7,076  $135 
$25,000 - $50,000  $16,636  $22,040  $24,855  $6,670  $4,793  $1,454 
$50,000 - $100,000  $28,424  $36,628  $37,095  $9,040  $5,277  $1,415 
$100,000 - $250,000  $53,391  $67,700  $65,774  $13,386  $6,698  $2,778 
$250,000 - $500,000  $105,792  $127,426  $122,288  $24,511  $14,321  $8,684 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $188,093  $219,541  $211,538  $46,405  $30,332  $20,170 








Table 3.32 Margin Stability, Cow-Calf Farms 
 
Cow Calf  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP   BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $2,566  $5,118  $7,999  $5,414  $4,316  $1,637 
$25,000 - $50,000  $8,015  $11,034  $12,226  $5,470  $3,951  $2,270 
$50,000 - $100,000  $15,149  $20,111  $20,841  $8,771  $6,270  $3,363 
$100,000 - $250,000  $24,203  $33,519  $35,051  $14,252  $9,752  $4,353 
$250,000 - $500,000  $38,100  $53,649  $55,340  $26,029  $17,980  $10,310 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $55,540  $73,768  $77,136  $29,416  $21,591  $8,988 
          
Cow Calf  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $9,509  $12,061  $14,942  $5,307  $4,278  $1,131 
$25,000 - $50,000  $17,846  $20,864  $22,056  $5,455  $4,026  $1,988 
$50,000 - $100,000  $27,887  $32,849  $33,579  $8,718  $6,251  $2,883 
$100,000 - $250,000  $41,243  $50,559  $52,090  $14,248  $9,867  $3,820 
$250,000 - $500,000  $63,794  $79,343  $81,034  $26,149  $17,981  $8,475 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $85,953  $104,180  $107,548  $31,546  $23,533  $9,406 
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Table 3.33 Margin Stability, Feedlot Farms  
 
Feedlot  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
>$1,000,000  $138,880  $175,950  $204,718  $113,717  $94,181  $42,716 
          
Feedlot  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
>$1,000,000  $216,522  $175,950  $204,718  $111,861  $149,201  $95,523 
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Table 3.34 Margin Stability, Tobacco Farms  
 
Tobacco  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $30,710  $35,732  $54,133  $21,865  $20,270  $2,164 
$25,000 - $50,000  $39,582  $46,930  $56,465  $20,012  $17,720  $3,564 
$50,000 - $100,000  $54,382  $65,849  $71,281  $23,839  $18,685  $4,252 
$100,000 - $250,000  $74,722  $91,143  $93,797  $32,241  $23,696  $10,517 
$250,000 - $500,000  $119,307  $141,470  $140,036  $44,478  $29,984  $19,729 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $236,962  $267,513  $267,634  $68,233  $46,593  $35,701 
>$1,000,000  $504,925  $569,019  $582,884  $181,208  $136,582  $103,008 
          
Tobacco  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 
Adj OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $46,941  $51,962  $70,363  $25,821  $24,361  $3,003 
$25,000 - $50,000  $57,195  $64,543  $74,078  $21,553  $19,366  $4,022 
$50,000 - $100,000  $74,190  $85,658  $91,089  $25,560  $20,445  $5,148 
$100,000 - $250,000  $108,016  $124,437  $127,091  $31,510  $23,324  $8,761 
$250,000 - $500,000  $180,498  $202,661  $201,227  $42,176  $28,530  $15,761 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $363,322  $393,872  $393,993  $63,734  $43,377  $28,101 
>$1,000,000  $707,794  $771,888  $785,753  $130,018  $91,870  $49,736 
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3.6 Refined Analysis With Accrual Data Using OFIDP Database 
To provide a more refined analysis of how the proposed program will operate relative to the 
current programs, a subset of data from consistent OFIDP applicants was isolated and analyzed
6.  
The data represent records from farms that had applied to the OFIDP program consistently from 
1998 to 2001.  These farms provide a source of time series, accrual-adjusted records that can be 
used to compare the proposed program using accrual data with current programs using the mix of 
cash-basis and accrual data that is applied in practice.  Thus, the sample provides the most 
accurate comparison possible given the data available. 
 
The database yielded 662 farms that applied to OFIDP consistently from 1998 to 2001.  Table 
3.35 below provides the breakdown of farms in the sample according to farm type.  About two-
thirds of the farms were cash-crop farms, with smaller numbers of cow/calf, hog, and 
vegetable/fruit farms.  Only small numbers of tobacco and feedlot farms were available, and 
greenhouse, dairy, and poultry farms had to be combined into a single category.  Thus, the 
sample is not representative, and is biased toward cash-crop farms. 
 
The comparison of the proposed program on an accrual basis with the current programs (OFIDP- 
accrual, other programs- cash basis) presented in Table 3.36 below.  As indicated above, Table 
3.36 provides the most accurate comparison possible between current and proposed programs, 
because all the data are presented on the accounting basis that is actually used.  The table gives 
the total payments for the period 1998-2001, on an average per farm basis, by farm type under 
the current and proposed programs.  It shows that, under the proposed program, about $6000 
more per farm would have been paid out over the four-year period than under the current 
programs.  The largest increases in payments under the proposed program were estimated 
experienced for feedlots, followed by cow-calf, tobacco farms, and cash-crop farms.  Fruit and 
vegetable operations had a cumulative average reduction in payments of about $6700, with hog 
farms seeing an average reduction in payments of about $700
7.  Payments to the greenhouse-
dairy-poultry group of farms are estimated to decrease by over $18,000 per farm over the period.   
                                                 
6 This is the same database that was used to analyze the differences in the proposed program on a cash vs. accrual 
basis.  
7 Again, remembering that the current programs were enriched in order, mainly, to assist hog farms in 1998 and 
1999.  This could also easily have occurred under the proposed program, but cannot be done in the database.  We do 
believe this analysis understates the relative benefits of the proposed BRM to hog operations. 
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Table 3.35 Breakdown of OFIDP Sample 
 
Farm Type  Number of Producers 
Cash Crop  424
Vegetables and Fruit  50
Greenhouse / Dairy / Poultry  4
Hogs  74
Cow/Calf  76
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Table 3.36 Comparison of Program Payments Between Current and Proposed Programs, Average per farm 1998-2001 Total 





  Current Programs  Proposed Program 
Farm Type 
Crop 





Cash Crop  $15,946 $27,157 $13,062 $10,070 $66,235 $15,946 $51,408 $67,353 
Vegetables and Fruit  $12,902 $31,836 $1,481 $31,781 $78,000 $12,902 $58,418 $71,320 
Greenhouse/Dairy/Poultry  $34,604 $64,373 $17,190 $18,059 $134,226 $34,604 $81,088 $115,692 
Hogs  $18,578 $57,339 $11,571 $19,171 $106,659 $18,578 $87,343 $105,921 
Cow/Calf  $6,570 $42,141 $8,023 $9,300 $66,034 $6,570 $68,170 $74,740 
Feedlot (Beef)  $22,359 $153,743 $16,362 $31,139 $223,603 $22,359 $435,362 $457,721 
Tobacco  $9,671 $20,582 $900 $16,650 $47,803 $9,671 $61,288 $70,959 
Total $14,954 $34,906 $11,123 $13,288 $74,270 $14,954 $65,346 $80,300  
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4.0 Distribution of Program Benefits Under Proposed Program 
 
Because of the difference in the structure of the proposed program relative to current programs, 
the incidence of program benefits is liable to differ from current programming.  This arises from 
multiple sources: 
 
•  The aggregate level of support will differ between current and proposed programs. 
•  The level of support directed at a given commodity will differ between current and proposed 
programs. 
•  The level of support allocated to each province will differ between current and proposed 
programs. 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide an analysis of the distributional effects of the proposed 
program.  Section 4.1 describes the approach and data used to analyze the distribution of 
program payments.  The results of this analysis are presented in Section 4.2.  Section 4.3 
interprets the distribution of program payments in the context of total farm cash receipts.  The 
observations and discussion based on the distribution of program payments are presented in 
Section 4.4. 
 
4.1 Analysis of Distributional Consequences of Proposed Program 
The share of program funding that is allocated to a given commodity type or region is a function 
of program design, the frequency and magnitude of claims that trigger a payment, and the 
number of farms within a given commodity type and region.  To provide an assessment of 
payment shares under the proposed and current programs, data was accessed from the federal 
NISA database by AAFC staff.  Information in the NISA database was isolated for producers 
that were continuous participants in NISA for the period 1996-2000.  In cases where accrual data 
were not available (because CFIP was not in existence or had not been participated in by the 
producer) accrual adjustments were simulated. This was done to ensure the programs were fully 
tested, since accrual adjustments increased the instability of margins.   The proposed program 
was modeled over the 1996 to 2000 period and compared with actual results under the current 
programs using actual data for NISA participants in each year.   
 
Given this data, the total government payments under current programs (CFIP, NISA, production 
insurance, and companion programs) were summarized to give the five-year average.  
Companion program payments were taken based on reportings in the designated space on the 
NISA form.  Production insurance payments were realized in the year payment was received 
(rather than the year that the year the indemnities were incurred).   
 
Thus, the simulation provides a representation of what the total average annual payment to 
producers from government would have been under the current and proposed programs, 
respectively.  The data were fragmented according to commodity type and converted to a 
percentage of total payments nationally.  This provides a framework within which to understand 




4.2 Distribution of Payments Under Current and Proposed Program 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below present the results of the above analysis.  Table 4.1 presents provincial 
and commodity funding shares as percentages of total national funding; Table 4.2 presents the 
raw funding levels.  In each case, the top panel of the table gives the distribution of funds 
according to province and commodity based on current programs, and the bottom panel provides 
the distribution under the proposed program.  The bottom row of each panel gives the total 
allocation of support funding according to province, and the final column provides the total 
support according to commodity type. 
Table 4.1 shows that under the proposed program, Ontario farmers would receive a slightly 
lower share of total national safety net funds than they do under current programs.  However, the 
distribution differs across commodity type.  Under the proposed program, grains and oilseeds, 
cattle, and hog segments of Ontario agriculture would see an increasing share of total national 
funding.  The Ontario fruit, vegetable, and potato segments would see a decreasing share of total 
funding.  At the national level, the proposed program would see a slight redistribution in safety 
net support toward Saskatchewan from other provinces.  This is a consequence of the fact that, 
relative to current programs, the proposed program would result in a greater allocation of support 
to grains and oilseeds, cattle, and hogs.  Thus, the results for Ontario mirror the national picture.  
Table 4.2 presents the payment data underlying Table 4.1.  It shows increases in funding for 
Ontario cash crops and cattle, with decrease in payments to horticultural and other industries.   
Table 4.2 suggests that total funding to Ontario would fall under the proposed program.  This is 
surprising, given that literally all of the detailed analysis completed on Ontario farm sectors in 
Section 3 suggests precisely the opposite.  However, the data prepared by AAFC covers the 
1996-2000 time period, while that analyzed by OMAF covers the period 1998-2001.  This has 
important implications in interpreting the results: 
•  The 1996-2000 period stretches back prior to the existence of the current suite of programs 
(notably CFIP/OFIDP).  AAFC simulated CFIP/OFIDP payments throughout the period 
(rather than just for 1996 and 1997).  This by itself increases the payments attributed to 
current programs, because some farmers that could have obtained payments from 
CFIP/OFIDP, did not apply to CFIP/OFIDP.  
•  The simulations for 1996 and 1997 used reference margins based on a shorter time period 
than that which would have been applied in practice.  In particular, 1996 and 1997, which 
were exceptionally high margin years for farmers, would tend to bias in favour of programs 
that provide payment on the basis of sales (as the NISA matching contribution does) rather 
than a program that triggers payment on the basis of actual margin losses 
•  AAFC staff indicated that, had their analysis used 1998 as the first year, the average payment 
to Ontario based on 1998, 1999, and 2000 would have been higher under the proposed 
program than under current programs  
Other findings in Table 4.2 are consistent with components of the analyses in Section 3 
regardless of the differences discussed above.  In particular, it suggests that more funding will  
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flow to grains and oilseeds and cattle (in Ontario and nationally), and, that less funding will flow 
to horticultural farms under the proposed program.  
Finally, payments to Quebec agriculture are conspicuously absent from Table 4.2.  This is 
because the funding for the Quebec ASRA program, which is supported by the federal 
government, does not flow through the NISA or CFIP funds that form the basis for Table 4.1.and 
4.2.  Thus, an accurate comparison of total funding for safety nets across all provinces and farm 
commodities (including ASRA) is not possible from Tables 4.1 and 4.2.      
In interpreting the distributional results, there are some critical caveats to observe.  First, the 
timing of payments is likely to be at least as important as the magnitudes of the payments 
themselves.  In other words, payments received in periods of great need have more value as 
stabilization than payments received under less adverse circumstances.  Secondly, looking only 
at the magnitude of payments without reference to the frequency of payments vs. magnitude of 
payments can be misleading.  For example, a farm that on average receives small payments but 
occasionally triggers a very large payment under adverse circumstances may be better served in 
stabilization than another farm the regularly triggers small program payments.  This latter farm 
could easily show up as receiving a higher share of payments than the former. 
4.3 Distribution of Proposed Program Payments Relative to Farm Cash Receipts 
It is difficult to place program payments across commodity sectors in context, because the 
different commodities have different relative profitability and margin volatility.  The notion of 
“fairness” in the allocation of program payments is inherently subjective, and a number of 
rationales exist on which to interpret payments.  One basis for comparison is farm cash receipts.  
Table 4.3 below plots farm cash receipts by product type.  It shows that dairy products are 
typically the largest source of farm sales, followed by grains and oilseeds, beef, and fruits and 
vegetables. 
Table 4.4 relates total farm cash receipts by product type to shares of payments under the 
proposed program.  In some cases, the share of program payments appears to correspond with 
farm cash receipts.  Payments to cattle, hog, and fruit and vegetable farms correspond reasonably 
closely with the shares of total farm cash receipts.  Payments to grains and oilseeds are much 
greater than their share of cash receipts. Payments to the “other” segment are much lower than 
their share of cash receipts. There is a number of ways to interpret this latter category: 
•  Grains and oilseeds tend to be a volatile and relatively low margin segment 
•  The “other” products category includes supply managed products which are implicitly 
supported outside of program payments   
Thus, while farm cash receipts provides a context within which to interpret the distribution of 
farm program payments, it is of limited use in making broad generalizations about how program 
payments are, or should, be allocated.     
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Table 4.1 Distribution of Government Payments to Producers by Commodity Type and Province, 1996-2000 Average Shares 
 
Current 
Programs   BC  AB  SK  MB  ON  QC  NB  NS  PEI  NFLD  CANADA 
  Grains and Oilseeds  0.25% 12.92% 27.69% 8.34% 7.20% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 56.49% 
  Cattle 0.11% 5.98% 5.50% 2.75% 2.45% 0.00% 0.02% 0.07% 0.06% 0.00% 16.93% 
  Hogs 0.15% 0.97% 0.30% 1.42% 2.37% 0.02% 0.02% 0.13% 0.12% 0.00% 5.50% 
  Fruit, Vegetable and Potato  1.25% 0.30% 0.13% 0.29% 4.04% 1.02% 0.33% 0.24% 1.02% 0.02% 8.65% 
  Other 0.68% 2.67% 1.87% 1.46% 5.15% 0.14% 0.03% 0.32% 0.09% 0.02% 12.43% 
  Total  2.45% 22.84% 35.49% 14.25% 21.21% 1.21% 0.41% 0.78% 1.31% 0.04% 100.00% 
Proposed 
Program                    
  Grains and Oilseeds  0.26% 12.71% 30.02% 7.71% 8.75% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 59.55% 
  Cattle 0.12% 5.56% 6.33% 2.69% 2.92% 0.00% 0.03% 0.07% 0.05% 0.00% 17.76% 
  Hogs 0.14% 1.01% 0.31% 1.66% 2.39% 0.03% 0.02% 0.10% 0.12% 0.00% 5.78% 
  Fruit, Vegetable and Potato  1.42% 0.22% 0.16% 0.15% 2.46% 0.47% 0.20% 0.24% 0.76% 0.02% 6.08% 
  Other 0.41% 2.52% 2.13% 1.36% 4.02% 0.06% 0.03% 0.22% 0.07% 0.00% 10.82% 
  Total  2.34% 22.02% 38.96% 13.57% 20.53% 0.61% 0.29% 0.65% 1.02% 0.02% 100.00% 
  Source: NISA Database, AAFC  
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Table 4.2 Distribution of Government Payments to Producers by Commodity Type and Province, 1996-2000 Average Amounts 
Current Programs                    
BC AB  SK  MB  ON  QC  NB NS  PEI NFLD  CANADA 
Grains and Oilseeds  2,042,700 104,592,458  224,180,543 67,486,968 58,260,853 291,727 0 0 227,474 0 457,273,145 
Cattle  922,194 48,402,615  44,498,357 22,250,194 19,807,745 0 139,838 584,006 471,624 0 137,079,588 
Hogs  1,186,864 7,872,801  2,459,624 11,462,997 19,207,544 149,685 190,576 1,070,777 945,780 0 44,547,936 
Fruit, Vegetable and 
Potato  10,145,214 2,423,340  1,013,080 2,341,879 32,723,856 8,278,734 2,679,336 1,959,194 8,247,600 173,391 69,985,624 
Other  5,535,385 21,620,421  15,139,561 11,793,494 41,724,500 1,110,583 223,109 2,625,465 722,438 151,672 100,646,627 
Total  19,832,357 184,911,634  287,291,165 115,335,532 171,724,498 9,833,613 3,335,678 6,327,045 10,614,915 326,484 809,532,921 
                  
Proposed Program                    
BC AB  SK  MB  ON  QC  NB NS  PEI NFLD  CANADA 
Grains and Oilseeds  2,029,525  99,614,541 235,388,908 60,467,756 68,566,679 415,063    203,609   466,928,828 
Cattle 944,259  43,607,706 49,652,011 21,106,357 22,857,397  204,427 533,032 360,725   139,270,190 
Hogs 1,086,255  7,925,593 2,453,247 12,996,945 18,736,070 196,094 178,918 788,990 931,568  45,293,680 
Fruit, Vegetable and 
Potato  11,105,929  1,734,647 1,225,228 1,142,485 19,265,591 3,665,128 1,547,342 1,905,111 5,940,039 166,137 47,697,639 
Other 3,177,215  19,744,649 16,737,902 10,650,148 31,507,756 493,870 205,034 1,758,225 572,873 18,790 84,866,460 
Total 18,343,184  172,627,136 305,457,296 106,363,691 160,933,493 4,773,823 2,248,148 5,115,678 8,008,813 185,536 784,056,797 
Source: NISA Database, AAFC 
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Table 4.3 Ontario Commodity Shares of Farm Cash Receipts, 1998-2002 (Thousand 
Dollars)  
   1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  Average  Share 
Cattle and Calves 
        
931,004  
        
994,791  
      
1,069,278  
   
1,226,128 
      
1,145,672   15.03%
Grain & Oilseeds 
      
1,232,134  
      
1,116,852  
      
1,130,507  
      
976,726  
      
1,185,687   15.80%
Hogs 589,661  601,127  831,107  956,406  817,877  10.63%
Dairy Products  1,277,740  1,280,810  1,319,954  1,369,058 1,357,337  18.50%
Fruits & 
Vegetables 
        
896,893  
        
949,138  
        
988,581  
   
1,093,346 
      
1,119,768   14.14%
Floriculture & 
Nursery 577,397  664,640  811,333  842,310  925,270  10.70%
Poultry 568388 
        
537,014  
        
564,892  
      
622,297  
        
601,702   8.11%
Eggs 182,292  188,335  197,134  210,597  211,800  2.77%
Sheep 2,590  2,391  3,069  2,821  2,275  0.04%
Tobacco 342,307  338,960  346,771  245,697  257,913 4.29%
Table 4.4 Farm Cash Receipts Relative to Program Payments 
 
Total Sales 98-02, 
($thousand) Payments  ($) 
Grains and Oilseeds            5,641,906  15.80% 68,566,679  42.61%
Cattle            5,366,873  15.03% 22,857,397  14.20%
Hogs            3,796,178  10.63% 18,736,070  11.64%
Fruit, Vegetable and Potato            5,047,726  14.14% 19,265,591  11.97%
Other  15,855,094 44.40% 31,507,756 19.58%
Total 
         
35,707,777   100.00% 160,933,493  100.00%
 
4.4 Summary 
The foregoing indicates: 
•  Distribution of funds nationally are difficult to calculate because the data do not account 
correctly for crop insurance, and because federal contributions to Quebec’s ASRA 
program.   
•  Based on numbers that do no reflect the foregoing, and using 1996 – 2000, it would 
appear that Ontario’s share of total program spending would have declined marginally 
with the proposed program. This implicitly differs from the analysis in Section 3.0, likely 
because of the time period.  The most relevant conclusion is that regional proportions 
vary at different times because of relative need. 
•  Similarly, in this time period, the portion of funds flowing from the program to grains, 
oilseeds, and beef.  
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5.0 Implications of the “Olympic Average Concept” 
 
The proposed BRM program will provide incentives that differ from current programs due to the 
design of the program.  The purpose of this section, in conjunction with Appendix I, is to explore 
in technical detail, how the structure of the proposed program will affect farm management 
incentives, and to interpret the implications. 
 
One of the key components in the success of any farm program is that it achieve its stated goals 
while minimizing the extent to which it induces perverse or opportunistic behaviour.  
Conceivably, this behaviour could include the following: 
 
•  Intentionally inducing production margin losses to trigger program payments (moral hazard) 
•  Altering output level or farm input use in order to access program payments 
•  Altering the product mix in order to access program payments  
 
To consider these incentives, a conceptual model of the proposed program was developed and 
analyzed in Appendix I.  Viewed in abstract, the mechanism of the proposed program has two 
components: 
 
•  The current year payment function 
•  Next year’s reference margin function 
 
As shown in the appendix, the payment calculation determines a farmer’s program payment at a 
single point in time.  To understand the incentives under the program, the payment function must 
be considered in the context of next year’s reference margin.  Changes in program payments in 
the current year will be reflected in future reference margin levels.    
 
The payment function shows that a payment can be triggered if the current year production 
margin falls below the reference production margin.  Farmers may perceive an incentive to 
intentionally trigger a payment under the proposed program.  The rationale for this is that they 
can access government payments and meet cash flow needs from their own deposit.  In a sense, 
the proposed program allows the producer to experience a loss that is partially funded by 
government with no loss in cash flow, because of the cash flow on deposit that becomes 
accessible.  The primary factor mitigating this incentive (besides detection and enforcement from 
program administrative staff) is that the reference margin in the next year adjusts in response to 
current year production margin.  In other words, a farmer who intentionally triggered a payment 
under the program would see his or her reference production margin decrease in the future, 
thereby decreasing future margin coverage.  However, the implication of the intentionally 
triggered production margin loss depends on the extent to which the next year’s production 
margin adjusts in response.   
 
The sensitivity of the subsequent year’s reference margin to changes in the current year 
production margin depends on the effect of an incremental change in the current year’s 
production on the reference margin.  This is explored in Appendix I.  It shows that:   
 
•  A producer who is intentionally trying to trigger a payment will attempt to do so in such a 
way that there is minimal reduction in the reference margin.  
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•  The sensitivity of next year’s reference margin to the current year reference margin is 
disjoint.  For large production margin losses that are not registered as a 5-year minimum, 
the impact on the reference is in proportion to one-third of the margin loss.  However, if the 
loss is significant enough to be registered as a minimum, then there is no change.  So the 
incentive is to make the current year’s production margin loss sufficient to be registered as 
a 5-year minimum. 
•  The reference margin will ultimately be more sensitive to price decreases than output 
decreases.  So someone who is intentionally attempting to trigger a payment (and have a 
minimal impact on the reference margin) has every incentive to avoid good price risk 
management and use negative movements in price as means to register a 5-year minimum 
production margin. 
•  In the case of a farm with multiple enterprises, the enterprise with the greater per unit 
production margin will give the greater incremental change in the reference margin (i.e. 
give the greater probability of registering the current year as the minimum).  Thus, a desire 
to intentionally trigger claims without changing next year’s reference margin would push 
farmers toward relatively risky enterprises.   
 
5.1 Summary and Implications 
There are differences in incentives between the proposed program and the current NISA and 
OFIDP programs, because of the following: 
 
•  Under OFIDP, the producer must lose 30% of average gross margin before a payment is 
made.  This deductible limits opportunistic behaviour.  The proposed program has no 
such deductible provision. 
•  Under NISA, an entitlement is created.  It is generally not in the producer’s best interest 
to orchestrate a loss to access an entitlement that will ultimately be his or her own 
regardless. 
 
Thus, there are reasons to be more concerned about producers behaving perversely to 
intentionally trigger a payment under the proposed program than under the current programs.   
To the extent that farmers can influence production margin to intentionally trigger a loss, they 
have an incentive to make the loss sufficient to register that year’s production margin as a five-
year minimum, so that it is essentially removed from any influence over the next year’s reference 
production margin.  A producer could periodically (every 5 years) intentionally trigger a 
production margin loss of such a magnitude that a significant program payment would be 
received, without any loss of coverage through a reduction in the reference production margin.  
 
•  Under a simple average reference concept (such as the 3-year average reference gross margin 
applied under OFIDP) this incentive does not apply; production margin losses would be 
reflected in downward adjustments to the reference margin in subsequent periods. 
•  Producers have an incentive to manipulate the aspects of the production margin calculation 
that have the greatest probability of being registered as a minimum so that the next year’s 
reference does not change.  It appears that the easiest way to produce this outcome is to 
experience a reduction in production margin due to low prices.  At a minimum, producers 
attempting to intentionally trigger a payment will not use price risk management tools.  
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•  Because the proposed program is whole-farm in nature, with assistance available without a 
deductible, there is a reduced incentive to diversify under the proposed program. One 
potential manifestation of this is, if one’s expectation of substantial payout for production 
insurance is once every five years, then the Olympic average provides a tremendous 
disincentive to enrol.   
•  Producers attempting to intentionally trigger a payment will tend to increase their 
involvement in riskier enterprises.  Production margin losses created by relatively risky 
enterprises have a greater potential of being registered as minimums, leaving reference 
production margins unchanged. 
•  Under the current programs (notably OFIDP) the principal source of moral hazard is in 
manipulating expenses in the gross margin calculation that are largely overhead in nature.  
Under the proposed program, there is a greater potential that moral hazard behaviour on 
behalf of producers will lead to manipulations in agronomic practices. 
•  The foregoing criticisms could be largely removed if the reference margin were converted to 




















6.0 Interpreting the Proposed Program under Cash-basis vs. Accrual 
Accounting   
 
To determine the role of accrual adjustments in interpreting comparisons between the current and 
proposed programs, a detailed analysis was made of farms that had applied to the OFIDP 
program consistently from 1998 to 2001.  These farms provide a source of time series, accrual-
adjusted records that can be used to compare the simulations of the proposed program on a cash 
basis and an accrual basis.   
 
The database yielded 662 farms that applied to OFIDP consistently from 1998 to 2001.  Table 
6.1 below provides the breakdown of farms in the sample according to farm type.  About two-
thirds of the farms were cash-crop farms, with smaller numbers of cow/calf, hog, and 
vegetable/fruit farms.  Only small numbers of tobacco and feedlot farms were available, and 
greenhouse, dairy, and poultry farms had to be combined into a single category.  Thus, the 
sample is not representative, and is biased toward cash-crop farms. 
 
Table 6.1 Breakdown of OFIDP Sample 
 
Farm Type  Number of Producers 
Cash Crop  424
Vegetables and Fruit  50
Greenhouse / Dairy / Poultry  4
Hogs  74
Cow/Calf  76




To determine the implication of cash vs. accrual records in interpreting the proposed program, 
the proposed program was simulated for the above farms using both cash records and accrual 
records.  In each case, linkages to the production insurance database were maintained to account 
for receipts from production insurance. 
 
Table 6.2 below presents the results of the simulation under cash and accrual based records.  The 
table shows that across farm types and across years, the accrual-based payments under the 
proposed were about 18% higher than the payments triggered from cash-basis farm records.  The 
implications of the accrual adjustments appear to vary on the basis of farm type.  The accrual 
adjustments had the largest effect on feedlot and tobacco farms, causing an increase in program 
payments of over 30%.  Most other farm types experienced increased payments of 15-19%.  The 
greenhouse, dairy and poultry category experienced an increase in payments of only about 5% 
due to accrual adjustments; however, given the mix of types and small number of farms in this 
category, no generalization is possible.   
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Cash to Accrual 
Cash Crop  $24,828,014 $28,557,836 15.0%
Vegetables and Fruit  $3,050,259 $3,565,996 16.9%
Green House / Dairy / Poultry  $438,878 $462,770 5.4%
Hogs  $6,720,873 $7,838,175 16.6%
Cow/Calf  $4,790,561 $5,680,244 18.6%
Feedlot (Beef)  $4,216,406 $5,492,655 30.3%
Tobacco  $1,151,989 $1,561,090 35.5%
Total $45,196,980 $53,158,765  17.6%
 
 
The results presented in the table are significant because the proposed program will operate using 
accrual farm records.  The implication is that in interpreting the results of the analysis derived 
from the NISA database (which is overwhelmingly populated with cash-basis information), the 
payments under the proposed program should be increased by about 18% to be reflective of the 




7.0 Supply Managed Industries Under the Proposed Program 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a description and implications of the operation of the 
proposed program for supply managed products.  Under the current NISA program, supply 
managed commodities are not eligible commodities.  Producers of supply managed products are 
eligible for support under OFDIP.  The defence of the current programs and the treatment of 
farms with supply managed products relates to their need for stabilization and disaster coverage.  
Volatility in price as a source of instability in incomes is not the threat in supply managed 
industries that it is in other sectors.  Supply managed industries employ a variety of measures 
that prevent a surging supply or declining demand from adversely affecting price.  Similarly, 
increases in cost are at least partially considered in arriving at prices.  Thus, NISA coverage has 
not been extended to supply-managed products, and through OFIDP (as with all farm types), 
income coverage is provided, but with the equivalent of a 30% deductible provision.   
 
The proposed program will be available for farms that produce supply managed commodities.  
Because it replaces NISA (which has not been extended to supply managed farms), OFIDP and 
Market Revenue Insurance, the proposed program applies to supply managed farms, but with 
some refinements.  This section provides an analysis of these refinements and the implications 
for supply managed industries.    
 
7.1 Needs of Supply Managed Sectors 
As discussed above, the needs for stabilization and disaster relief (unlike other commodities) do 
not derive from output price volatility.  Instead, the need for stabilization and disaster protection 
derives from production related perils, such as animal disease, catastrophic mortality, and 
product spoilage losses.  These perils are currently protected against under OFDIP.  However, 
OFDIP only covers losses of more than 30%; it is likely that many production losses are of less 
than 30% and are thus not covered, despite the fact that the losses are substantial. 
 
A second source of need relates to diversified farms with supply managed products under the 
current programs.  Under the current NISA, sales of supply managed products are ineligible 
sales, while other farm sales (such as cash crops, for example) are eligible sales.  However, some 
of the direct expenses related to ineligible sales are either eligible purchases or eligible expenses.  
In many cases, the magnitude of eligible purchases or expenses associated with supply managed 
product (such as purchased feed) is large relative to eligible sales, making the effective coverage 
for eligible sales small (or even negative).  This masks the potential need for stabilization on the 
sales of non-supply managed products from farms that have supply-managed product sales. 
 
Table 7.1 below provides some context for the second source of need for stabilization.  The table 
presents the sources of total farm revenue on farms that reported sales of supply managed 
production in NISA.  The table shows that, across all sales categories, sales of supply managed 
product formed about 55% of farm sales, with cattle sales forming 22%, sales of grain and 
oilseeds 14%, and sales of other products about 10%.  There was a sharp distinction in 
diversification according to sales level.  The table indicates that, at an aggregate level, farms with 
$0-$25,000 in supply managed sales are not small farms; only 7% of sales came from supply 
managed products, with the majority in cattle, grain/oilseed, or other farm sales.  For farms with 
supply managed sales above $25,000, the case is entirely different.  For these farms, sales of  
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supply managed products are the largest single source of farm sales.  For the most part, as the 
farm size increases (level of sales increases) farms become more specialized in sales of supply 
managed product.  Thus, farms with supply managed sales are highly diversified into other 
enterprises, especially at lower sales levels. 
 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present a breakdown of the data in Table 7.1 into dairy and poultry farms.  
The trends noted above are reflected in both the dairy and poultry data.  In particular, the farms 
at the lowest levels of supply managed sales are highly diversified.  Even at the lowest level of 
supply managed sales, the farms with dairy sales of less than $25,000 have total farm sales of 
almost $100,000.  In contrast, the poultry farms with less than $25,000 in supply managed sales 
have total farm sales of only about $17,000.     
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Table 7.1 Diversification of Farms With Supply Managed Sales Based on 2001 Tax Year NISA Data  
Income Range  
(Sales Exclusively from 
Supply Managed Sector) 
No. of 
Participants 
Sales from SM 
Sectors  Sales of G&O  Sales of Cattle 
Sales from All 
Other Sector* 
Total Sales  
(Sales from all sectors 
including SM) 
$ 0 to $25,000  2,603 5,324,561 16,960,900 33,124,323 21,993,722 77,403,506 
      6.9%  21.9%  42.8%  28.4%  100.0% 
$25,000 to $50,000  288 11,245,243 4,076,084 7,897,554 2,833,607 26,052,489 
      43%  16%  30%  11%  100% 
$50,000 to $100,000  719 53,616,651 13,994,184 17,333,812 7,795,386 92,740,034 
      57.8%  15.1%  18.7%  8.4%  100.0% 
$100,000 to $250,000  977 152,118,620 29,601,534 59,352,414 14,593,586 255,666,154 
      59.5% 11.6% 23.2% 5.7%  100.0% 
$250,000 to $500,000  356 123,855,003 29,142,171 39,754,007 18,216,280 210,667,461 
      58.8% 13.8% 18.9% 8.6%  100.0% 
$500,000 to $1,000,000  92 59,665,921 13,176,496 7,871,108 4,258,050 84,971,575 
      70.2% 15.5% 9.3%  5.0%  100.0% 
> $1,000,000  18 23,828,649 3,574,535 3,157,784 7,299,356 37,860,324 
      62.9% 9.4% 8.3% 19.3%  100.0% 
Total 5,053 429,654,651 110,525,905 168,491,003 76,989,988 785,361,549 
% of Sales     54.7% 14.1% 21.5% 9.8%  100.0% 
* includes sales from hogs, tobacco, vegetables & fruit and all other sectors 
Note: % of sales by sector and by SM income range is shown underneath the total sales in each cell.  
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Table 7.2 Diversification of Farms With Dairy Sales Based on 2001 Tax Year NISA Data 
Income Range (Income 










Sales from All 
Other Sector* 
Total Sales(Sales 




$ 0 to $25,000  236 1,821,465 3,877,108 14,914,118 2,227,334 22,840,025        96,780  
      8.0%  17.0%  65.3%  9.8%  100.0%   
$25,000 to $50,000  118 3,528,447 1,896,678 4,305,529 802,632 10,533,286        89,265  
      33.5%  18.0%  40.9%  7.6%  100.0%   
$50,000 to $100,000  255 15,780,815 3,552,129 7,124,427 1,996,336 28,453,707      111,583  
      55.5%  12.5%  25.0%  7.0%  100.0%   
$100,000 to $250,000  1,393 161,076,695 26,100,479 56,514,553 9,363,295 253,055,022      181,662  
      63.7% 10.3%  22.3%  3.7%  100.0%   
$250,000 to $500,000  762 97,790,486 25,555,621 46,169,602 7,584,853 177,100,562      232,415  
      55.2% 14.4%  26.1%  4.3%  100.0%   
$500,000 to $1,000,000  144 51,717,524 8,769,291 8,265,713 1,732,662 70,485,190      489,480  
      73.4% 12.4%  11.7%  2.5%  100.0%   
> $1,000,000  16 14,593,753 3,295,183 3,264,140 7,296,484 28,449,560   1,778,098  
      51.3% 11.6%  11.5%  25.6%  100.0%   
Total  2,924 346,309,188 73,046,490 140,558,084 31,003,596 590,917,358      202,092  
% of Sales     58.6% 12.4%  23.8%  5.2%  100.0%   
* includes sales from hogs, tobacco, vegetables & fruit and all other sectors 
Note: % of sales by sector and by dairy income range are been shown underneath the total sales in each cell.  
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Table 7.3 Diversification of Farms With Poultry Sales Based on 2001 Tax Year NISA Data 
 
Income Range (Income 










Sales from All 
Other Sector* 
Total Sales(Sales 




$ 0 to $25,000  1,582 4,232,086 5,231,732 13,805,172 3,644,426 26,913,416          17,012  
      15.7%  19.4%  51.3%  13.5%  100.0%   
$25,000 to $50,000  60 1,823,565 2,717,615 1,948,768 1,930,502 8,420,450        140,341  
      21.7%  32.3%  23.1%  22.9%  100.0%   
$50,000 to $100,000  87 5,280,027 3,642,183 2,444,978 2,211,196 13,578,384        156,073  
      38.9%  26.8%  18.0%  16.3%  100.0%   
$100,000 to $250,000  168 22,418,585 6,575,786 4,435,671 8,159,410 41,589,452        247,556  
      53.9% 15.8%  10.7%  19.6%  100.0%   
$250,000 to $500,000  185 27,509,659 15,383,374 3,190,826 13,959,454 60,043,313        324,558  
      45.8% 25.6%  5.3%  23.2%  100.0%   
$500,000 to $1,000,000  42 21,053,329 3,658,839 1,134,862 1,927,790 27,774,820        661,305  
      75.8% 13.2%  4.1%  6.9%  100.0%   
> $1,000,000  6 13,759,435 997,983 821,083 541,794 16,120,295     2,686,716  
      85.4% 6.2%  5.1%  3.4%  100.0%   
Total  2,130 96,076,689 38,207,513 27,781,361 32,374,573 194,440,136          91,286  
% of Sales     49.4% 19.7%  14.3%  16.7%  100.0%   
* Includes sales from hogs, tobacco, vegetables & fruit and all other sectors 
Note: % of sales by sector and by poultry income range are shown underneath the total sales in each cell. 
 57
7.2 Support to Supply Managed Industries Under Current Programs 
To interpret the implications of the proposed program on supply management, it is useful to 
consider the support that farmers with sales of supply managed commodities receive under 
current programs.  Farmers who produce supply managed commodities are eligible for payments 
under OFIDP, for NISA benefits on sales of non-supply managed products, for crop insurance, 
and for MRI on sales of eligible products.  Table 7.2 below gives the magnitude of payments to 
producers with sales of supply managed products that constituted the majority of farm sales over 
the period 1998-2001.  The table shows that support to farms with supply managed sales under 
current programs has been increasing.  Total support paid to farms with supply managed 
production was over $12 million in 2001, with the majority of support paid to dairy.  Support 
under OFIDP has been relatively steady over the period.  However, government matching shares 
of NISA have more than doubled, and MRI payments increased almost six fold between 1998 
and 2001.    
 
Table 7.4 does not account for support of farms that have sales of supply managed products as a 
minority of total farm sales.  In 2001, there were 2,102 dairy and poultry farms in this category 
that received total NISA government matching shares of $4,723,928. 
 
Table 7.5 below presents the NISA Fund 1 and Fund 2 balances for farms with sales of supply 
managed products for the 2001 tax year broken down by supply managed sales level.  The table 
shows that producers with supply managed sales had $63 million in NISA accounts in 2001.  The 
majority of this balance was held by farms in the $100,000-250,000, $0-25,000, and $250,000-
$500,000 sales categories.  As indicated above, the farms with less than $25,000 in sales are very 
different than those above $100,000 in sales, although they are not small farms. 
 
Also apparent from Table 7.5, is that the NISA accounts held by producers with supply managed 
sales, in aggregate, are not being drawn down.  This can be seen by comparing the Fund 2 
balance with the Fund 1 balance, within a sales category.  Since withdrawals must occur from 
Fund 2 first, if stabilization needs were triggering withdrawals, one would expect Fund 2 
balances to be less than Fund 1.  Based on this logic, it appears that only the farms in the $25,000 
to $50,000 in supply managed sales have been triggering NISA withdrawals.        
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Table 7.4 Payments Under Current Programs, Farms with Supply Managed Sales>51% 
Farm Sales 
 
  1998  1999 2000 2001 
  Dairy  Poultry  Dairy Poultry Dairy Poultry Dairy Poultry 
NISA  1,694,056 365,627 2,156,736 460,977  2,397,328 454,013  3,458,698 995,491 
MRI  566,682 141,671  2,974,375 743,594 5,087,727 1,271,932  4,914,961 1,228,740
OFIDP  1,550,000 331,000 1,171,000 342,000  1,173,000 182,000  1,317,000 411,000 
Total  3,810,738 838,298 6,302,111 1,546,571 8,658,055 1,907,945 9,690,659 2,635,231
Total 
SM 
4,649,036 7,848,682 10,566,000 12,325,890 




Table 7.5 NISA Fund Balances For Supply Managed Operations, 2001 Tax Year 
 
Income Range (Income 

















$ 0 to $25,000  2,603 7,237,105 7,596,228  14,833,333 2,780 2,918 5,699
      48.8%  51.2%             
$25,000 to $50,000  288 1,595,660 1,505,547  3,101,207 5,540 5,228 10,768
      51.5%  48.5%             
$50,000 to $100,000  719 4,522,117 4,989,382  9,511,499 6,289 6,939 13,229
      47.5%  52.5%             
$100,000 to $250,000  977 7,760,071 8,364,217  16,124,288 7,943 8,561 16,504
      48.1%  51.9%             
$250,000 to $500,000  356 6,712,572 7,260,582  13,973,154 18,856 20,395 39,250
      48.0%  52.0%             
$500,000 to $1,000,000  92 2,289,387 2,777,468  5,066,855 24,885 30,190 55,075
      45.2%  54.8%             
> $1,000,000  18 535,061 627,237  1,162,298 29,726 34,847 64,572
      46.0%  54.0%             
Total 5,053 30,651,976 33,120,664  63,772,634 6,066 6,555 12,621
% of Sales     48.1%  51.9%             
Note: % distribution of total fund balances by producer and govt. fund are shown underneath the each cell of fund 1 and fund 
2.  
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Table 7.6 NISA Fund Balances For Dairy Operations, 2001 Tax Year 
 
Income Range (Income 




Fund 1 Total 
(Producer) 











$ 0 to $25,000  236 1,126,460 1,253,037  2,379,497 4,773 5,309 10,083
      47.3%  52.7%             
$25,000 to $50,000  118 440,769 452,060  892,829 3,735 3,831 7,566
      49.4%  50.6%             
$50,000 to $100,000  255 1,088,099 1,292,322  2,380,421 4,267 5,068 9,335
      45.7%  54.3%             
$100,000 to $250,000  1,393 7,496,198 8,114,038  15,610,236 5,381 5,825 11,206
      48.0%  52.0%             
$250,000 to $500,000  762 6,144,919 6,820,692  12,965,611 8,064 8,951 17,015
      47.4%  52.6%             
$500,000 to $1,000,000  144 1,674,761 2,212,934  3,887,695 11,630 15,368 26,998
      43.1%  56.9%             
> $1,000,000  16 505,486 624,681  1,130,167 31,593 39,043 70,635
      44.7%  55.3%             
Total 2,924 18,476,695 20,769,767  39,246,456 6,319 7,103 13,422
% of Sales     47.1%  52.9%             
Note: % distribution of total fund balances by producer and govt. fund are shown underneath the each cell of fund 1 and fund 
2.  
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7.3 Operation of the Proposed Program on Farms with Supply Managed Products 
As identified above, there are refinements in the application of the proposed program to supply 
managed programs.  Implicitly, the program design refinements relate to the proportion of the 
farm’s reference production margin derived from supply managed product sales.  The intent is to 
prevent payments from being made based on losses in supply managed enterprises on the farm 
(as distinct from other enterprises) in the stabilization layers.  Payments are to be made based on 
losses in non-supply managed enterprises in the stabilization layers, with payments to both 
supply managed and non-supply managed enterprises in the disaster layer.  To accomplish this, 
the following design is employed: 
 
•  The deposit levels, reference production margin, and payment cost shares are as described 
above, for all other commodities. 
•  Based on history, farm revenues are broken down into supply managed and non-supply 
managed sources. 
•  Within the two stabilization layers of income loss, payments triggered would be pro-rated 
based on the share of non-supply managed product revenue. 
•  For losses that reach the disaster layer, there would be no pro-rating; the full value of the 
payment would be triggered, with no pro-rating in any of the layers. 
 
Consider a stylized example.  Suppose a farm had a historic production margin of $100,000, 75% 
sales received from supply managed product, and 25% from sales of non-supply managed 
product.  Assume the farm had $14,000 on deposit, so it was effectively covered for a 70% loss.   
 
If the farm experienced a 20% loss in production margin, the following would occur: 
 
•  A program claim of $20,000 would be triggered.  Ordinarily, the $5000 loss below $85,000 
would be paid $3500 from government and $1500 from the producer deposit.  The loss 
between $85,000 and $100,000 would be evenly split $7500 each between producer and 
government.  The farm would receive $11,000 from government and deduct $9000 from its 
own account.  
•  In this case however, the program claim would be pro-rated according to the 25% share of 
non-supply managed sales.  The $5000 loss below $85,000 would be pro-rated at 25%, so the 
producer would receive $875 from government and withdraw $375 from his deposit.  The 
loss between $85,000 and $100,000 would be evenly split $1875 each between producer and 
government 
•  Thus, the farmer would receive $1875+$875 = $2750 from government and deduct 
$1875+$375 = $2250 from his deposit.  The farmer would have $11,750 ($14,000 – $2250) 
remaining in his account. 
 
Suppose, instead, that the farm experienced a loss of 40%.  Then the situation changes markedly: 
 
•  There is no pro-rating of the payments, because the loss reaches the disaster layer.  The 
farmer receives $26,000 (or 65% of the total loss) in government payments and receives the 
return of the entire $14,000 of his or her own deposit.  This is calculated as follows:  
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•  For the $10,000 loss between 60% and 70%, the producer’s share is $2,000 
(20%), and the government’s is $8,000. 
•  For the $15,000 loss between 70% and 85%, the producer’s share is $4,500 (30%) 
and the government’s share is $10,500. 
•  At this point, the producer has received $6,500 of the original deposit, thereby 
leaving $7,500.  Therefore, government pays another $7,500 to match this part 
between 85% and 100%.   
•  The total government contribution from the three portions is $26,000, while the 
farmer’s share is $14,000, and all of the loss is covered. 
Thus, the operation of the program and the support paid changes markedly based on the 
dimension of loss.  Furthermore, net of program payments, there are ranges of loss at which the 
producer is better off having an increased loss of production margin and triggering additional 
program payouts.  This is illustrated in Figure 7.1 below.  The figure reflects results for a farm 
with $100,000 reference production margin, 75% of farm sales from supply managed product, 
and $14,000 on deposit (which protects 70% coverage, as described above).  The figure shows 
that, moving from right to left on the production margin scale (so losses are increasing), the 
production margin with program payments (from government) takes the production margin with 
the proposed program above the production margin without protection, and that the production 
margins with and without the proposed program are downward sloping.   
 
However, as the losses cross into the disaster layer, the production margin with the proposed 
program kinks up.  This is because, once losses take the production margin into the disaster 
level, the pro-rating component disappears.  Looking at Figure 7.1, the apparent implication is 
that the producer’s production margin with the proposed program is largest for small losses down 
to between $85,000 to $90,000, but then, because of the kink, at levels of $65,000.  Thus, a 
farmer would be better off with a production margin of $69,000 than with a production margin of 
$75,000.  This represents a moral hazard problem within the program.      
 
•  Interaction between proposed program and COP formulae 
•  Splitting farms into SM and non-SM segments 
•  Animal health catastrophes 
 
7.4 Trade Risk and Program Design  
Given the moral hazard problem discussed above, the obvious question to ask is whether the 
program can be re-designed for supply managed commodities.  The rationale for the design of 
the proposed program for farms with supply-managed sales is the following: 
 
•  According to federal government trade experts, once losses have penetrated the disaster tier, 
all payments made by government (in the disaster and stabilization layers) would be ruled 
“green” under the WTO.    
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•  In contrast, if the program involved pro-rating in the stabilization layers when the losses had 
penetrated the disaster layer, the payments in the disaster layer would be ruled green, but 
payments in the stabilization layers would be ruled “amber” under WTO. 
 
Figure 7.1 Program Payments triggered According to Production Margin Loss for a Farm 

































































Thus, the design allows the proposed program to be more “trade friendly”.  Also, the design 
allows the producer to make full use of their deposit when losses push income into the disaster 
tier.  The pro-rating otherwise limits the access the producer has to deposits when losses fall 
within the stabilization layers.   
 
7.5 Program Design Alternatives for Supply Management 
The discussion above suggests that the proposed program contains fundamental design 
difficulties as it relates to supply management.  The apparent problems with the design under the 
proposed BRM program are the following: 
 
•  Moral hazard related to pro-rating within stabilization tiers relative to losses in the disaster 
layer 
•  Funding for stabilization of non-supply managed enterprises on farms with supply managed 
production relative to those without supply managed production 
•  Perceived or real trade threats resulting from payments to farms with supply managed 
production 
 
Alternatives to the design contained in the proposed BRM program must address these issues. 
 
In this regard, several alternatives are evident.  These are presented in Table 7.7 below.  The first 
alternative would reinstate the pro-rating in the stabilization layers for margin losses that 
penetrate the disaster layer.  This would clearly address the moral hazard problem, and 
effectively remove the “kink” depicted in Figure 7.1.  Producers that sustained a margin loss 
would not have the incentive to intensify the margin loss into the disaster layer as a means to 
recover the pro-rated payments in the stabilization layer.  However, it does not address the fact 
that, for a given loss in a non-supply management enterprise, a farm with supply managed 
production would only receive a fraction of the portion of the payment that a farm with only non-
supply managed production did.  From the trade retaliation perspective, it would appear that this 
alternative would be an improvement.  This is because it would pay out less to farmers that 
triggered payments in the disaster layer compared with the proposed design; however, it would 
do little in terms of matching payments with the enterprise that triggered it.  Stabilization 
payments could be triggered by either supply managed or non-supply managed enterprises in the 
stabilization tiers, with the pro-rating applying regardless.   
 
The second alternative is the moral equivalent of the current OFIDP program converted to a 
production margin basis with eligibility for crop insurance and an MRI replacement.  It would 
clearly reduce the moral hazard problem, because it only provides payments below 70% of 
reference.  So, it has a 30% “deductible”.  It would also reduce the trade threat, because it would 
only trigger a payment below 70% of reference.  The MRI replacement could be conceived as a 
potential trade irritant, but it is not a trade threat to supply management per se.  However, this 
approach would not provide any stabilization support for non-supply managed enterprises on 
farms with supply managed production.  This is in clear conflict with the second bullet above.  
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The third alternative would see only costs and returns from non-supply managed enterprises used 
in the production margin calculation.  This would reduce the moral hazard problem relative to 
the BRM proposal, because there would be no incentive to intensify a production margin loss.   
  
Table 7.7 Alternatives for Supply Management Under Proposed Program 
 
1.  Re-instate the pro-rating in the stabilization layers for claims that penetrate the 
disaster layer 
2. Convert current OFIDP coverage to production margin basis, with an MRI 
replacement and crop insurance   




However, it is evident that there could be significant potential for moral hazard or manipulation 
of costs to trigger a payment, particularly when the supply-managed enterprise is the customer 
for the product of the non-supply managed enterprise.  For example, on a dairy farm with cash 
crop sales, under this approach it would appear that if hay acreage were expanded (with a 
corresponding reduction in cash crop acreage) depending upon the hay price quoted to the dairy 
enterprise, a payment could be triggered.  This would particularly be the case if the hay were 
transferred at cost.  There would also be a tendency to transfer expense items from the dairy 
enterprise to the crop enterprise opportunistically.  Conceivably, these distortions could be 
managed and enforced by program administration, but probably only at additional expense.  It 
appears that the supply managed boards’ proposal would give equivalent protection for non-
supply managed sales regardless of whether it occurs on a farm with supply managed sales or 
not.  It would also seem that the supply managed boards’ claim that their proposal provides a 
clear indication that support can be more closely related to products with losses and not paid to 
supply managed enterprises is probably correct.  At the same time, supply managed enterprises 
would lose any support in the disaster layer. 
 
7.6 Ontario Supply Management Boards’ Proposal 
Supply management groups have indicated concerns about the proposed program.  These 
include: 
 
•  Lack of recognition of the three pillars of supply management in the APF 
•  Perceived risks of trade retaliation resulting from inclusion of supply management in the 
BRM program 
 
The supply management boards feel that the three pillars of supply management (import 
controls, production controls, price setting) provide adequate support for supply managed 
enterprises.  As such, under their proposal, supply management commodities would be excluded 
from the proposed program.  Non-supply management enterprises on farms with sales of supply 
managed products would be eligible for the proposed program.  This design would be 
administered by either:  
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•  Producers operating supply management enterprises as distinct business entities from non-
supply management enterprises, subject to audit by program administration, or 
•  Pro-rate sales and eligible expenses on farms that have supply managed and non-supply 
managed sales based on industry average production margin ratios for supply managed 
commodities. 
 
As described, the supply management boards’ proposal is essentially equivalent to alternative 3 
above.  
 
As a consequence of this design, the supply management boards argue that a penalty exists 
against non-supply management enterprises on farms with supply managed sales under the 
proposed BRM design will be removed.  They also argue that their proposed design more closely 
relates program payments to individual products (rather than whole-farm, on the basis of the 
majority of sales), which would be more defensible in the face of trade retaliation.   
 
7.7 Observations 
It appears that any of the alternatives described in sections 7.5 or 7.6 would improve upon the 
design in the proposed BRM program.  However, none of them appears to entirely address the 
three concerns described above.  Under the first design alternative, non-supply managed products 
produced on farms with supply managed sales are at a disadvantage relative to the same products 
produced on farms without supply management.  This is also true under the second alternative.  
The third alternative effectively puts non-supply managed products on equal footing regardless 
of whether the farm producing them has supply managed sales; however this comes at the cost of 
lost disaster support for supply managed enterprises, and some potential for opportunistic 
allocation of costs.  It appears that those representing supply management favour the third 
alternative. 
 
The only question about the third alternative is whether it may call into question the “whole 
farm” concept, thereby jeopardizing another commodity in a trade action.  In other words, if 
dairy and poultry were not included in the program, then another country may question whether 
the program is generally available to all farms in Canada in a trade action against another 
product.  This would make the program amber, and therefore, countervailable.  If it is clear that 
this is not a risk, then we would favour making supply managed commodities ineligible for 
support under the program, as the supply management boards have suggested.  If not, then we 
would recommend that they be eligible for the disaster portion only, and payments be pro-rated 








8.0 Potential for Trade Disputes Under Proposed Program 
 
Among the concerns with any new safety net program, is its potential to cause retaliatory trade 
actions from other countries.  The purpose of this section is to consider the potential for the 
proposed program to cause trade disputes, relative to current programs.  Section 8.1 considers the 
distribution of support levels between “green” and “amber” categories.  The potential for the 
proposed program to trigger countervailing duty action from the US is considered in Section 8.2.   
  
8.1 Green and Amber 
As indicated above, concern that has been expressed about the proposed Business Risk 
Management program is that it may invite a trade dispute.  This concern has at least three 
elements: 
 
•  The distinction between “green” and “amber” payments and Canada’s limits on aggregate 
support. AAFC proposes to change the definition of what is green and what is amber in 
reporting payments to farmers under the new program.   
•  A possible US countervailing duty action. 
•  Possible implications for supply managed commodities because of the definition of green 
and amber. (This issue was discussed in section 7.0). 
 
The first of these issues stems, in part, from the definitions of what is green and what is amber 
under the proposed programs, a distinction defined under the 1995 WTO agreement. Green 
instruments are those that governments could continue to use without having to reduce their 
expenditure, and without concern about countervailing duties being imposed by importers of the 
product whose producers are the beneficiaries in the domestic market. Amber instruments are 
those for which government spending was supposed to be reduced after the 1995 agreement, and 
which remained countervailable
8.  Governments are required to report to the WTO each year the 
amount of expenditure on amber instruments.  They each have a limit on the amount of money 
that can be spent on amber instruments, so the reporting mechanism is the way that the WTO 
monitors compliance with the agreement.   
 
A government program that directly compensates farmers for “losses” is defined as green under 
the 1995 WTO agreement if two requirements are met: 
 
•  Compensation must be generally available for losses to the entire farm, not to an 
individual commodity. 
•  Compensation must be for losses of 30 percent or more of “income” during a base period.  
 
Based on these requirements, Canada historically classified payments under NISA as amber and 
those under the Disaster program as green.  This is because, by definition, NISA withdrawals 
from Fund 2 could be made in a year when a farmer’s net income was lower than in a reference 
period by less than 30%.  Disaster payments were regarded as green because they were made 
                                                 
8 This is true under the so-called “peace clause”, but it is due to expire at the end of 2003.    
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when income in a given year declined by more than 30% from a reference period
9.  An important 
distinction is that, under the existing programs, payments under the disaster portion restored 
producers’ incomes to 70% of the reference margins.  
 
The proposed program essentially integrates the disaster and NISA concepts into a single new 
structure.  Therefore, the definitions of amber and green are not so clear because a loss of more 
than 30% now triggers a payment that can restore a farmer to 100% of a reference.  For example, 
a loss of 40% of the reference margin will trigger a payment that would restore a farmer’s 
income to 100% of the reference, so long as the farmer’s deposit is sufficient.  So the issue arises 
with the proposed program as to whether, when a payment is triggered by a loss greater than 
30% of the reference, the payment is green or amber. 
 
AAFC has chosen, on the basis of a legal opinion, to argue that the definition should be based on 
what triggers a payment.  Therefore, a payment triggered by a loss of less than 30% remains 
amber.  But a payment triggered by a loss of more than 30% is regarded as green, whether the 
payment is in the portion of the program that is shared 80/20, or the portions that are shared 
70/30 or 50/50. 
 
This means that a higher portion of the proposed program will be regarded as green if Canada’s 
definition is accepted.  The upside of this is that Canada will be better able to ensure that its 
Aggregate Measure of Support limit is met.  We estimated the difference in the simulation of the 
proposed program for Ontario, as reported in section 3.0, compared to payments from the 
existing program under NISA and MRI.  Green payments with the current programs were for 
about $123 mil from 1998 – 2001.  Under the proposed program, they are estimated at $455 mil 
for the same period, based on the NISA database. 
 
The issues are whether this is the correct definition of green and amber and, if not, what might be 
the consequences.  The first question is not answerable according to information from Canadian 
trade officials. To date, each country has interpreted the WTO rules and submitted their data 
accordingly.  To date, no country has appealed another’s definition.  Moreover, the European 
Union recently changed the nature of its farm programs to decouple payments from production.  
This will materially redistribute its payments to farmers from amber to green.  This decision is 
regarded as a major breakthrough that will lead to progress in the current round of negotiations.  
The proposed Canadian program is less questionable than the EU’s.  While there are no 
guarantees, we do not perceive that there is a substantial risk.   
 
Another way to look at this question is to estimate the impact if the definition is questioned.  If 
so, then we assume that Canada would need to amend its definition to include only the portion of 
payments triggered by losses greater than 30% of the reference margin that bring farmers back to 
70% of the reference.  It was possible to estimate this in the simulations for the proposed 
program. The simulation shows that, with this alternative definition, the estimated green 
payments for Ontario would have been $224 million from 1998 – 2001.   
 
                                                 
9 Of course, income was measured on a cash basis for NISA, and on a modified accrual basis for the disaster 
component, so less than or greater than 30% was of two different levels of income.    
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8.2 The Countervail Issue 
The countervail issue is much less about the definition of green and amber than about the 
distribution of payments among commodities.  The idea of countervail under international law is 
that an importing country may impose a tariff on an exporter if the exporting country provides 
subsidies to its producers, the effects of which causes injury to producers in the importing 
country.  
 
One way to avoid countervailing duties is to provide financial assistance through whole-farm 
programs – i.e. program whose payments are not triggered by factors that occur in a 
commodity’s market. With a whole-farm program, it is perceived that payments do not 
encourage production of a specific product.  For example, if a countervail action was initiated 
against a grain commodity, there is little doubt that the Market Revenue Insurance program 
would be countervailable because its payments are triggered by events in the grain markets.  
With a NISA or BRM program, it is much more difficult to countervail. 
 
Nevertheless, Canada has experienced a number of countervail cases brought by the US, and it is 
important to understand US practice.  A case in point was the countervail case brought against 
Canada by the US on beef and cattle.  In their final determination for part of this case, the US 
Commerce Department explains its concept of “disproportionate use” of a program.  The 
relatively vague explanation amounts to a case-by-case examination to determine whether an 
industry under examination obtains more benefits from a program than others relative to the 
importance of the industry.  In addition, a general program would likely be countervailable if the 
triggering mechanism for one industry was different than for another.  
 
There is also some unofficial information to suggest that the US tends to judge a general program 
as countervailable if around 15% of its benefits go to an industry that is being investigated.   
 
All of this suggests that the proposed BRM program is an issue if it materially changes the 
distribution of benefits among industries.  If it does then it may increase the likelihood of being 
countervailed if an investigation is launched. It is possible, at least for the Ontario data, to obtain 
a view of the risk of countervail.  Again, returning to the simulation in section in section 3.0 it is 
possible to compare the distribution of benefits from the actual and proposed programs. The 
estimates of the share of payments to various commodity groups is shown in Table 8.1 for the 
period 1998 - 2001. 
 
The data show that the proposed programs would increase the portion of benefits that go to the 
beef and grain industries, while the proportion to horticulture falls.  The differences are 
relatively minor and do not appear to be enough different to have a material impact on the 
interpretation.  
 
A final thought on this subject is that the proposed program’s structure may have an advantage 
in avoiding countervail.  In the event that the peace clause expires at the end of 2003 and is not 
renewed, there is no guarantee that green programs will not be countervailed.  OFIDP was 
green.  As the simulations of programs show, farms in most industries can trigger payments in 
the upper 30% of the range of the reference margin at any time.  However, payments triggered  
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for losses greater than 30% tend to occur either because of a disaster on an individual farm, or 
because of an industry disaster.  Therefore, specific industries tend to dip into the region greater 
than 30% losses only periodically because of events in their business cycles.  Therefore, the 
proportion of benefits accruing to individual industries from the disaster portion is much more 
variable than the proportion from the combined program.  By integrating the disaster and 
stabilization portions, the proposed BRM may actually reduce the risk of countervail. 
 
Table 8.1 Estimate of the Share of Payments to Various Commodities Under the Current 
and Proposed Programs, 1998 – 2001 NISA Participants 
 
  Current Program  Proposed Program 
 Total  Payments 
Share of 
Total 




Field Crops  $322,605,036 50.2% $342,973,066  51.2%
Vegetables and 
Fruit $91,510,268 14.2% $83,854,979  12.5%
Green House 
(F&V) $11,647,273 1.8% $10,668,740  1.6%
Poultry $3,224,488 0.5% $5,151,661  0.8%
Dairy $13,227,791 2.1% $9,632,345  1.4%
Swine $82,500,427 12.8% $68,820,261  10.3%
Beef $46,476,698 7.2% $54,342,383  8.1%
Feedlot (Beef)  $21,485,520 3.3% $35,815,718  5.3%
Tobacco $49,920,335 7.8% $58,832,107  8.8%




The foregoing discussion suggests that the proposed program is not likely to be any less “green” 
than its predecessors.  At most, the objection could be raised that payments in the stabilization 
portion of the program that are triggered by losses in the disaster portion are amber.  Even if this 
question was raised and Canada lost, the proposed program would continue to have a higher 
portion of green payments.  Given the major changes that are about to occur in the EU’s 
programs, and the fact that to date all countries have been allowed their own interpretation of 
their own programs, it is doubtful that any objection would be raised. 
 
Similarly, there seems to be very little additional issue about countervailability of the proposed 
program.  Estimated proportions of payout under the proposed program would not materially 
change the distribution and, therefore, would not likely cause a difference in the interpretation 




9.0 Impact of Other Jurisdictions’ Farm Policies Under the Proposed 
Program 
  
Economic injury because of other countries’, especially US, agricultural policy is a major 
preoccupation of many people in the Canadian grain industry.  This type of injury can occur on a 
one-off basis, such as dumping, or it can occur systematically over time.  The latter would occur 
if subsidies in a competing nation encourage excess production that systematically drives down 
prices relative to what they would have been absent the subsidy. 
  
Members of the grain industry in Canada have long held that they suffer from systematic injury.  
Their argument results from the high levels of subsidy that continue to be paid by the US and EU 
governments (Table 9.1) to grain producers. The table shows the percentages that subsidies 
represented of total revenues before and after the most recent round of WTO trade negotiations.  
They also show that subsidies were nearly as great after as before. While there are many other 
factors that affect prices, subsidies by these two powers are certainly among them.  Part of the 
reason for the Market Revenue Insurance program is to deal with this problem.  The MRI does so 
by making payments to farmers when the price in Canada is below a 15-year moving average.   
The industry has concerns that the BRM will not be effective in dealing with systematic injury as 
well as the MRI does.  
 
Table 9.1 Producer Subsidy Equivalents for the US and the EU, 19886-1988 and 1999-2001, 
Percentage 
 
United States  European Union   
1986-1988 1999-2001 1986-1988  199-2001 
Wheat  49 46 52 48 
Maize  38 31 52 40 
Oilseeds  8  26 59 39 
  
  
It is not obvious how to make a conclusion about this allegation.  It is clearly true the MRI 
addresses prices in the industry directly.  However, farms are rarely specialized in one or two 
enterprises.  Therefore, the effects of interaction among commodities on a farm’s risk profile are 
important, and MRI does not account for this. 
  
Moreover, the use of a 15-yr average is not necessarily a better or worse basis than some other 
base – whether it is good or not depends on what has happened recently.  For example, corn 
prices were relatively high in 1996 and 1997.  Because of lags and inertia, these prices will never 
have a large impact on a 15-yr average, but their effects will be in the average for 15 years.  On 
the other hand, they will have a large impact on the support prices until 2002 for the five-year 
average, but will not affect them at all thereafter.  Of course, the same is true of exceptionally 
low prices. 
  
In addition, to the foregoing is the practical question of how much relationship grain prices and 
production margins have to each other.  If they are highly correlated, then a price stabilization  
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program such as MRI would be an effective stabilization tool.  If they are not correlated, then                               
an instrument such as MRI would not be effective.   
  
Accordingly, we tested the correlation between grain prices and production margins.  The 
procedure used is as follows. 
  
The NISA database for Ontario of 13,757 accounts has 7,452 cash crop accounts.  Of the 7,452, a 
sample of 5,347 was chosen because more than 75% of their total farm revenue is from the sale 
of cash crops.  The production margins for each of these farms were calculated for each of 1994 
through 2001.  Each farm’s production margin was expressed as a percentage of the farm’s sales 
and then expressed as production margin per $1000 of farm sales.   
 
For a representation of the crop market price, average Ontario yields and prices for each of 1994-
2001 for corn, soybeans and wheat were multiplied to estimate per acre revenue for each crop.  
Then, based on a 2:2:1 corn:soybean:wheat acreage allocation with normal rotation, crop revenue 
per acre was estimated for 1994-2001.  Using the latter as a price variable, correlation 
coefficients were estimated between each farm’s production margin over this period and the crop 
basket’s revenue per acre. The simple average correlation coefficient was -0.1573.  
Subsequently, the per acre revenue estimate was normalized for yield by using the 1994-2001 
average yield and annual prices.  The resulting estimates were then correlated with each farm’s 
production margin over 1994 – 2001 and averaged.  The resulting coefficient was -0.1553. 
 
Correlations were also calculated between farm sales - i.e. total revenue – and the two estimates 
of per acre revenues (using actual yields and normalized yields).  The resulting correlations were 
-0.1751 and -0.2234, respectively. 
 
These results say that, from 1994 – 2001 there was very little correlation between either farm 
sales or production margins for Ontario grain farms and annual average prices of corn, soybeans 
and wheat.  In fact, the correlations were weakly negative: ie sales and margins were higher 
when prices were lower. This surprising result likely occurs over 5,400 farms for a number of 
reasons, including: even relatively specialized grain farms are relatively diversified; they don’t 
sell on annual averages, but rather have a wide array of ways to sell; they have flexibility in the 
timing of sales. 
  
Whatever the cause, the data show little correlation between prices and the end result shows 
little to no correlation between margins over time.  By inference, there is a direct correlation 
between total revenue and production margin.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the BRM 
program will be more effective in providing support when revenue is down in the short term.  A 
stabilization program is, by definition, designed to reduce income instability.  It is not designed 






10.0 Insurance – Issues and Opportunities  
 
Several insurance issues and opportunities presented themselves as this project unfolded.  One is 
that the APF promises a number of additional “production” insurance products will be 
introduced over the next five years, but there is no indication of what they may be.  We 
conducted a number of focus groups and interviews with farmers and insurance providers to 
identify some potentially feasible alternatives.  This is also an important consideration in the 
transition period. 
 
A second issue is the linkage between insurance and the transfer component of the BRM 
program.  The proposed linkage is that production insurance payments are regarded as income, 
and production insurance premiums are regarded as expenses.  To some extent, this means that 
insurance and the BRM may be regarded as substitutes for each other, and there is concern that 
enrolment in production insurance will decline.  Hence, this section explores alternate linkages.  
 
A third issue is the development of an insurance/option instrument that could replace cash 
deposits by farmers.  They are addressed in section 10.3. 
 
10.1 Enhanced Insurance Products 
Based on discussions with farmers and insurance providers, it would appear that there is 
potential to initiate production insurance products in the following areas.   
 
Livestock 
The livestock industry currently has no production insurance, except for relatively extreme 
insurance against death loss for high value animals (e.g. prize breeding stock, race horses).  With 
the advent of the BRM program, two potential products are suggested: 
•  Mortality insurance.  This product would most likely be based on each individual 
producer’s own history of mortality, and would pay off if mortality increased 
substantially.  It might be limited to specific or sets of perils – e.g. disease outbreaks.  
To be practical, it would likely carry a deductible – e.g. if your historical mortality is 
5%, the instrument would not pay unless mortality increased to some specified 
percentage such as 8% or 10%.  It might be segmented for various stages of 
productions – e.g. sows, weanlings, nursery, finishing – because of differential risks 
at the various stages. 
 
A product of this sort, like production insurance, would provide risk management for 
uncontrollable events.  The only negative that was mentioned by our focus groups 
from a farm management perspective is that it might reward poor husbandry.  
However, with a deductible, specific perils, and the requirement of actuarial 
soundness (i.e. premiums increase if performance worsens), there should be no more 
reward than is provided by any other type of insurance. 
 
•  Negative margin insurance. There is no question that livestock operations, especially 
those that focus on finishing cattle, hogs or sheep, have a higher probability than 
other farms of a negative production margin under the proposed BRM.  This is  
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because these operations buy feeders and sell finished animals. The cost of feeders is 
an eligible expense in the BRM and, therefore, cash costs are relatively high 
compared to revenue.  Hence there is more probability that these operations could 
experience negative production margins.  The proposed BRM does not compensate 
for losses greater than the reference margin.   Therefore, livestock producers are less 
well protected than other farmers.   
 
The recent outbreak of BSE illustrates the problem with this and, therefore, a gap in 
the BRM program.  As one observer said, “there are disasters and there are disasters”.  
One such as the BSE problem can’t likely be handled by this program because it is 
unprecedented – a combination of a small disease outbreak and the closing of borders 
for an exported product.  If borders remain closed for a protracted period of time, then 
both the negative margin component and the spending cap of $1.1 bil of federal 
money will likely be restrictions. 
 
There are at least two potential solutions to the issue of negative margins.  The first is 
to define production margin differently for the livestock industries.  While this may 
be intuitively appealing, it likely invites the US to include any payments to these 
industries in any countervail action in the future because the program would likely be 
deemed to be not generally available.   
 
The second is to develop a negative margin insurance product specifically for the 
livestock industries.  Again, this likely would need to be associated with specific 
hazards to distinguish between the uncontrollable risk such as a border closing and 
simply overpaying for inputs.   
 
Although the foregoing discussion is couched in terms of livestock, it is also possible 
to develop negative margin insurance for farms with other specializations as well.  
The feasibility probably depends on the specificity of the perils, and the number 
potential clients over which the risks are shared. 
 
Horticulture  
This is also a “transition” issue.   The reason SDRM exists is that production insurance was not 
adequate for many horticultural products and the four percent top-up in SDRM was perceived to 
provide a degree of equity with government’s contribution to production insurance in the field 
crop industry.  It is clear from the analysis in section 3.0 that horticultural producers will be less 
well off under the proposed BRM, assuming there is no replacement for SDRM, and assuming 
that market conditions for horticulture remain as stable as during 1998 – 2001. 
 
 Over the past decade the horticultural industry has grown and matured.  It is possible that 
additional insurance products can now be developed to replace some or all of SDRM.  
Horticulture is complex, and many parts are small, thereby providing few farm units over which 
to spread risk in calculating premiums.  So, the opportunities need to focus on areas that have the 
highest potential payoff for production insurance products.  One possibility is to introduce 
weather derivative products that insure against rainfall, temperature, or frost.  If they could be 
applied to a range of products, they could be far more cost effective than more general coverage  
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of individual crops.  Despite the foregoing statement, other possibilities include extending more 
traditional crop insurance to additional crops whose acreage has expanded in recent years. 
 
Replacing Market Revenue Insurance (MRI) 
MRI is a companion program that will be phased out over three years and replaced after the 
transition period.  It is specific to the grain and oilseed industries.   
 
The Province of Alberta introduced
10, for the current fiscal year, an insurance product that 
insures a price or a minimum price for farm products.  It has some similarities to the MRI 
concept.  But it is insurance, not an income transfer instrument.  Its pay out is not based on an 
historic average.  But it does provide a floor under prices.   
 
There are alternative ways that a price insurance mechanism could be established and several are 
likely candidates for insurance.  This is an area where the private sector is very much involved 
because the grain handling industry offers forward pricing services, and has an interest in 
procuring supplies.  As a transitional idea, it would seem appropriate for an insurance provider 
such as AGRICORP to work with grain and oilseed producers and the handling industry to 
develop appropriate insurance products to replace MRI. 
 
10.2 Linkages Between Production Insurance and BRM Transfer Payments 
A major concern about the BRM program is that farmers may reduce their use of production 
insurance because it directly covers the loss of margin no matter the source of the loss, at a lower 
cost than production insurance.  This is especially important for the horticultural processing 
industry because production insurance facilitates the industry’s efficient operation.  
 
Five alternative linkages between the proposed program and production insurance were 
discussed: 
•  The one currently proposed, in which the production insurance premium is an eligible 
expense and payments are eligible revenues.  With this linkage, production insurance 
can provide protection from negative margins, the BRM program pays out after 
production insurance payments have been received, and the revenue from production 
insurance adds to the farmer’s future reference margin
11. 
•  Make production insurance mandatory in order to enrol in the proposed program. 
•  “Impute” the value of production insurance (regardless of whether it was taken) and 
adjust payments under the proposed program. (This is a variant on the foregoing 
alternative). 
                                                 
10 See Appendix II for a comparison of the Alberta program and MRI.  
11 A variant to this alternative that has been suggested to us is (since production insurance is expected to be 
actuarially sound and farmers share the cost with government), make only the farmer’s portion of production 
insurance an eligible revenue and eligible expense. This may be a useful interim measure for horticultural producers. 
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•  Use an incentive scheme to induce farmers to continue to take production insurance.  
For example, if, as a result of production insurance, payments under the proposed 




The relationship that is currently proposed is extremely important to understand because 
including any payout from production insurance affects the reference margin.  For example, 
assume a farm has a $100,000 reference margin and, before production insurance, experiences a 
$40,000 loss in a given year (i.e. $60,000 production margin).  Now assume the farm receives a 
production insurance payment of $25,000.  Adding this to $60,000 brings the production margin 
in that year to $85,000.  This is included in the Olympic average to calculate the new reference 
margin, which means a higher potential level of support for the farm in future years because the 
insurance payment is included.   
 
The idea of rebating the farm by the amount of the savings to the BRM is appealing on a number 
of grounds.  Return to the foregoing example, and add the assumption that the farm’s premium 
for production insurance is $2500.  
 
Now, let’s look at the outcome from the farmer’s perspective.  The farmer would receive 
$25,000 from insurance, and $15,000 from the BRM.  The farmer’s “cost” would be the 
insurance premium of  $2500 the farmer’s share of the top tier of the program – i.e. $7500.  The 
farm would use $85,000 in calculating the reference margin next year.   
 
What if the farm did not have production insurance? In this case, the farm receives $40,000 from 
BRM, of which the farmer’s cost is $14,000 (i.e. $2000 from the disaster tier, $4500 from the 
second tier, and $7500 from the top tier of the program).   The farm would use $60,000 to 
calculate the reference margin in the future.  In other words, the farm is worse off by the 
difference between the production insurance premium and the farmer’s share of the BRM, as 
well as by the loss in the reference margin.  
 
Of course, the outcome changes in the example if the insurance premium is higher.  In any event, 
it’s not possible to determine the optimum decision before the fact because the outcome can’t be 
predicted in a given year.  However, if one expects a significant loss one year in five from 
natural causes, then this argument breaks down because the Olympic average is used in the 
program.  In other words, if I only expect to have a substantial claim on my crop insurance one 
year in five, then that year is the one I would drop from the Olympic average.  So, the inability to 
claim on production insurance does not decrease my reference margin, but paying crop insurance 
premiums every year is a cost and it does reduce my reference margin.  Therefore, if this is my 
expectation, then there is no incentive to take insurance even with the link to rebate the premium.  
Once again, the problem here is the use of the Olympic average. 
 
From the BRM’s perspective, especially with a relatively fixed funding envelope, the difference 
between the two situations is substantial.  If the farmer enrols in production insurance, the cost to 
                                                 
12 Since this project started, apparently this proposal has been accepted by the federal government and will be 
implemented.  
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the BRM of this example is $7500.  If not, the cost is $26,000. From both the perspective of the 
ability of public funds to assist more people and fiscal responsibility, there is incentive to 
encourage farmers to enrol in insurance.  Moreover, farmers can see that, from a community 
perspective, enrolling in insurance provides more opportunity for the BRM program to assist 
other people.  Overall, it would appear sensible to rebate the insurance premium back to the 
farmer because of the savings to the BRM program.  In this example the program still makes a 
$23,500 savings.  Moreover, we would recommend that the rebate be added to the calculation of 
the reference margin – either as an additional insurance payment or as a reduction of the eligible 
expense. Also, for a number of reasons, this being one, we recommend that the Olympic average 
not be used to calculate the reference margin. 
 
There seems to be little appetite among either most farm organizations or politicians to require 
farmers to enrol in production insurance and/or to deem that they have to.  However, the 
processing vegetable industry in Ontario feels quite  strongly that production insurance should be 
mandatory for participation in the BRM program, especially if the Olympic average is used as 
proposed.  That industry needs crop insurance is an integral part of the supply chain.  The 
Processing Vegetable Board fears that the rebate mechanism will not be enough to encourage all 
growers to take crop insurance if the Olympic average remains.  We concur that it should be 
mandatory when industry representatives feel it is important to do so to ensure efficient 
operations.    
 
10.3 Developing A Deposit Instrument 
One of the criticisms of the BRM program is that it requires a large amount of capital to be tied 
up unproductively. One farmer summed up the reaction quite nicely in a focus group. “We were 
told that NISA has to go because there is too much money sitting in NISA accounts.  Now we 
find out it’s being replaced by a program that ties up even more!” 
 
In earlier sections we discussed the possibility that balances in NISA accounts could be rolled 
over to provide the financing for farmers’ deposits, and the possibility of using loans or letters of 
credit. A third alternative is to develop an insurance “option” for the deposit.   Based on 
discussions to date with an insurer, this option would have the following characteristics: 
 
•  It would be a Call on the issuer for 18.5% of the producer’s reference margin.   
•  18.5% is chosen because it represents a “deductible” of 7.5%.  The maximum 
producer deposit to the program is 26%, and the top tier of the program requires a 
producer deposit of 7.5%.  So, the deductible portion essentially means that the 
producer would be responsible for the top tier – including the deposits and the 
claims.
13 A deductible of this nature would substantially reduce both claims and 
transactions costs on the part of the insurer, thereby materially reducing the premium 
required to fund it. 
                                                 
13 If the program was changed to a 40/60 producer/government cost sharing arrangement, then the deductible would 
be 6% instead of 7.5%.  
 78
•  The Call would then be exercised any time a producer has a claim of more than 15% 
of the reference margin.  The producer would receive any money from the insurer that 
is required, above 7.5%, to provide the producer’s deposit.  So, if a producer with a 
$100,000 reference margin experienced a $50,000 loss in a claim year, the producer 
would have provided $7500 in deposit, would exercise the Call and receive $8500 
from the insurer.  This would be forwarded to the government which would write the 
producer a cheque for $50,000 – i.e. $34,000 for the government’s portion, $8500 
representing the Call, and $7500 representing the producer’s deposit. 
 
Note that the difference between the Call and a letter of credit from a lender is that the farmer 
would pay back the lender when a claim is paid (who would then issue a new letter of credit), but 
would not repay the insurer.  Presumably, the producer would buy a new Call for the following 
year or years.     
 
10.4 The Option As an Administration Fee 
The foregoing implies that requiring a producer deposit is for the program is needed.  We see no 
reason why a deposit is necessary.  An alternative is to simply charge an administration fee for 
the program based on the likely use of it by an industry or individual.  If a fee was to be charged 
on this basis, its calculation would require the same information as for calculating the premium 
for an option – i.e. what is the frequency that one would use the various tiers of the program.  
 
This would be particularly intriguing if the same organization that delivers production insurance 
also has responsibility for administering the BRM program because of the interaction between 
BRM and insurance.  This would influence the premiums for insurance, as well as the premium 
cost to use the BRM program. 
 
Whether one sees this as an option provided by an underwriter, or an administration fee, it is 
possible and likely that appropriate pricing procedures would result in different premiums/fees 
for different industries.  It is clear that different industries would have different risk profiles with 
some using the disaster portion more fairly frequently, while others would likely use the 
stabilization portion heavily.  Given the differences in the ratio of government matching, one 
would expect different probabilities of draws on the Call or different relative costs to government 
by industry. 
 
Although it is not as intuitively clear as for industries, it is also possible that there would be 
different distributions for various size categories.   
 
10.5 Summary 
•  This section suggests that there are several potential applications of insurance principles 
and linkages to existing insurance programs that can and should be made in the BRM 
program.  They include Mortality insurance for livestock 
•  Specific risk negative margin insurance for livestock and, theoretically, for other products 
•  Weather derivatives and additional crop insurance products for horticulture  
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•  An insurance product to replace MRI 
•  An option to provide the producer deposit for the BRM program, or 
•  An administration fee based on insurance principles to participate in the program 
•  A rebate of production insurance premiums when insurance saves money for the BRM 
program 
•  Mandatory crop insurance for participation by processing vegetable producers in BRM, 
especially if the Olympic average method is used to calculate the reference margin.   
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11.0 Program Administration Under Proposed Program 
 
The effectiveness of the proposed program will be determined by both the design of the program 
and the means in which producers apply and have their applications processed by government.  
This section addresses an important issue about the administration of the proposed program 
regarding the timing of filing and provision of information.
14   
 
Producer Application and Compliance Under the Proposed Program 
From the design of the proposed program discussed in earlier sections, it is clear that the 
proposed program will have some differences in regard to producer application and timing 
relative to current programs: 
 
•  Producers will apply to the program every year, not just when they believe they are in a claim 
position.  This is similar to NISA, but unlike OFIDP. 
•  Producers will submit accrual farm records.  This is similar to OFIDP, but unlike NISA. 
•  Under current programs, NISA applications must be submitted by June, with OFIDP 
applications submitted by October.  Under the proposed program, there would be one 
submission deadline in June. 
•  Under current programs, the NISA “DWON” forms are issued to producers in July or 
August, with processing completed and withdrawals issued in the fall.  Under OFIDP, 
processing occurs in the fall, with payments typically occurring early in the next year. 
•  Under the proposed program, there would be additional contact between producer and 
government to declare “coverage” levels and submit deposits 
 
Thus, the proposed program requires annual submissions of accrual data, with a single deadline 
and payment period, and additional provisions to declare coverage and submit deposits.   
 
The specific dates at which program activities would be due under the proposed program are still 
under discussion.  The administration of the program proposed by OMAF has the following 
provisions: 
 
•  Producers would sign up for the program, declare coverage levels, make deposits, and submit 
beginning year accrual data by March 31 before a crop year begins. 
•  By June 30
th of the following year, after receipt of tax information by CCRA, the information 
required to administer the proposed program would be completed. 
•  Payments under the proposed program would be made by September. 
 
The proposal for administration from the federal government appears similar to the above, with 
the following difference: 
 
                                                 
14 At very literally the 11
th hour, we received a communication from an accountant about the way the accrual 
adjustment procedure for inventories will be implemented in the proposed program.  It was far too late to do any 
analysis on the concern.  Therefore, the communications about the issue has been passed on to OMAF officials.     
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•  Producers would declare coverage levels by March 31, but deposits would not be due until 
December.  Accrual information would also not be due until December of the following 
year. 
 
We see no advantage to the federal proposal on this issue.  In fact the federal proposal likely has 
two downsides.  The first is that declaring the deposit level in March and collecting it in 
December means that the farmer will not know much about the outcome of a crop year when the 
deposit is declared, but will know a lot about it when the deposit is made.  This will surely give 
rise to issues when things have gone more poorly than expected; reluctance to make the deposit 
if there is no chance of a payout, and a desire for more deposit when there is a high probability.  
Why set up the opportunity for conflict? 
 
The second is that the federal proposal gets money in producers’ hands much later.   
 
We see no down side to the Ontario proposal. In fact, it has the additional advantage of providing 
producers who file on a cash basis with accrual accounting information in a timely manner that 
could help them make better management decisions. This is because it will provide accounting 






























12.0 Variants to the Proposed Program 
 
In addition to the analyses of measures included in the proposed program, there are potential 
variations on the proposed program brought forward that deserve analysis.  These include the 
impact of making hired labour an ineligible expense, and the impact of averaging the two 
stabilization layers into a single stabilization under the proposed program, and aspects of an 
industry-proposed alternative to the proposed program (NISA 1-2-3).  The purpose of this 
section is to provide an analysis of these variants or alternative to the proposed program.  
Section 12.1 considers the impact on payments and margin stability under the proposed program 
of excluding hired labour as an eligible expense.  Section 12.2 considers the impact on average 
payment and the stability of margins of merging the stabilization layers under the proposed 
program.  Section 12.3 considers the entitlement aspect of the industry proposal relative to the 
payments within the stabilization layers of the proposed program.  Observations and conclusions 
are drawn in Section 12.4. 
    
12.1 Treatment of Labour in Proposed Program 
The treatment of labour as an eligible expense under the proposed program is of critical 
importance in specific sectors.  The issues around labour relate to the sensitivity of the payment 
trigger, and the potential for moral hazard.  In the first case, if labour costs are relatively fixed 
and are counted as eligible expenses, then in a year in which farm revenue falls and/or 
production expenses increase, decreases in labour costs will decrease program payments.  In the 
second case, if a crop failure occurs such that the crop is not worth harvesting (so less labour is 
required) then maintaining labour as an eligible expense could give the farmer the incentive to 
hire labour when it is not required.   
 
Fundamentally, whether labour should be an eligible expense or not really depends on the nature 
of work in an industry and/or an individual farm, as we suggested in our federal report (Martin, 
et al). From a management perspective, the program should not discourage managers from 
hiring labour when it should be hired, nor from reducing labour expenses when they should be 
reduced.  If the normal relationship for a farm or industry is a positive correlation between farm 
revenue and labour cost (i.e. as production or price rises, more labour is hired and vice versa), 
then the farm is better off if labour cost is not an eligible expense. If the relationship is the 
opposite, then the farm is better off if labour cost is eligible.    
 
In general, it is not possible to generalize about whether hired labour should be an eligible 
expense or not – it is an empirical question. The purpose of this section is to investigate the 
impact of including labour as an eligible expense.  Section 12.1 considers the impact on 
payments under the proposed program of including or excluding labour as an eligible expense.  
Section 12.2 considers the impact on stability of margins of including or excluding labour as an 
eligible expense.   
 
To assess the impact of excluding labour as an eligible expense under the proposed program, the 
following analysis was conducted.  Using the NISA database described in Section 3, the 
proposed program was simulated with labour as an eligible expense and with labour as an  
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ineligible expense.  These were compared, and contrasted against the current programs for the 
cumulative total of payments for the period 1998-2001, and for each year individually. 
 
Table 12.1 below presents the aggregate payments for 1998-2001 by farm type.  The first three 
columns reproduce results obtained from the analyses in Section 3.  The last two columns give 
the results with labour as an ineligible expense.  The results show that, overall, payments under 
the proposed program would increase by about $6 million under proposed program with labour 
as an ineligible expense.  These results differed markedly across farm types: 
 
•  Field crops, poultry, dairy, cow-calf, and tobacco farms appear to benefit from labour being 
removed as an eligible expense 
•  Vegetable and fruit farms and greenhouses appeared to be significantly worse off as a result 
of removing labour as an eligible expense 
 
Tables 12.2 to 12.10 present the comparison for each farm type.  Here, the conclusion is quite 
interesting.  For those industries that receive more funding overall, the benefits accrue to most 
farm size groups.  There is no discernible pattern of winners and losers.  But for fruit and 
vegetable farms and greenhouses, most size categories receive more funding with labour as an 
ineligible expense, but the largest operations are much worse off.  In fact, the two industries 
would receive more funding with labour as an ineligible expense but, because of the substantial 
effects on the largest operations, the two are far worse off. 
 
The largest operations are undoubtedly involved in packing and, perhaps, processing to some 
extent.  The only general explanation that can be made for these curious results, without looking 
at individual records, is that the largest operations have a strong positive correlation between 





Table 12.1 Comparison of Program Payments With and Without Labour as an Eligible 
Expense, 1998-2001 Combined Total  
 
  
Arm's Length Labour as an 
Eligible Expense 
Arm's Length Labour as an In-
Eligible Expense 
  Total Current  BRM Payments Total APF  BRM Payments  Total APF 
Field Crops  $322,605,036  $249,747,398 $342,973,066 $257,524,901 $350,750,569
Vegetables and Fruit  $91,510,268  $70,716,123 $83,854,979 $61,365,215 $74,504,071
Green House (F&V)  $11,647,273  $9,497,083 $10,668,740 $8,698,721 $9,870,379
Poultry  $3,224,488  $4,418,989 $5,151,661 $4,910,914 $5,643,586
Dairy  $13,227,791  $6,095,634 $9,632,345 $5,460,016 $8,996,728
Swine  $82,500,427  $57,383,239 $68,820,261 $55,693,808 $67,130,830
Cow-calf  $46,476,698  $45,952,207 $54,342,383 $46,543,381 $54,933,557
Feedlot  $21,485,520  31,819,045 $35,815,718 $30,191,577 $34,188,250
Tobacco  $49,920,335  $49,263,702 $58,832,107 $58,816,346 $68,384,751
Total 642,597,835  524,893,420 670,091,261 529,204,878 674,402,720
 
Table 12.2 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Field Crop Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total   
$0 - 
$25,000  1,761 $26,274,107 $35,054,461  $37,247,826
$25,000 - 
$50,000  1,358 $39,876,220 $46,432,028  $48,184,999
$50,000 - 
$100,000  1,334 $65,959,638 $64,028,112  $67,779,046
$100,000 - 
$250,000  1,186 $101,013,026 $102,209,675  $101,917,157
$250,000 - 
$500,000  348 $48,914,442 $50,569,824  $51,146,658
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  128 $31,334,633 $30,397,563  $30,102,017
>$1,000,000  43 $9,232,970 $14,281,404  $14,372,865
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Table 12.3 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Fruit and Vegetable Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  138 $1,900,083 $5,053,589  $5,620,646
$25,000 - 
$50,000  101 $2,092,541 $3,699,490  $4,334,779
$50,000 - 
$100,000  137 $5,658,216 $5,317,882  $5,986,446
$100,000 - 
$250,000  232 $16,922,905 $14,502,768  $15,171,267
$250,000 - 
$500,000  146 $17,702,525 $11,967,485  $11,736,945
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  130 $23,171,416 $15,358,507  $15,507,258
>$1,000,000  109 $24,062,582 $27,955,258  $16,146,731
 
Table 12.4 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Greenhouse Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  16 $184,254 $709,524  $817,836
$25,000 - 
$50,000  10 $328,041 $497,899  $577,557
$50,000 - 
$100,000  23 $784,326 $795,411  $995,552
$100,000 - 
$250,000  19 $1,238,291 $1,212,015  $1,421,001
$250,000 - 
$500,000  21 $3,137,536 $2,975,977  $3,147,861
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  17 $2,693,356 $2,137,898  $1,648,746
>$1,000,000  17 $3,281,468 $2,340,015  $1,261,825 
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Table 12.5 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Poultry Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  9 $117,135 $619,375  $618,111
$25,000 - 
$50,000  5 $141,838 $295,630  $382,544
$50,000 - 
$100,000  5 $194,747 $857,557  $1,001,947
$100,000 - 
$250,000  23 $591,415 $712,515  $654,550
$250,000 - 
$500,000  28 $852,346 $1,192,281  $1,438,304
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  27 $1,230,374 $1,433,610  $1,501,234
>$1,000,000  4 $96,634 $40,693  $46,896
 
Table 12.6 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Dairy Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  4 $35,607 $283,673  $288,925
$25,000 - 
$50,000  6 $90,114 $288,970  $289,272
$50,000 - 
$100,000  25 $322,716 $330,578  $333,369
$100,000 - 
$250,000  147 $3,503,126 $3,602,833  $3,654,331
$250,000 - 
$500,000  167 $5,295,051 $3,017,429  $2,725,754
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  70 $3,234,436 $1,415,252  $1,314,678
>$1,000,000  16 $746,740 $693,609  $390,399
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Table 12.7 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Hog Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  20 $413,068 $1,186,411  $1,201,492
$25,000 - 
$50,000  33 $713,325 $1,084,916  $1,099,772
$50,000 - 
$100,000  71 $2,330,076 $2,462,687  $2,457,559
$100,000 - 
$250,000  243 $14,608,138 $12,036,427  $12,014,221
$250,000 - 
$500,000  252 $21,807,649 $16,627,907  $16,620,976
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  158 $19,875,239 $14,816,888  $14,444,936
>$1,000,000  123 $22,752,933 $20,605,026  $19,291,872
 
Table 12.8 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Beef Cow-calf Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  206 $2,102,966 $4,477,059  $4,634,754
$25,000 - 
$50,000  256 $3,090,736 $4,311,433  $4,323,586
$50,000 - 
$100,000  308 $6,113,537 $7,012,052  $7,108,766
$100,000 - 
$250,000  394 $14,682,093 $17,095,849  $17,443,585
$250,000 - 
$500,000  197 $12,852,561 $13,585,142  $13,517,751
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  91 $7,634,806 $7,860,848  $7,905,117
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Table 12.9 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Beef Feedlot Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 





Income Range  Number  Total   Total  Total 
> $1,000,000  163 $21,485,520 $35,815,718  $34,188,250
 
Table 12.10 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs With and Without Labour as 
an Eligible Expense, Tobacco Farms 
 
    Proposed  Program 






Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  47 $944,094 $4,403,463  $6,777,826
$25,000 - 
$50,000  33 $969,933 $2,228,503  $3,103,875
$50,000 - 
$100,000  83 $3,807,181 $5,610,354  $7,586,684
$100,000 - 
$250,000  297 $19,507,930 $22,660,842  $26,276,853
$250,000 - 
$500,000  195 $17,287,293 $16,169,076  $17,384,084
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  48 $5,865,643 $5,888,853  $5,812,366 
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Stability Impact of Removing Labour as an Eligible Expense 
 
The analysis above shows that removing labour as an eligible expense affects payments under 
the proposed program.  To determine whether removing labour impacts the stability of margins, 
the following analysis was completed.  Using the NISA database, the proposed program was 
simulated with labour as an ineligible expense, and the semi-deviation calculated (as described in 
Section 3.0 above).  This semi-deviation was then compared against the semi-deviation under the 
proposed program with labour as an eligible expense, the semi-deviation under current programs, 
and the semi-deviation under no program. 
 
Tables 12.11 to 12.19 present the results of this analysis across farm types and across income 
ranges.  To compare the stability between the proposed program with and without labour as an 
eligible expense, compare the furthest right bolded column under Hired Arms Length Labour as 
an Eligible Expense with Hired Arms Length Labour as an Ineligible Expense.  For each income 
level, the column that gives the lower semi-deviation provides the more stability.    
 
The results show that semi-deviation is generally lowered by making labour an ineligible 
expense for cash crop farms.  Vegetable and fruit, and greenhouse farms have a higher semi-
deviation when labour expenses are ineligible.  For other farm types, difference in semi-
deviation resulting from the exclusion of labour expenses depends on income levels.  Generally, 
any advantage in terms of decreased semi-deviation from removal of labour as an eligible 
expense occurred at the lower levels of sales.  In most cases, farms with sales over $1,000,000 
had an increase in semi-variance when labour was excluded as an expense.  As farm size 
increased, any stability benefit of excluding labour as an eligible expense under the proposed 
program decreased.     
 









Table 12.11 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Cash Crop Farms 1998-2001 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin 
Normal Deviation Below 
Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $4,181  $7,532  $10,569  $4,824  $3,165  $844  $4,181  $7,532  $10,880  $4,824  $3,165  $804 
$25,000 - 
$50,000  $9,967  $17,139  $18,530  $7,126  $3,627  $1,284  $9,967  $17,139  $18,853  $7,126  $3,627  $1,221 
$50,000 - 
$100,000  $22,360  $34,478  $34,360  $10,542  $4,520  $1,963  $22,360  $34,478  $34,688  $10,542  $4,520  $1,887 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $50,771  $72,064  $71,262  $19,595  $8,820  $3,702  $50,771  $72,064  $71,622  $19,595  $8,820  $3,506 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $110,913  $146,053  $145,446  $37,622  $19,845  $9,405  $110,913  $146,053  $146,219  $37,622  $19,845  $8,815 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $197,773  $258,974  $252,261  $64,154  $30,989  $14,283  $197,773  $258,974  $254,707  $64,154  $30,989  $14,437 
>$1,000,000  $405,806  $459,486  $488,837  $132,939  $100,466  $49,441  $405,806  $459,486  $489,369  $132,939  $100,466  $47,582 
  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin 
Normal Deviation Below 
Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP   BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $10,553  $13,912  $16,949  $4,692  $3,100  $411  $10,987  $14,347  $17,695  $4,860  $3,259  $396 
$25,000 - 
$50,000  $20,736  $27,893  $29,284  $6,973  $3,580  $782  $21,632  $28,789  $30,502  $7,124  $3,702  $733 
$50,000 - 
$100,000  $37,532  $49,650  $49,532  $10,363  $4,585  $1,274  $38,980  $51,097  $51,307  $10,685  $4,834  $1,287 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $73,211  $94,503  $93,702  $18,640  $8,296  $2,332  $77,793  $99,086  $98,644  $19,393  $8,942  $2,502 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $149,238  $184,378  $183,771  $34,620  $17,480  $5,978  $163,195  $198,334  $198,501  $36,581  $19,185  $6,568 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $248,236  $309,437  $302,724  $62,865  $30,794  $9,812  $292,301  $353,501  $345,235  $65,290  $32,910  $12,300 
>$1,000,000  $474,829  $528,509  $557,861  $121,689  $90,094  $25,590  $593,988  $647,668  $677,551  $130,673  $97,727  $31,905  
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Table 12.12 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Fruit and Vegetable Farms 1998-2001 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $6,329  $9,771  $15,484 $7,946 $6,562 $1,694 $6,329  $9,771 $16,511 $7,946 $6,562 $1,473 
$25,000 - 
$50,000  $8,564  $13,743  $17,721 $8,153 $4,984 $2,494 $8,564  $13,743 $19,293 $8,153 $4,984 $2,482 
$50,000 - 
$100,000  $21,222  $31,547  $30,926 $11,695 $6,838 $5,107 $21,222  $31,547 $32,146 $11,695 $6,838 $4,892 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $44,681  $62,917  $60,309 $22,704 $13,366 $9,617 $44,681  $62,917 $61,029 $22,704 $13,366 $9,948 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $89,088  $119,401  $109,580 $36,378 $20,346 $18,456 $89,088  $119,401 $109,185 $36,378 $20,346 $18,903 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $189,532  $234,093  $219,068 $69,829 $42,360 $39,214 $189,532  $234,093 $219,354 $69,829 $42,360 $40,482 
>$1,000,000  $518,523  $573,713  $582,641 $207,097 $166,540 $142,448 $518,523  $573,713 $555,557 $207,097 $166,540 $168,969 
  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP   BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $15,168  $18,610  $24,323 $8,387 $7,027 $1,272 $19,110  $22,552 $29,292 $9,433 $8,050 $1,393 
$25,000 - 
$50,000  $25,565  $30,744  $34,722 $8,157 $5,455 $2,024 $31,596  $36,776 $42,326 $8,688 $6,154 $2,050 
$50,000 - 
$100,000  $41,679  $52,004  $51,383 $11,156 $6,601 $3,827 $54,508  $64,833 $65,432 $11,850 $7,484 $4,246 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $88,632  $106,868  $104,260 $24,274 $14,794 $9,161 $124,394  $142,630 $140,742 $25,836 $16,520 $10,461 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $162,586  $192,899  $183,079 $35,531 $19,639 $16,086 $233,943  $264,255 $254,040 $38,938 $22,878 $19,660 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $338,490  $383,050  $368,025 $65,693 $39,952 $32,634 $471,734  $516,294 $501,555 $73,256 $45,717 $39,067 
>$1,000,000  $912,283  $967,472  $976,400 $205,923 $169,601 $130,933 $1,573,197  $1,628,387 $1,610,231 $211,730 $174,653 $164,606 
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Table 12.13 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Greenhouse Farms 1998-2001 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $8,557  $11,436  $19,643 $6,497 $5,133 $1,367 $8,557  $11,436 $21,336 $6,497 $5,133 $1,227 
$25,000 - 
$50,000  $21,142  $29,343  $33,590 $11,445 $9,081 $1,587 $21,142  $29,343 $35,581 $11,445 $9,081 $2,121 
$50,000 - 
$100,000  $17,784  $26,309  $26,430 $8,240 $4,241 $2,767 $17,784  $26,309 $28,605 $8,240 $4,241 $2,610 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $60,515  $76,808  $76,463 $28,483 $19,215 $14,312 $60,515  $76,808 $79,213 $28,483 $19,215 $13,155 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $86,644  $123,996  $122,073 $36,923 $15,353 $10,652 $86,644  $123,996 $124,119 $36,923 $15,353 $10,146 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $177,964  $217,572  $209,403 $63,743 $38,577 $32,238 $177,964  $217,572 $202,210 $63,743 $38,577 $39,815 
>$1,000,000  $587,646  $635,903  $622,058 $161,666 $126,848 $125,864 $587,646  $635,903 $606,202 $161,666 $126,848 $141,069 
  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP   BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $18,596  $11,436  $19,643 $8,598 $12,725 $6,620 $22,675  $11,436 $21,336 $10,726 $16,184 $8,476 
$25,000 - 
$50,000  $33,722  $29,343  $33,590 $11,841 $17,804 $9,077 $38,910  $29,343 $35,581 $13,289 $21,940 $11,192 
$50,000 - 
$100,000  $38,396  $26,309  $26,430 $8,660 $18,245 $16,728 $51,656  $26,309 $28,605 $9,531 $29,298 $26,262 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $104,376  $76,808  $76,463 $32,177 $51,459 $47,270 $136,771  $76,808 $79,213 $36,789 $78,108 $71,213 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $160,036  $123,996  $122,073 $39,895 $65,718 $59,790 $234,509  $123,996 $124,119 $45,633 $128,685 $121,025 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $305,314  $217,572  $209,403 $64,626 $128,258 $126,278 $423,333  $217,572 $202,210 $67,227 $229,385 $238,698 
>$1,000,000  $971,408  $635,903  $622,058 $188,898 $433,321 $437,092 $1,420,211  $635,903 $606,202 $199,400 $835,194 $861,395 
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Table 12.14 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Poultry Farms 1998-2001 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Poultry  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $1,395  $4,649  $18,600 $8,123 $6,572 $517 $1,395 $4,649 $18,565 $8,123 $6,572 $468 
$25,000 - $50,000  $32,950  $40,042  $47,731 $19,774 $16,398 $6,180 $32,950 $40,042 $52,077 $19,774 $16,398 $1,694 
$50,000 - $100,000  $40,421  $50,158  $83,299 $16,854 $11,095 $1,240 $40,421 $50,158 $90,518 $16,854 $11,095 $1,261 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $55,748  $62,176  $63,493 $9,873 $6,896 $4,971 $55,748 $62,176 $62,863 $9,873 $6,896 $4,887 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $101,899  $109,509  $112,544 $26,099 $21,174 $17,885 $101,899 $109,509 $114,741 $26,099 $21,174 $15,647 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $177,733  $189,126  $191,008 $32,662 $24,198 $18,987 $177,733 $189,126 $191,634 $32,662 $24,198 $19,862 
>$1,000,000  $398,815  $404,855  $401,359 $69,911 $67,556 $68,732 $398,815 $404,855 $401,746 $69,911 $67,556 $68,223 
                    
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Poultry  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $12,349  $15,602  $29,553 $8,401 $7,058 $68 $12,632 $15,886 $29,802 $8,459 $7,115 $68 
$25,000 - $50,000  $51,894  $58,986  $66,675 $21,162 $17,633 $5,083 $55,643 $62,735 $74,770 $22,892 $19,250 $3,352 
$50,000 - $100,000  $63,894  $73,631  $106,772 $23,421 $18,022 $1,691 $68,381 $78,119 $118,479 $27,027 $21,563 $1,676 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $85,748  $92,176  $93,492 $11,763 $8,748 $4,822 $89,485 $95,913 $96,600 $11,951 $8,900 $5,023 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $147,594  $155,204  $158,239 $23,449 $19,446 $14,303 $168,555 $176,165 $181,397 $25,224 $21,214 $15,217 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $259,954  $271,347  $273,228 $36,943 $29,646 $21,399 $290,643 $302,035 $304,543 $38,486 $30,909 $22,537 
>$1,000,000  $566,992  $573,032  $569,536 $72,952 $70,817 $71,704 $645,816 $651,856 $648,747 $76,439 $74,212 $74,706 
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Table 12.15 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Dairy Farms 1998-2001 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Dairy  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $28,307  $30,532  $46,036 $13,862 $12,306 $2,341 $28,307 $30,532 $46,365 $13,862 $12,306 $2,272 
$25,000 - $50,000  $32,581  $36,336  $44,621 $10,359 $9,258 $1,147 $32,581 $36,336 $44,634 $10,359 $9,258 $1,238 
$50,000 - $100,000  $37,516  $40,743  $40,821 $6,102 $4,187 $2,874 $37,516 $40,743 $40,849 $6,102 $4,187 $2,742 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $66,127  $72,085  $72,254 $10,207 $6,936 $5,866 $66,127 $72,085 $72,342 $10,207 $6,936 $5,928 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $126,289  $134,216  $130,806 $16,700 $12,136 $12,938 $126,289 $134,216 $130,369 $16,700 $12,136 $13,390 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $221,070  $232,622  $226,125 $26,029 $19,765 $21,955 $221,070 $232,622 $225,765 $26,029 $19,765 $22,320 
>$1,000,000  $453,408  $465,076  $464,246 $67,446 $59,513 $51,403 $453,408 $465,076 $459,508 $67,446 $59,513 $57,246 
                    
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Dairy  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $42,495  $44,720  $60,224 $19,817 $18,574 $759 $44,102 $46,327 $62,159 $20,672 $19,426 $1,345 
$25,000 - $50,000  $48,219  $51,973  $60,259 $15,923 $14,809 $1,365 $52,183 $55,938 $64,236 $16,871 $15,767 $1,353 
$50,000 - $100,000  $53,503  $56,730  $56,809 $6,895 $5,271 $3,049 $54,316 $57,543 $57,650 $7,122 $5,451 $3,073 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $102,488  $108,446  $108,615 $10,495 $7,477 $5,431 $109,252 $115,210 $115,467 $10,677 $7,607 $5,612 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $196,716  $204,643  $201,233 $17,289 $13,356 $13,226 $216,746 $224,673 $220,827 $17,387 $13,149 $13,774 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $341,979  $353,531  $347,034 $27,531 $22,391 $23,255 $379,035 $390,586 $383,730 $27,326 $21,868 $23,752 
>$1,000,000  $758,944  $770,612  $769,781 $79,563 $73,448 $61,124 $877,495 $889,163 $883,595 $76,460 $69,560 $65,088 
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Table 12.16 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Hog Farms 1998-2001 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Hogs  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $9,402  $14,565  $24,232 $7,370 $5,014 $189 $9,402 $14,565 $24,421 $7,370 $5,014 $188 
$25,000 - $50,000  $6,054  $11,458  $14,273 $6,032 $4,314 $1,447 $6,054 $11,458 $14,386 $6,032 $4,314 $1,430 
$50,000 - $100,000  $14,844  $23,048  $23,515 $9,337 $5,552 $1,968 $14,844 $23,048 $23,497 $9,337 $5,552 $1,885 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $32,111  $46,420  $44,494 $12,740 $6,091 $2,929 $32,111 $46,420 $44,471 $12,740 $6,091 $2,994 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $66,399  $88,034  $82,895 $22,021 $11,865 $7,400 $66,399 $88,034 $82,888 $22,021 $11,865 $7,214 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $112,574  $144,023  $136,019 $44,692 $28,468 $20,155 $112,574 $144,023 $135,430 $44,692 $28,468 $20,263 
>$1,000,000  $314,838  $359,052  $356,719 $143,412 $115,094 $87,351 $314,838 $359,052 $354,050 $143,412 $115,094 $91,668 
                     
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Hogs  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $17,885  $23,049  $32,716 $9,226 $7,076 $135 $17,996 $23,159 $33,014 $9,269 $7,116 $137 
$25,000 - $50,000  $16,636  $22,040  $24,855 $6,670 $4,793 $1,454 $17,373 $22,777 $25,705 $6,763 $5,099 $1,475 
$50,000 - $100,000  $28,424  $36,628  $37,095 $9,040 $5,277 $1,415 $29,546 $37,750 $38,199 $9,362 $5,550 $1,397 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $53,391  $67,700  $65,774 $13,386 $6,698 $2,778 $56,121 $70,430 $68,482 $13,651 $7,007 $2,921 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $105,792  $127,426  $122,288 $24,511 $14,321 $8,684 $112,320 $133,954 $128,809 $25,057 $14,950 $9,068 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $188,093  $219,541  $211,538 $46,405 $30,332 $20,170 $210,112 $241,560 $232,968 $48,604 $32,667 $22,687 
>$1,000,000  $532,062  $576,275  $573,942 $166,924 $134,809 $108,089 $644,852 $689,066 $684,064 $174,543 $143,024 $120,558 
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Table 12.17 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Beef Cow-Calf Farms 1998-2001 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Cow Calf  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin 
Normal Deviation Below 
Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $2,566  $5,118  $7,999 $5,414 $4,316 $1,637 $2,566 $5,118 $8,191 $5,414 $4,316 $1,630 
$25,000 - $50,000  $8,015  $11,034  $12,226 $5,470 $3,951 $2,270 $8,015 $11,034 $12,238 $5,470 $3,951 $2,274 
$50,000 - $100,000  $15,149  $20,111  $20,841 $8,771 $6,270 $3,363 $15,149 $20,111 $20,919 $8,771 $6,270 $3,242 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $24,203  $33,519  $35,051 $14,252 $9,752 $4,353 $24,203 $33,519 $35,272 $14,252 $9,752 $4,364 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $38,100  $53,649  $55,340 $26,029 $17,980 $10,310 $38,100 $53,649 $55,254 $26,029 $17,980 $10,209 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $55,540  $73,768  $77,136 $29,416 $21,591 $8,988 $55,540 $73,768 $77,257 $29,416 $21,591 $8,756 
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Cow Calf  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Produiction Margin 
Normal Deviation Below 
Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $9,509  $12,061  $14,942 $5,307 $4,278 $1,131 $9,714 $12,267 $15,339 $5,336 $4,304 $1,116 
$25,000 - $50,000  $17,846  $20,864  $22,056 $5,455 $4,026 $1,988 $18,240 $21,258 $22,462 $5,453 $4,021 $1,988 
$50,000 - $100,000  $27,887  $32,849  $33,579 $8,718 $6,251 $2,883 $29,025 $33,987 $34,795 $8,866 $6,363 $2,944 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $41,243  $50,559  $52,090 $14,248 $9,867 $3,820 $43,331 $52,647 $54,399 $14,288 $9,877 $3,791 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $63,794  $79,343  $81,034 $26,149 $17,981 $8,475 $69,375 $84,924 $86,530 $26,708 $18,488 $8,766 
$500,000 - 




Table 12.18 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Beef Feedlot Farms 1998-2001 
Feedlot  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 
>$1,000,000  $138,880  $175,950  $204,718 $113,717 $94,181 $42,716 $138,880 $175,950 $201,688 $113,717 $94,181 $43,656 
                 
Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Feedlot  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 




Table 12.19 Margin Variability With and Without Labour as Eligible Expense, Tobacco Farms 1998-2001 
Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Tobacco  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $30,710  $35,732  $54,133 $21,865 $20,270 $2,164 $30,710 $35,732 $66,763 $21,865 $20,270 $1,291 
$25,000 - $50,000  $39,582  $46,930  $56,465 $20,012 $17,720 $3,564 $39,582 $46,930 $63,096 $20,012 $17,720 $3,126 
$50,000 - $100,000  $54,382  $65,849  $71,281 $23,839 $18,685 $4,252 $54,382 $65,849 $77,233 $23,839 $18,685 $3,359 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $74,722  $91,143  $93,797 $32,241 $23,696 $10,517 $74,722 $91,143 $96,841 $32,241 $23,696 $10,334 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $119,307  $141,470  $140,036 $44,478 $29,984 $19,729 $119,307 $141,470 $141,594 $44,478 $29,984 $20,709 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $236,962  $267,513  $267,634 $68,233 $46,593 $35,701 $236,962 $267,513 $267,235 $68,233 $46,593 $36,867 
>$1,000,000  $504,925  $569,019  $582,884 $181,208 $136,582 $103,008 $504,925 $569,019 $565,052 $181,208 $136,582 $132,863 
                    
Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense  Hired Arms Length Labour as an In-Eligible Expense 
Tobacco  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current Pgm - 




OFIDP  BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 




OFIDP  BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $46,941  $51,962  $70,363 $25,821 $24,361 $3,003 $60,234 $65,256 $96,286 $32,884 $31,517 $2,614 
$25,000 - $50,000  $57,195  $64,543  $74,078 $21,553 $19,366 $4,022 $73,483 $80,831 $96,997 $27,619 $25,486 $4,930 
$50,000 - $100,000  $74,190  $85,658  $91,089 $25,560 $20,445 $5,148 $101,639 $113,107 $124,491 $31,681 $26,701 $5,248 
$100,000 - 
$250,000  $108,016  $124,437  $127,091 $31,510 $23,324 $8,761 $159,424 $175,845 $181,543 $35,478 $26,898 $10,349 
$250,000 - 
$500,000  $180,498  $202,661  $201,227 $42,176 $28,530 $15,761 $264,742 $286,905 $287,029 $47,884 $33,140 $20,115 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $363,322  $393,872  $393,993 $63,734 $43,377 $28,101 $525,829 $556,379 $556,101 $74,801 $53,450 $37,286 
>$1,000,000  $707,794  $771,888  $785,753 $130,018 $91,870 $49,736 $1,075,234 $1,139,328 $1,135,361 $166,946 $130,877 $105,216  
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12.2 Combining the Stabilization Layers under the Proposed Program 
An alternative variant on the proposed program is that the two stabilization layers be combined 
into a single layer, with the average of the funding shares in the two stabilization layers under the 
current design used in the single combined layer.  In other words, in place of a layer that covers 
the first 15% of margin loss in a 50:50 producer:government funding ratio, and a layer that 
covers the second 15% of margin loss in a 30:70 producer:government funding ratio, there would 
be a single layer that covers the first 30% of margin losses in a 40:60 producer:government 
funding ratio.  Thus, under this alternative, there would be only two layers of support - one 
stabilization layer and one disaster layer. 
 
The essential difference between the current design and this alternative (in terms of average 
payments) is the following.  Farmers that tend to trigger in the first 15% of margin loss will 
receive more under the alternative, because the government share of support is higher (60% vs. 
50% under the proposed design).  For payments triggered in the second 15% of margin losses, 
the government portion is lower under this alternative (60% vs 70%).  Thus, for losses in the first 
15% of reference production margin, the alternative should give a higher government payment 
relative to the proposed design; in the second 15%, it should give a lower payment than the 
proposed design.  However, since a farmer must lose the first 15% before reaching the second 
15%, the net effect is likely to be an increase in payments under the alternative design.   
 
To determine the implication of this design alternative, the scenario was simulated using the 
NISA database above.  The total payments according to industry segment are presented in Table 
12.20.  Relative to the design proposed, total payments are somewhat higher under this 
alternative.  The table shows that total payments increase by almost $7 million.  All farm types 
received more support under the alternative than under the proposed design.  Tables 12.21 to 
12.29 present the results for each farm type according to sales category.  The tables show the 
finding that combining the stabilization layers increases program payments is robust across farm 
sizes.   
 
The implication on variability in margins from combining the stabilization layers into a single 
stabilization layer are presented in Tables 12.30 to 12.38.  The tables show that, in comparing the 
alternative design (labelled as “2 Tiered BRM” in the tables) with the proposed design (labelled 
as “3 Tiered BRM” in the tables), no unambiguous statement can be made with regard to margin 
stability.  In many cases, it appears that the alternative design provides better stability at lower 
sales levels than the proposed design, and that the alternative stabilized gross margin better than 
production margin.  However, these observations were inconsistent.  What is more consistent is 
the finding that the proposed program with the stabilization layers combined provided better 
stability in either gross margin or production margin relative to current programs. 
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Table 12.20 Total Program Payments Under Current Programs, Proposed Program, and 
Proposed Program With Stabilization Layers Combined, 1998-2001 
 
  




Total BRM with 
Combined Stabilization 
Layers 
Field Crops  $322,605,036 $342,973,066  $346,080,947
Vegetables and 
Fruit $91,510,268 $83,854,979  $84,873,548
Green House 
(F&V)  $11,647,273 $10,668,740 $10,815,367
Poultry $3,224,488 $5,151,661  $5,190,622
Dairy $13,227,791 $9,632,345  $9,802,013
Swine $82,500,427 $68,820,261  $69,626,350
Beef Cow-calf  $46,476,698 $54,342,383 $54,716,850
Beef Feedlot   $21,485,520 $35,815,718 $35,966,982
Tobacco $49,920,335 $58,832,107  $59,664,624
Total All Sectors  642,597,835 670,091,261  676,737,303
 
 
Table 12.21 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 






Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  1,761 $26,274,107 $35,054,461 $35,238,065
$25,000 - 
$50,000  1,358 $39,876,220 $46,432,028 $46,738,669
$50,000 - 
$100,000  1,334 $65,959,638 $64,028,112 $64,614,591
$100,000 - 
$250,000  1,186 $101,013,026 $102,209,675 $102,206,869
$250,000 - 
$500,000  348 $48,914,442 $50,569,824 $53,610,195
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  128 $31,334,633 $30,397,563 $29,218,976
>$1,000,000  43 $9,232,970 $14,281,404 $14,453,582 
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Table 12.22 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 






Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  138 $1,900,083 $5,053,589 $5,063,570
$25,000 - 
$50,000  101 $2,092,541 $3,699,490 $3,719,725
$50,000 - 
$100,000  137 $5,658,216 $5,317,882 $5,362,078
$100,000 - 
$250,000  232 $16,922,905 $14,502,768 $14,647,231
$250,000 - 
$500,000  146 $17,702,525 $11,967,485 $12,117,487
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  130 $23,171,416 $15,358,507 $15,669,974
>$1,000,000  109 $24,062,582 $27,955,258 $28,293,483
 
Table 12.23 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 





Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range  Number Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  16 $184,254 $709,524 $712,676
$25,000 - 
$50,000  10 $328,041 $497,899 $501,843
$50,000 - 
$100,000  23 $784,326 $795,411 $804,852
$100,000 - 
$250,000  19 $1,238,291 $1,212,015 $1,226,042
$250,000 - 
$500,000  21 $3,137,536 $2,975,977 $3,015,530
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  17 $2,693,356 $2,137,898 $2,162,800
>$1,000,000  17 $3,281,468 $2,340,015 $2,391,626
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Table 12.24 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 





Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  9 $117,135 $619,375 $620,541
$25,000 - 
$50,000  5 $141,838 $295,630 $297,240
$50,000 - 
$100,000  5 $194,747 $857,557 $859,757
$100,000 - 
$250,000  23 $591,415 $712,515 $718,256
$250,000 - 
$500,000  28 $852,346 $1,192,281 $1,205,911
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  27 $1,230,374 $1,433,610 $1,443,656
>$1,000,000  4 $96,634 $40,693 $45,260
 
 
Table 12.25 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 





Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  4 $35,607 $283,673 $284,559
$25,000 - 
$50,000  6 $90,114 $288,970 $289,659
$50,000 - 
$100,000  25 $322,716 $330,578 $335,870
$100,000 - 
$250,000  147 $3,503,126 $3,602,833 $3,644,904
$250,000 - 
$500,000  167 $5,295,051 $3,017,429 $3,081,143
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  70 $3,234,436 $1,415,252 $1,462,200
>$1,000,000  16 $746,740 $693,609 $703,678
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Table 12.26 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 





Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  20 $413,068 $1,186,411 $1,191,489
$25,000 - 
$50,000  33 $713,325 $1,084,916 $1,092,253
$50,000 - 
$100,000  71 $2,330,076 $2,462,687 $2,483,288
$100,000 - 
$250,000  243 $14,608,138 $12,036,427 $12,173,117
$250,000 - 
$500,000  252 $21,807,649 $16,627,907 $16,848,664
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  158 $19,875,239 $14,816,888 $15,012,918
>$1,000,000  123 $22,752,933 $20,605,026 $20,824,621
 
 
Table 12.27 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 





Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  206 $2,102,966 $4,477,059 $4,490,154
$25,000 - 
$50,000  256 $3,090,736 $4,311,433 $4,337,255
$50,000 - 
$100,000  308 $6,113,537 $7,012,052 $7,064,619
$100,000 - 
$250,000  394 $14,682,093 $17,095,849 $17,229,734
$250,000 - 
$500,000  197 $12,852,561 $13,585,142 $13,670,085
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  91 $7,634,806 $7,860,848 $7,925,004
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Table 12.28 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 





Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
>$1,000,000  163 $21,485,520 $35,815,718 $35,966,982
 
 
Table 12.29 Support Under Current and Proposed Programs with Stabilization Layers 





Total Payment Under 
Proposed Program 
Total Payment Under Proposed 
Program with Combined 
Stabilization Layers 
Income 
Range Number  Total    Total  Total 
$0 - 
$25,000  47 $944,094 $4,403,463 $4,417,172
$25,000 - 
$50,000  33 $969,933 $2,228,503 $2,239,348
$50,000 - 
$100,000  83 $3,807,181 $5,610,354 $5,655,885
$100,000 - 
$250,000  297 $19,507,930 $22,660,842 $22,905,459
$250,000 - 
$500,000  195 $17,287,293 $16,169,076 $16,460,134
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  48 $5,865,643 $5,888,853 $6,052,104
>$1,000,000  6 $1,538,261 $1,871,016 $1,934,523
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Table 12.30 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers, Cash Crop Farms 1998-2001 
Cash Crops  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 





BRM  No Pgm 
Current 






$0 - $25,000  $4,181  $7,532  $10,569  $10,906  $4,824  $3,165  $844  $798 
$25,000 - $50,000  $9,967  $17,139  $18,530  $18,911  $7,126  $3,627  $1,284  $1,206 
$50,000 - $100,000  $22,360  $34,478  $34,360  $34,799  $10,542  $4,520  $1,963  $1,852 
$100,000 - $250,000  $50,771  $72,064  $71,262  $71,842  $19,595  $8,820  $3,702  $3,437 
$250,000 - $500,000  $110,913  $146,053  $145,446  $146,621  $37,622  $19,845  $9,405  $8,648 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $197,773  $258,974  $252,261  $251,436  $64,154  $30,989  $14,283  $14,035 
>$1,000,000  $405,806  $459,486  $488,837  $490,550  $132,939  $100,466  $49,441  $47,093 
              
Cash Crops  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 





BRM  No Pgm 
Current 






$0 - $25,000  $10,553  $13,912  $16,949  $17,721  $4,692  $3,100  $411  $392 
$25,000 - $50,000  $20,736  $27,893  $29,284  $30,561  $6,973  $3,580  $782  $722 
$50,000 - $100,000  $37,532  $49,650  $49,532  $51,418  $10,363  $4,585  $1,274  $1,261 
$100,000 - $250,000  $73,211  $94,503  $93,702  $98,864  $18,640  $8,296  $2,332  $2,450 
$250,000 - $500,000  $149,238  $184,378  $183,771  $198,903  $34,620  $17,480  $5,978  $6,415 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $248,236  $309,437  $302,724  $345,963  $62,865  $30,794  $9,812  $11,925 
>$1,000,000  $474,829  $528,509  $557,861  $678,732  $121,689  $90,094  $25,590  $31,271 
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Table 12.31 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers , Fruit and Vegetable Farms 1998-2001 
Fruit & Veg  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $6,329  $9,771  $15,484  $16,542  $7,946  $6,562  $1,694  $1,455 
$25,000 - $50,000  $8,564  $13,743  $17,721  $19,357  $8,153  $4,984  $2,494  $2,457 
$50,000 - $100,000  $21,222  $31,547  $30,926  $32,248  $11,695  $6,838  $5,107  $4,821 
$100,000 - $250,000  $44,681  $62,917  $60,309  $61,283  $22,704  $13,366  $9,617  $9,741 
$250,000 - $500,000  $89,088  $119,401  $109,580  $109,649  $36,378  $20,346  $18,456  $18,530 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $189,532  $234,093  $219,068  $220,149  $69,829  $42,360  $39,214  $39,675 
>$1,000,000  $518,523  $573,713  $582,641  $557,200  $207,097  $166,540  $142,448  $167,191 
              
Fruit & Veg  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $15,168  $18,610  $24,323  $29,322  $8,387  $7,027  $1,272  $1,383 
$25,000 - $50,000  $25,565  $30,744  $34,722  $42,389  $8,157  $5,455  $2,024  $2,021 
$50,000 - $100,000  $41,679  $52,004  $51,383  $65,534  $11,156  $6,601  $3,827  $4,172 
$100,000 - $250,000  $88,632  $106,868  $104,260  $140,997  $24,274  $14,794  $9,161  $10,243 
$250,000 - $500,000  $162,586  $192,899  $183,079  $254,503  $35,531  $19,639  $16,086  $19,260 
$500,000 - $1,000,000  $338,490  $383,050  $368,025  $502,351  $65,693  $39,952  $32,634  $38,155 
>$1,000,000  $912,283  $967,472  $976,400  $1,611,874  $205,923  $169,601  $130,933  $162,580 
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Table 12.32 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers , Greenhouse Farms 1998-2001 
Greenhouse  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $8,557  $11,436  $19,643  $21,384  $6,497  $5,133  $1,367  $1,199 
$25,000 - $50,000  $21,142  $29,343  $33,590  $35,671  $11,445  $9,081  $1,587  $2,114 
$50,000 - $100,000  $17,784  $26,309  $26,430  $28,782  $8,240  $4,241  $2,767  $2,551 
$100,000 - $250,000  $60,515  $76,808  $76,463  $79,457  $28,483  $19,215  $14,312  $12,932 
$250,000 - $500,000  $86,644  $123,996  $122,073  $124,675  $36,923  $15,353  $10,652  $9,882 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $177,964  $217,572  $209,403  $203,256  $63,743  $38,577  $32,238  $38,695 
>$1,000,000  $587,646  $635,903  $622,058  $607,127  $161,666  $126,848  $125,864  $140,380 
              
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense 
Greenhouse  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $18,596  $11,436  $19,643  $21,384  $8,598  $12,725  $6,620  $8,437 
$25,000 - $50,000  $33,722  $29,343  $33,590  $35,671  $11,841  $17,804  $9,077  $11,170 
$50,000 - $100,000  $38,396  $26,309  $26,430  $28,782  $8,660  $18,245  $16,728  $26,111 
$100,000 - $250,000  $104,376  $76,808  $76,463  $79,457  $32,177  $51,459  $47,270  $70,923 
$250,000 - $500,000  $160,036  $123,996  $122,073  $124,675  $39,895  $65,718  $59,790  $120,505 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $305,314  $217,572  $209,403  $203,256  $64,626  $128,258  $126,278  $237,494 
>$1,000,000  $971,408  $635,903  $622,058  $607,127  $188,898  $433,321  $437,092  $860,365 
  
  108
Table 12.33 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers, Poultry Farms 1998-2001 
Poultry  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $1,395  $4,649  $18,600  $18,600  $8,123  $6,572  $517  $462 
$25,000 - $50,000  $32,950  $40,042  $47,731  $52,115  $19,774  $16,398  $6,180  $1,686 
$50,000 - $100,000  $40,421  $50,158  $83,299  $90,577  $16,854  $11,095  $1,240  $1,240 
$100,000 - $250,000  $55,748  $62,176  $63,493  $62,926  $9,873  $6,896  $4,971  $4,839 
$250,000 - $500,000  $101,899  $109,509  $112,544  $114,854  $26,099  $21,174  $17,885  $15,524 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $177,733  $189,126  $191,008  $191,718  $32,662  $24,198  $18,987  $19,775 
>$1,000,000  $398,815  $404,855  $401,359  $402,076  $69,911  $67,556  $68,732  $67,978 
              
Poultry  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $12,349  $15,602  $29,553  $29,837  $8,401  $7,058  $68  $68 
$25,000 - $50,000  $51,894  $58,986  $66,675  $74,808  $21,162  $17,633  $5,083  $3,345 
$50,000 - $100,000  $63,894  $73,631  $106,772  $118,537  $23,421  $18,022  $1,691  $1,650 
$100,000 - $250,000  $85,748  $92,176  $93,492  $96,663  $11,763  $8,748  $4,822  $4,975 
$250,000 - $500,000  $147,594  $155,204  $158,239  $181,510  $23,449  $19,446  $14,303  $15,068 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $259,954  $271,347  $273,228  $304,627  $36,943  $29,646  $21,399  $22,433 
>$1,000,000  $566,992  $573,032  $569,536  $649,076  $72,952  $70,817  $71,704  $74,457 
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Table 12.34 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers , Dairy Farms 1998-2001 
Dairy  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $28,307  $30,532  $46,036  $46,428  $13,862  $12,306  $2,341  $2,241 
$25,000 - $50,000  $32,581  $36,336  $44,621  $44,662  $10,359  $9,258  $1,147  $1,217 
$50,000 - $100,000  $37,516  $40,743  $40,821  $40,900  $6,102  $4,187  $2,874  $2,700 
$100,000 - $250,000  $66,127  $72,085  $72,254  $72,410  $10,207  $6,936  $5,866  $5,879 
$250,000 - $500,000  $126,289  $134,216  $130,806  $130,465  $16,700  $12,136  $12,938  $13,267 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $221,070  $232,622  $226,125  $225,886  $26,029  $19,765  $21,955  $22,185 
>$1,000,000  $453,408  $465,076  $464,246  $459,793  $67,446  $59,513  $51,403  $56,893 
              
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense 
Dairy  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $42,495  $44,720  $60,224  $62,223  $19,817  $18,574  $759  $1,345 
$25,000 - $50,000  $48,219  $51,973  $60,259  $64,264  $15,923  $14,809  $1,365  $1,326 
$50,000 - $100,000  $53,503  $56,730  $56,809  $57,700  $6,895  $5,271  $3,049  $3,027 
$100,000 - $250,000  $102,488  $108,446  $108,615  $115,535  $10,495  $7,477  $5,431  $5,549 
$250,000 - $500,000  $196,716  $204,643  $201,233  $220,922  $17,289  $13,356  $13,226  $13,637 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $341,979  $353,531  $347,034  $383,851  $27,531  $22,391  $23,255  $23,580 
>$1,000,000  $758,944  $770,612  $769,781  $883,879  $79,563  $73,448  $61,124  $64,676 
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Table 12.35 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers, Hog Farms 1998-2001 
Hogs  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $9,402  $14,565  $24,232  $24,482  $7,370  $5,014  $189  $188 
$25,000 - $50,000  $6,054  $11,458  $14,273  $14,441  $6,032  $4,314  $1,447  $1,426 
$50,000 - $100,000  $14,844  $23,048  $23,515  $23,571  $9,337  $5,552  $1,968  $1,860 
$100,000 - $250,000  $32,111  $46,420  $44,494  $44,626  $12,740  $6,091  $2,929  $2,941 
$250,000 - $500,000  $66,399  $88,034  $82,895  $83,130  $22,021  $11,865  $7,400  $7,075 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $112,574  $144,023  $136,019  $135,794  $44,692  $28,468  $20,155  $19,976 
>$1,000,000  $314,838  $359,052  $356,719  $354,554  $143,412  $115,094  $87,351  $91,057 
              
Hogs  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $17,885  $23,049  $32,716  $33,075  $9,226  $7,076  $135  $137 
$25,000 - $50,000  $16,636  $22,040  $24,855  $25,760  $6,670  $4,793  $1,454  $1,466 
$50,000 - $100,000  $28,424  $36,628  $37,095  $38,273  $9,040  $5,277  $1,415  $1,378 
$100,000 - $250,000  $53,391  $67,700  $65,774  $68,636  $13,386  $6,698  $2,778  $2,867 
$250,000 - $500,000  $105,792  $127,426  $122,288  $129,050  $24,511  $14,321  $8,684  $8,904 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $188,093  $219,541  $211,538  $233,332  $46,405  $30,332  $20,170  $22,380 
>$1,000,000  $532,062  $576,275  $573,942  $684,568  $166,924  $134,809  $108,089  $120,014 
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Table 12.36 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers, Beef Cow-calf Farms 1998-2001 
Cow Calf  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $2,566  $5,118  $7,999  $8,207  $5,414  $4,316  $1,637  $1,622 
$25,000 - $50,000  $8,015  $11,034  $12,226  $12,265  $5,470  $3,951  $2,270  $2,254 
$50,000 - $100,000  $15,149  $20,111  $20,841  $20,965  $8,771  $6,270  $3,363  $3,211 
$100,000 - $250,000  $24,203  $33,519  $35,051  $35,361  $14,252  $9,752  $4,353  $4,324 
$250,000 - $500,000  $38,100  $53,649  $55,340  $55,373  $26,029  $17,980  $10,310  $10,130 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $55,540  $73,768  $77,136  $77,453  $29,416  $21,591  $8,988  $8,620 
              
  Hired Arms Length Labour as an Eligible Expense 
Cow Calf  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $9,509  $12,061  $14,942  $15,355  $5,307  $4,278  $1,131  $1,110 
$25,000 - $50,000  $17,846  $20,864  $22,056  $22,489  $5,455  $4,026  $1,988  $1,968 
$50,000 - $100,000  $27,887  $32,849  $33,579  $34,841  $8,718  $6,251  $2,883  $2,910 
$100,000 - $250,000  $41,243  $50,559  $52,090  $54,488  $14,248  $9,867  $3,820  $3,749 
$250,000 - $500,000  $63,794  $79,343  $81,034  $86,649  $26,149  $17,981  $8,475  $8,698 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $85,953  $104,180  $107,548  $114,235  $31,546  $23,533  $9,406  $8,994 
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Table 12.37 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers, Beef Feedlot Farms 1998-2001 
Feedlot  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
>$1,000,000  $138,880  $175,950  $204,718  $201,941  $113,717  $94,181  $42,716  $43,544 
              
Feedlot  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
>$1,000,000  $216,522  $175,950  $204,718  $201,941  $111,861  $149,201  $95,523  $123,934 
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Table 12.38 Margin Variability With Combined Stabilization Layers, Tobacco Farms 1998-2001 
Tobacco  Average Gross Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $30,710  $35,732  $54,133  $66,881  $21,865  $20,270  $2,164  $1,221 
$25,000 - $50,000  $39,582  $46,930  $56,465  $63,257  $20,012  $17,720  $3,564  $3,079 
$50,000 - $100,000  $54,382  $65,849  $71,281  $77,456  $23,839  $18,685  $4,252  $3,285 
$100,000 - $250,000  $74,722  $91,143  $93,797  $97,208  $32,241  $23,696  $10,517  $10,107 
$250,000 - $500,000  $119,307  $141,470  $140,036  $142,328  $44,478  $29,984  $19,729  $20,081 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $236,962  $267,513  $267,634  $268,793  $68,233  $46,593  $35,701  $35,509 







              
Tobacco  Average Production Margin  Normal Deviation Below Average 
Sales Range  No Pgm 
Current 
Pgm - Adj 
OFIDP 
3 Tiered 
BRM  2 Tiered BRM  No Pgm 
Current Pgm 
- Adj OFIDP  3 Tiered BRM 
2 Tiered 
BRM 
$0 - $25,000  $46,941  $51,962  $70,363  $96,405  $25,821  $24,361  $3,003  $2,606 
$25,000 - $50,000  $57,195  $64,543  $74,078  $97,158  $21,553  $19,366  $4,022  $4,894 
$50,000 - $100,000  $74,190  $85,658  $91,089  $124,714  $25,560  $20,445  $5,148  $5,210 
$100,000 - $250,000  $108,016  $124,437  $127,091  $181,910  $31,510  $23,324  $8,761  $10,141 
$250,000 - $500,000  $180,498  $202,661  $201,227  $287,763  $42,176  $28,530  $15,761  $19,449 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  $363,322  $393,872  $393,993  $557,660  $63,734  $43,377  $28,101  $35,715 
>$1,000,000  $707,794  $771,888  $785,753  $1,138,207  $130,018  $91,870  $49,736  $102,482  
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12.3 NISA 1-2-3 
An area of curiosity is the “value of the asset” under the proposed program compared to the 
current programs.  In particular, the issue is entitlement.  Under NISA, farmers were credited for 
government matching funds when they made their contributions.  Therefore, the program makes 
government money an entitlement.  Farmers couldn’t realize the payment unless they took a loss, 
but this was triggered by a cash accounting measure or a minimum income trigger. 
 
Under the proposed program, there is no entitlement, and payments only occur when there is 
need.  Not surprisingly, some farmers are concerned that the proposed program may not provide 
the same level of income supplement.   
 
The only way to test this is to compare the eligible NISA matching funds during a period of time 
to what would be paid out in the top two tiers of the BRM program.  This was done using the 
sample of NISA accounts for the period 1998 – 2001 (Table 12.39). The results show the amount 
of matching funds that were actually available to the accounts under NISA, compared to what 
their claims would have been in the top two tiers of the BRM (on a cash basis).  The results show 
that there would actually have been a higher overall payout of just over $50 million in the top 
two tiers of the proposed BRM than in NISA.   All of the industries, except fruit and vegetables 
and greenhouses, would have received more payment.   
 
Those two industries are affected for two reasons.  One is SDRM, which provided a higher level 
of support to horticulture in place of effective crop insurance programs.  The second is structural 
adjustment.  There was a tremendous amount of planned growth in those two industries during 
the time period of the analysis.  A number of farms in those two industries had their NISA 
entitlements increased substantially because they applied for structural adjustment.  The 
proposed program will also allow for structural adjustment, but this analysis does not.  In reality, 
the results quite substantially underestimate the likely effects of the proposed program on these 
two industries.   
 
Table 12.39 NISA Matching Funds Relative to Triggered Stabilization Payments  
Under Proposed Program 
 
Number of 
Producers  Matching NISA Contribution 
BRM Payment in Top Two Tiers 
(gov't payment)) 
    Total $  Avg $/Farm  Total $  Avg $/Farm 
Field Crops  6,158  $89,704,066 $14,567 $140,027,914  $22,739
Vegetables and Fruit  993  $65,517,663  $65,980  $39,926,187   $40,208 
Green House (F&V)  123  $8,859,236  $72,026  $5,421,885   $44,080 
Poultry 101  $928,525  $9,193  $2,404,558    $23,808 
Dairy 435  $4,612,271  $10,603  $3,817,443    $8,776 
Swine 900  $30,954,171  $34,394  $32,261,394    $35,846 
Beef Cow-calf  1,452  $15,764,137  $10,857  $25,311,153   $17,432 
Beef Feedlot  163  $7,598,712  $46,618  $18,073,147   $110,878 
Tobacco 709  $27,903,888  $39,357  $36,279,009    $51,169 
Total   11,034  $251,842,670  $22,824 $303,522,690   $27,508 
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12.4 Observations About Program Variants 
It would appear that most of the individual segments of the industries are either better off or not 
affected by treating hired labour as an ineligible expense.  Fruit and vegetable farms and 
greenhouses would have received less payout over all with labour as an ineligible expense, but in 
both cases the overall result is driven by the two highest gross sales categories.  The small and 
medium farms in these industries would actually have received more in total payments.  The 
actual number of farms that are worse off with hired labour as an ineligible expense is quite 
small.  
 
Contrasting the tobacco industry results with the other horticulture operations gives a clue about 
treatment of this variable.  The fact that the tobacco industry would have received more 
payments with labour as an eligible expense without exception across size groups is probably 
reflective of the rapid movement toward mechanical technology in this industry during the past 
decade. In earlier years, it would likely have been more labour intensive, and the results would 
have been different for the industry.  Conversely, it is likely that large fruit and vegetable farms 
and green houses have a relatively high labour complement and that labour cost is negatively 
correlated with revenue – perhaps in part because more labour is hired to salvage poor crops.  As 
technology changes, the results may change.   
 
Therefore, it is not obvious how to treat labour.  What is clear is that the majority of farms are 
either better off or only marginally affected if hired labour is not an eligible expense, and the 
worst affected are the largest operations in the green house and fruit and vegetable industries.  
Therefore, the largest number is made better off by not having labour as an eligible expense.  
Also, not including labour makes the program simpler and easier to administer. 
 
We are inclined to suggest, in general, that hired labour not be an eligible expense as a general 
rule, but that farmers be given the opportunity to include it if they desire. If they do decide to 
include it as an expense, the decision should be made at the outset and should remain in force 
for a given period of time – i.e. three to five years.  This will make program administration 
easier. 
 
Combining the top two tiers of the program so that the cost share is 40:60 is appealing.  It is 
simpler.  It is more similar to the current NISA program.  The analysis shows that it would have 
paid slightly more money during 1998 – 2001 and would have had few effects on the stabilizing 












13.0 “Affordability” of Proposed Program 
 
The design of the proposed BRM program is such that producers must submit a deposit to a fund 
in order to leverage receipts of government funds.  The merits of this design feature of the 
proposed program and some alternatives to it are discussed elsewhere in this report.  Given the 
need for farmers to forward deposits under the proposed program, a natural question to ask is, 
“do farmers have the cash necessary to make their required deposits”.  The purpose of this 
section is to answer this question. Let us be clear here.  The issue of affordability is not one of 
the cost to participate.  There is no cost beyond the interest cost of the money that is tied up in 
the deposit and a very modest administration fee of $50.  The issue is one of cash flow, and the 
question is whether it makes sense to have a large amount of funds tied up in deposits for a 
government program, and whether there is a significant difference between the amount tied up 
under the proposed program and what is tied up now in NISA. 
 
Under the proposed program, at the time of closure of NISA accounts, producers will have an 
option to roll Fund 1 balances into deposits for the BRM program.  They will also clearly have 
the option of forwarding liquidated Fund 2 balances as deposits into the BRM program after 
paying the deferred tax liability.  This is in addition to borrowings for the purpose of BRM 
deposits (discussed below) and any free cash that can be contributed.  Thus, the level of current 
NISA balances relative to BRM deposit requirements will determine producers’ needs for cash 
from other sources to participate in the proposed program. 
 
To determine the extent to which NISA balances can fund deposits under the proposed program, 
NISA Fund 1 and Fund 2 balances were analyzed across farm types and sizes, and then 
compared with deposits required given reference production margins.  Table 13.1 presents the 
aggregate and average per farm NISA balances across Ontario farm commodity segments (as 
defined by majority of farm sales) at the end of the last fiscal year.  The table shows that 
aggregate Ontario NISA balances are almost $680 million.  Well over half of the balances are 
held by field crop and fruit and vegetable farms.  Greenhouse, swine, tobacco, and fruit and 
vegetable farms have lower Fund 2 balances than Fund 1 balances, indicating that withdrawals 
had been made; this is not evident from the other commodity sectors. Table 13.2 provides a 
breakdown by commodity segment and farm sales range.  Across farm types, average NISA 
balances increase with farm size, but with the greatest proportion of NISA balances held by 
farms in the middle size range.       
 
Table 13.3 presents the frequency with which NISA balances are sufficient to cover deposits to 
the proposed program. Proposed program balances are shown as the maximum 26% deposit, and 
the actual amount required for each farm’s claims. The table shows that, with the exception of 
supply managed segments, there is a surprising level of uniformity in the capability of NISA 
balances to fund the producer’s balance of the proposed program.  Across most commodity 
segments, a sufficient Fund 1 balance exists to fund 60-70% of the maximum and 70-80% of the 
minimum BRM deposit required.  Table 13.3 shows that if both Fund 1 and Fund 2 are used to 
finance deposits, the percentage of account holders with sufficient balance for full deposits under 
the proposed program increases further, although the values in the table for Fund 1 and Fund 2  
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overstate the case somewhat since tax liabilities on the Fund 2 balances are not accounted for. 
Supply managed segments have relatively smaller NISA balances, and as such cannot leverage 
them to fund the BRM deposit to the same extent.  Table 13.4 fragments these results according 
to farm size.    
 
Thus, between 63 and 68% of NISA participants can fund the BRM program from current NISA 
Fund 1 balances.  Ignoring the tax liability on Fund 2 balances, the percentage of NISA 
participants who can fund BRM deposits from whole NISA balances increases to 68-72%.   
 
 
Table 13.1 Current NISA Balances by Commodity Segment, $  











Cow-calf 1452  26,623,515 26,974,579 53,598,094 18,336  18,578 36,913
Feedlot 163  10,526,113 11,512,704 22,038,817 64,577  70,630 135,207
Dairy 435  8,052,279 9,445,803 17,498,082 18,511  21,714 40,225
Field Crops  6158  153,309,280 150,027,005 303,336,285 24,896  24,363 49,259
Greenhouse 123  12,992,026 8,797,761 21,789,787 105,626  71,527 177,153
Poultry 101  1,702,753 1,730,641 3,433,393 16,859  17,135 33,994
Swine 900  37,627,357 36,896,501 74,523,858 41,808  40,996 82,804
Tobacco 709  46,618,022 41,753,605 88,371,627 65,752  58,891 124,643
Fruit and Vegetable  993  95,601,032 75,299,150 170,900,182 96,275  75,830 172,105
Total 11,034  355,902,749 323,950,466 679,853,215 32,255  29,359 61,614
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Table 13.2 Current NISA Balances by Commodity Segment, $ 
 
# of 
PIN  Sector  Income Range  Total  Total  Total  Avg.  Avg.  Avg. 
         Fund 1  Fund 2  Fund  Fund 1  Fund 2 
Total 
Fund 
206  Cow-Calf  $0 - $25,000  896,224  848,214 1,744,438 4,351 4,118  8,468 
256  Cow-Calf  $25,000 - $50,000  2,145,419 2,117,091  4,262,511  8,381 8,270  16,650 
308  Cow-Calf  $50,000 - $100,000  3,443,150  3,642,115 7,085,265  11,179  11,825  23,004 
394  Cow-Calf  $100,000 - $250,000  9,315,946 9,112,328  18,428,274 23,645  23,128  46,772 
197  Cow-Calf  $250,000 - $500,000  5,687,168 6,298,025  11,985,193 28,869  31,970  60,839 
91  Cow-Calf 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  5,135,608 4,956,806  10,092,414 56,435  54,470 110,906 
1452  Total  All Income Range  26,623,515 26,974,579  53,598,094 18,336  18,578  36,913 
4  Dairy  $0 - $25,000  14,846  15,319 30,164  3,711  3,830  7,541 
6  Dairy  $25,000 - $50,000  15,712  28,239 43,951  2,619  4,707  7,325 
25  Dairy  $50,000 - $100,000  163,410  184,764 348,174  6,536  7,391  13,927 
147  Dairy  $100,000 - $250,000  1,787,643  1,855,559 3,643,202  12,161  12,623  24,784 
167  Dairy  $250,000 - $500,000  3,105,218  3,724,825 6,830,043  18,594  22,304  40,898 
70  Dairy 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  2,213,716 2,670,193  4,883,909 31,625  38,146  69,770 
16  Dairy >$1,000,000  751,735  966,904 1,718,639  46,983  60,431  107,415 
435  Total  All Income Range  8,052,279 9,445,803  17,498,082 18,511  21,714  40,225 
163 Feedlot  >$1,000,000  10,526,113  11,512,704 22,038,817 64,577 70,630  135,207 
                          
1,761  Field Crops  $0 - $25,000  12,576,410 11,507,336  24,083,745  7,142  6,535  13,676 
1,358  Field Crops  $25,000 - $50,000  19,395,054 18,319,350  37,714,403  14,282 13,490  27,772 
1,334  Field Crops  $50,000 - $100,000  30,767,379 29,466,451  60,233,831  23,064 22,089  45,153 
1,186  Field Crops  $100,000 - $250,000  47,596,934 47,246,262  94,843,196  40,132 39,837  79,969 
348  Field Crops  $250,000 - $500,000  25,845,124 25,208,557  51,053,682  74,268 72,438  146,706 
128  Field Crops 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  12,675,813 13,420,922  26,096,735 99,030  104,851 203,881 
43  Field Crops  >$1,000,000  4,452,566  4,858,127 9,310,693  103,548  112,980  216,528 
6158  Total  All Income Range  153,309,280 150,027,005  303,336,285 24,896  24,363  49,259 
16  GH (F&V)  $0 - $25,000  436,930  124,986 561,916  27,308  7,812  35,120 
10  GH (F&V)  $25,000 - $50,000  298,275 124,371  422,646  29,827  12,437  42,265 
23  GH (F&V)  $50,000 - $100,000  569,728  404,015 973,742  24,771  17,566  42,337 
19  GH (F&V)  $100,000 - $250,000  1,935,633  1,636,842 3,572,475  101,875  86,150  188,025 
21  GH (F&V)  $250,000 - $500,000  2,028,230  1,680,331 3,708,560  96,582  80,016  176,598 
17  GH (F&V) 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  3,615,639 2,563,579  6,179,218 212,685  150,799  363,483 
17  GH (F&V)  >$1,000,000  4,107,593  2,263,637 6,371,229  241,623  133,155  374,778 
123  Total  All Income Range  12,992,026 8,797,761  21,789,787 105,626  71,527  177,153 
9  Poultry  $0 - $25,000  30,221  22,654  52,874  3,358  2,517  5,875 
5  Poultry  $25,000 - $50,000  28,909 44,013  72,922  5,782  8,803  14,584 
5  Poultry  $50,000 - $100,000  75,702  82,561 158,262  15,140  16,512  31,652  
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23  Poultry  $100,000 - $250,000  362,132 216,290  578,422  15,745  9,404  25,149 
28  Poultry  $250,000 - $500,000  447,258  617,593 1,064,850  15,973  22,057  38,030 
27  Poultry 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000  636,418 596,025  1,232,443  23,571  22,075  45,646 
4  Poultry >$1,000,000  122,114  151,506 273,619  30,528  37,876  68,405 
101  Total  All Income Range  1,702,753 1,730,641  3,433,393 16,859  17,135  33,994 
20  Swine  $0 - $25,000  169,664  61,844 231,508  8,483  3,092  11,575 
33  Swine  $25,000 - $50,000  212,580  200,487 413,067  6,442  6,075  12,517 
71  Swine  $50,000 - $100,000  832,538  835,451 1,667,989  11,726  11,767  23,493 
243  Swine  $100,000 - $250,000  5,954,710  5,615,167 11,569,878 24,505 23,108  47,613 
252  Swine  $250,000 - $500,000  11,043,294  10,594,047 21,637,341 43,823 42,040  85,862 
158  Swine 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000 10,294,810  9,862,161  20,156,971 65,157  62,419 127,576 
123  Swine >$1,000,000  9,119,760  9,727,345 18,847,104 74,144 79,084  153,228 
900  Total  All Income Range  37,627,357 36,896,501  74,523,858 41,808  40,996  82,804 
47  Tobacco  $0 - $25,000  1,176,566  774,768 1,951,333  25,033  16,484  41,518 
33  Tobacco  $25,000 - $50,000  1,688,641  1,210,634 2,899,275  51,171  36,686  87,857 
83  Tobacco  $50,000 - $100,000  3,385,834  3,108,402 6,494,236  40,793  37,451  78,244 
297  Tobacco  $100,000 - $250,000  18,081,807  15,639,467 33,721,274 60,882 52,658  113,540 
195  Tobacco  $250,000 - $500,000  16,087,000  15,741,915 31,828,916 82,497 80,728  163,225 
48  Tobacco 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000 5,024,511  4,657,676  9,682,187 104,677  97,035  201,712 
6  Tobacco >$1,000,000  1,173,663 620,743 1,794,407  195,611  103,457  299,068 
709  Total  All Income Range  46,618,022 41,753,605  88,371,627 65,752  58,891 124,643 
138  Veg. & Fruit  $0 - $25,000  1,275,823 936,418  2,212,242  9,245  6,786  16,031 
101  Veg. & Fruit  $25,000 - $50,000  1,691,234 1,482,730  3,173,964 16,745  14,680  31,425 
137  Veg. & Fruit  $50,000 - $100,000  3,874,146 3,103,047  6,977,193 28,278  22,650  50,928 
232  Veg. & Fruit  $100,000 - $250,000  17,496,627 12,497,820  29,994,447 75,416  53,870 129,286 
146  Veg. & Fruit  $250,000 - $500,000  18,599,868 14,427,764  33,027,632 127,396  98,820  226,217 
130  Veg. & Fruit 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000 25,439,586  20,571,937  46,011,522 195,689  158,246  353,935 
109  Veg. & Fruit  >$1,000,000  27,223,748 22,279,435  49,503,183 249,759  204,398  454,158 
993  Total  All Income Range  95,601,032 75,299,150  170,900,182 96,275  75,830 172,105 
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Fund 1 enough to 
cover Max Deposit 
(% of farms) 
Total Fund  
enough to cover 
Max Deposit  (% 
of Farms) 
Fund 1 enough to 
cover Min Deposit 
(% of Farms) 
Total Fund  
enough to cover 
Min Deposit (% of 
Farms) 
Cow-calf  1452 63.15% 72.38% 68.53%  75.34%
Feedlot  163 40.49% 51.53% 46.01%  53.99%
Dairy  435 4.14% 25.06% 11.49%  36.78%
Field Crops  6158 64.21% 73.90% 69.76%  77.41%
Greenhouse  123 60.98% 64.23% 64.23%  66.67%
Poultry  101 14.85% 23.76% 18.81%  32.67%
Swine  900 49.00% 65.89% 59.56%  70.89%
Tobacco  709 54.30% 63.61% 62.76%  68.97%
Fruit and 
Vegetable  993 66.36% 73.72% 72.61%  77.04%
Total   11,034  59.18% 69.55% 65.40%  73.55%
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Table 13.4 Sufficiency of NISA Fund Balances Relative to BRM Funding Requirements by 
Farm Sales Category 
 
No. of  Sector  Income Range  Fund 1 enough  Total Fund enough  Fund 1 enough 
Total Fund 
enough 
Participant       
to cover Max 
Deposit 
to cover Max 
Deposit 
to cover Min 
Deposit 
to cover Min 
Deposit 
         (Share of Farms)  (Share of Farms)  (Share of Farms) 
(Share of 
Farms) 
206  Cow-Calf  $0 - $25,000  60.19%  67.96%  66.02%  71.84% 
256  Cow-Calf  $25,000 - $50,000  66.02%  74.22%  68.75%  75.00% 
308  Cow-Calf  $50,000 - $100,000  58.77%  66.88%  64.94%  70.78% 
394  Cow-Calf  $100,000 - $250,000  65.48%  75.89%  70.05%  78.93% 
197  Cow-Calf  $250,000 - $500,000  65.48%  75.13%  73.60%  78.17% 
91  Cow-Calf  $500,000 - $1,000,000  61.54%  74.73%  68.13%  78.02% 
1452  Total  All  Income  Range  63.15% 72.38% 68.53%  75.34% 
4  Dairy  $0 - $25,000  0.00%  50.00%  0.00%  75.00% 
6  Dairy  $25,000 - $50,000  16.67%  50.00%  16.67%  50.00% 
25  Dairy  $50,000 - $100,000  12.00%  52.00%  20.00%  64.00% 
147  Dairy  $100,000 - $250,000  6.12%  29.25%  17.69%  44.90% 
167  Dairy  $250,000 - $500,000  1.20%  14.37%  5.39%  23.95% 
70  Dairy  $500,000 - $1,000,000  4.29%  30.00%  11.43%  37.14% 
16 Dairy  >$1,000,000  0.00%  18.75%  6.25%  37.50% 
435  Total  All  Income  Range  4.14% 25.06% 11.49%  36.78% 
163 
Feedlot 
(Beef)  >$1,000,000  40.49% 51.53% 46.01%  53.99% 
163  Total  All  Income  Range  40.49% 51.53% 46.01%  53.99% 
1,761 
Field 
Crops  $0 - $25,000  64.22%  71.49%  68.09%  74.39% 
1,358 
Field 
Crops  $25,000 - $50,000  68.63%  77.25%  72.97%  79.75% 
1,334 
Field 
Crops  $50,000 - $100,000  65.44%  76.09%  72.49%  80.13% 
1,186 
Field 
Crops  $100,000 - $250,000  62.14%  73.61%  68.97%  77.99% 
348 
Field 
Crops  $250,000 - $500,000  56.90%  71.26%  65.80%  75.57% 
128 
Field 
Crops  $500,000 - $1,000,000  51.56%  64.06%  57.03%  69.53% 
43 
Field 
Crops  >$1,000,000  39.53% 58.14% 44.19%  65.12% 
6158  Total  All  Income  Range  64.21% 73.90% 69.76%  77.41% 
16 
GH 
(F&V)  $0 - $25,000  50.00%  50.00%  50.00%  56.25% 
10 
GH 
(F&V)  $25,000 - $50,000  70.00%  80.00%  80.00%  80.00% 
23 
GH 
(F&V)  $50,000 - $100,000  56.52%  65.22%  69.57%  73.91% 
19 
GH 




(F&V)  $250,000 - $500,000  38.10%  38.10%  38.10%  38.10% 
17 
GH 
(F&V)  $500,000 - $1,000,000  82.35%  82.35%  82.35%  82.35% 
17 
GH 
(F&V)  >$1,000,000  76.47% 76.47% 76.47%  76.47% 
123  Total  All  Income  Range  60.98% 64.23% 64.23%  66.67% 
9  Poultry  $0 - $25,000  11.11%  22.22%  11.11%  22.22% 
5  Poultry  $25,000 - $50,000  20.00%  20.00%  20.00%  20.00% 
5  Poultry  $50,000 - $100,000  40.00%  60.00%  60.00%  60.00% 
23  Poultry  $100,000 - $250,000  26.09%  34.78%  30.43%  43.48% 
28  Poultry  $250,000 - $500,000  17.86%  21.43%  21.43%  35.71% 
27  Poultry  $500,000 - $1,000,000  0.00%  11.11%  3.70%  22.22% 
4 Poultry  >$1,000,000  0.00%  25.00%  0.00%  25.00% 
101  Total  All  Income  Range  14.85% 23.76% 18.81%  32.67% 
20  Swine  $0 - $25,000  45.00%  50.00%  50.00%  50.00% 
33  Swine  $25,000 - $50,000  48.48%  60.61%  54.55%  66.67% 
71  Swine  $50,000 - $100,000  54.93%  61.97%  59.15%  61.97% 
243  Swine  $100,000 - $250,000  57.20%  67.49%  65.02%  71.19% 
252  Swine  $250,000 - $500,000  51.19%  71.43%  64.68%  75.00% 
158  Swine  $500,000 - $1,000,000  48.10%  68.35%  61.39%  74.05% 
123  Swine  >$1,000,000  26.83% 54.47% 39.02%  67.48% 
900  Total  All  Income  Range  49.00% 65.89% 59.56%  70.89% 
47  Tobacco  $0 - $25,000  31.91% 40.43% 40.43% 46.81% 
33  Tobacco  $25,000 - $50,000  60.61% 63.64% 63.64% 66.67% 
83  Tobacco  $50,000 - $100,000  60.24% 69.88% 66.27% 73.49% 
297 Tobacco  $100,000  - $250,000  56.90%  65.99% 65.99%  71.72% 
195 Tobacco  $250,000  - $500,000  54.36%  65.13% 63.08%  70.77% 
48 Tobacco  $500,000  -  $1,000,000 45.83% 54.17% 56.25%  60.42% 
6 Tobacco  >$1,000,000  50.00% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 
709  Total  All  Income  Range  54.30% 63.61% 62.76%  68.97% 
138 
Veg. & 
Fruit  $0 - $25,000  61.59%  66.67%  65.94%  70.29% 
101 
Veg. & 
Fruit  $25,000 - $50,000  74.26%  78.22%  77.23%  80.20% 
137 
Veg. & 
Fruit  $50,000 - $100,000  59.85%  66.42%  64.96%  70.07% 
232 
Veg. & 
Fruit  $100,000 - $250,000  67.67%  74.57%  74.14%  78.45% 
146 
Veg. & 
Fruit  $250,000 - $500,000  69.86%  79.45%  77.40%  81.51% 
130 
Veg. & 
Fruit  $500,000 - $1,000,000  70.00%  76.92%  76.92%  80.00% 
109 
Veg. & 
Fruit  >$1,000,000  61.47% 74.31% 71.56%  78.90% 





What the foregoing indicates is that the BRM program, as proposed, will require more cash to 
be tied up in deposits than is currently in the NISA accounts.  While the Fund 1 balances would 
cover about 2/3 of the requirement, this means that another third is required.  What is the 
purpose of the cash deposit?  Is it a good use of money? 
 
In our discussions with government officials, two reasons have been provided for having the 
deposits, one of which is for having them be 100% of the producer’s share.  The first is that the 
program is about managing risk, and farmers should be consciously making decisions about it, 
not just collecting cheques.  Requiring them to make a deposit means that they will be fully 
engaged.  Moreover, since the program pays as much as 4:1 on the dollar, it is argued that it is 
not unreasonable to require that the producer’s dollar is there. We agree with this concept, but 
don’t understand why it would add to their engagement to require the full deposit to be there.  
Whether the deposit is $5000, or $26,000 doesn’t likely change a farmer’s inclination to pay 
attention.  For most farmers, $5000 remains a not insignificant sum: one won’t be five times 
more engaged if the deposit is five times as much.  
 
In fact, the 1/3 initial deposit that has to be topped up by the end of the third year, or when there 
is a claim, is a bit silly.  If a farmer has a 1/3 deposit in place, then has a bad year, the farmer 
will need to send the remainder of the deposit to the government, who then writes the farmer a 
cheque for both the farmer’s and the government’s share. In other words, the farmer needs to 
find cash when cash, almost by definition, is short so the farm can send the government a 
cheque, which the government will then send back to the farmer.  This sounds like making work 
for the sake of making work.   
 
The second reason given is that the program is designed to make the farmer whole (bring them 
back to the reference margin) by combining the government’s and the farmer’s shares.  There is 
a concern that this principle will get lost if all of the deposit is not required.  Therefore, 
government officials are concerned that not requiring the full deposit will put eventual pressure 
on for richer programs. 
 
The latter is a matter of communication. We agree with the farm community that it is 
unnecessary to require this much money to be tied up in deposits. It can be used elsewhere.  That 
is why, in earlier sections of this report, we suggested that depositing a letter of credit or 
developing an option (i.e. a derivative) to cover the deposit would be preferable.  Also, in section 
10.0, we suggested that another way to accomplish the same end is to charge a fee to farmers 
based on their likely benefits from the program.  As with an option premium, the fee can be 
calculated based on the risk associated with industries or farm sizes.  
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14.0 Transitional Programming: Alternatives and Analysis 
 
The first three years under the proposed program will be a period of transition from current 
programs to the new program.  NISA accounts will be closed beginning at the end of 2003, and 
the CFIP program (OFIDP in Ontario) will be discontinued at the end of 2003.  It is being 
proposed that NISA balances be withdrawn over a five-year period, during which the proposed 
program will begin and farmers may be drawing on them.  
 
In addition, there will be a transition period for companion programs.  Thus, for the three years 
of transition from current to proposed programs, a transition away from companion programs to 
solely the proposed program will occur.   
 
The funding constraints for the three year transition are the following: 
 
•  The so-called “wedge” funding, which amounts to $167 million 
•  Funding allocated for contributions to MRI of $95 million 
•  Any funds in the MRI pool that become surplus in the future 
 
Thus, a total of approximately $262 million exists to fund the transition. 
 
Against these funding constraints, Table 14.1 presents the recent patterns in government funding 
of companion programs.  The government contributions in the table include both provincial and 
federal government contributions for companion programs.  The table shows actual government 
cost associated with companion programs in the previous three years, along with the average 
annual payment for companion programs and the total payment over the last three years.  The 
last column provides a sum over three years of the highest payments observed in the last three 
years. 
 
The values in the table suggest that if the three years in the wedge period resemble the previous 
three years, the funding that has been allocated between the MRI funding and the wedge funding 
would be insufficient to cover the all the companion programs listed.  This is particularly the 
case if each of the three years in the transition period had the highest payments seen in the last 
three years.  Thus, choices must be made between historic levels of companion program funding 
and funding that can be allocated to companions during the transition funding. 
 
Choices must also be made with regard to the design of companion programs during the 
transition period.  In particular, because NISA is being closed at the end of 2003, it begs the 
question as to how SDRM and the NISA top-up programs will operate.  Under the proposed 
program, no new contributions to NISA will be accepted, and producers will be required to 
withdraw 20% of their NISA Fund 2 balance by March 31
st, 2004, with the remainder withdrawn 
over the next 5 years.  Any NISA Fund 1 balance not used to fund a producer’s BRM deposit 
would be withdrawn in an equal amounts to Fund 2.  Thus, the companion funding in the 
transition period would not have a “fund” to go to as it has in under current programs. 
 
As a means to redesign SDRM and NISA top-ups in the transition period, the following options 
are apparent:  
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•  Issue payments directly to producers for SDRM and other top-up payments based on ENS, 
adjusted for the taxable liability 
•  Direct SDRM and top-up payments based on ENS into BRM deposits, with an adjustment for 
tax liability on the government portion 
•  Establish “new” Fund 1 and Fund 2 accounts in which to accumulate SDRM and top-up 
payments based on ENS, with withdrawal triggers linked to defined perils and/or negative 
margins.  
 
Table 14.1 Government Contributions to Companion Programs, 2000-01 to 2002-03 








































































The first design for SDRM and top-ups in the transition appears relatively straightforward.  
Rather than deposits being matched and directed to a fund, a cheque would be issued from 
government directly to the producer in the amount of X% of ENS to producers that had 
historically participated in SDRM and NISA.  Unlike the operation of SDRM and top-ups under 
current programs, under this design no conscious effort would be required on behalf of the 
producer to obtain the entitlement.  Under the current design, the producer must actually make a 
contribution in order to receive the entitlement.  As a result of the removal of the requirement for 
a deposit on behalf of the producer, it presents the likely potential that total payments to SDRM 
and top-ups would increase. 
 
Under the second design alternative, SDRM and top-up payments would be directed into BRM 
deposits to producers who had historically participated in SDRM and NISA.  Rather than a 
cheque being written directly to the producer, funds would be deposited in the producer’s BRM 
account.  The tax liability owing to the payment could be either deducted at the time the payment 
is transferred as a deposit into the producer’s BRM account, or at the time that a payment is 
triggered under the BRM program.  Thus, the companion program money would be allocated to 
buttress the producer’s BRM account. 
 
Finally, given that NISA Fund 1 and Fund 2 are to be closed, a new Fund 1 and Fund 2 could be 
opened, with producer contributions going into Fund 1 and government matching funds going 
into Fund 2.  Withdrawals could be triggered by hazards not well covered by crop insurance, or  
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negative margins.  For example, if data can be readily observed to verify a spot loss, such as a 
frost on specialty crop, the producer would be eligible for a withdrawal; first from Fund 2 (with 
tax liability realized), then from Fund 1. 
 
Among these three options, there are distinct advantages to the third.  It has perhaps the most in 
common with program intentions associated with companion programs.  First, in order to receive 
government entitlement, producers must set aside their own funds.  The first two alternatives do 
not have this characteristic, and it is difficult to see how they could be made to.  Second, SDRM 
in particular was conceived as filling a gap in crop insurance for producers of horticultural 
products.  Under the conception of the triggers for SDRM and top-ups in the transition period, 
this intent is retained.  Third, a trigger concept as a means to access funds is retained under the 
third alternative, while it is not under the first alternative.  Under the second or third alternatives 
the funds are only accessible by the producer on a countercyclical basis; under the first 
alternative the entitlement can be realized at any time after it has been paid.  The potential 
weakness of the third option is that it requires new accounts to set up because current Fund 1 and 
Fund 2 accounts are to be dissolved.  This introduces a setup cost that would not be necessary if 







The Proposed Program: A Conceptual Model 
 
There are three related conceptual components of the proposed BRM program: 
•  Payment calculation 
•  Reference margin calculation 
•  Deposit calculation 
 
Of these three, the deposit calculation is among the most complex to treat in a generic way, but 
at the same time the least relevant to the overall operation of the proposed program.  This is 
because the deposit remains the producer’s money (it is simply cash flow out of one account 
into another), and the affordability of this deposit is not an important issue, for reasons 
discussed elsewhere.  In fact, by ignoring the deposit and the return of deposits through 
program payments, the understanding of the proposed program becomes much clearer.  Thus, it 
is ignored here. 
 
The payment calculation is a function of the magnitude of the deposit, or the level of 
“coverage”, that has been selected by the producer.  As such, it is technical.  Consider the 
representation of the payment function below: 
 
Let:  πt = farm profit in the current year 
pt = output price in the current year 
 q t = volume of output in the current year 
 c(qt) = eligible costs in the current year 
  FC = ineligible costs in the current year 
 RMt = reference margin in the current year 
 
Then the farmer attempts to maximize income (given the proposed program) according to: 
 
Max πt = ptqt - c(qt) - FC + .8*max{.7[RMt - ptqt - c(qt), 0]} + .7*max{min{.85[RMt - ptqt - 
c(qt)], .85RMt-.7RMt},0}+ .5* max{min{[RMt - ptqt - c(qt)], RMt-.85RMt},0}   [1] 
 
The first components of the expression above deal with farm sales and costs, the later sections 
express the potential for payments under the proposed program.  The terms in the first set of 
brace brackets identify that the producer receives 80% of losses below 70% of the reference 
margin, or zero (whichever is greater).  The second brace bracketed terms show that, in addition, 
the producer receives 70% of losses below 85% of reference margin less current year margin up 
to 15% of reference, or zero (whichever is greater).  The final set of terms show that the producer 
receives 50% of the reference margin less current year margin, up to 15% of reference, or zero 
(whichever is greater).   
 
The specific nature of an individual’s payment function will depend on the deposit (coverage) 
that has been chosen.  The above expression assumes a deposit equivalent to 100% “coverage”; 
for farmers with deposits at the 85% level, the final term would not apply.  Payment for farmers 
with deposits at the 70% would be represented by eliminating the final two terms.  
  128
 
Implicit in the above expression is the calculation of the current year reference production 
margin, RMt.  It is given by the following: 
 
3
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t RM               [2] 
 
In the current year reference margin expression, the eligible revenue less eligible expenses 
(production margin) in each of the previous five years is summed, with the minimum production 
margin and maximum production margin over the previous five years subtracted.  The remaining 
three years’ data is divided by three to calculate the average that forms the reference margin.   
 
From the perspective of farm management incentives, what is more interesting is the reference 
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t RM      [3] 
 
The expression characterizing next year’s reference production drops the oldest of the production 
margins in [2] and replaces it with the current year (year t) production margin; current year 
production margins are used in the minimum and maximum calculations to determine which 
years’ production margins are omitted from the reference calculation. 
 
Analysis of Payment and Reference Margin Calculations 
 
The payment function presented above is static in nature; given results in the current year, it 
calculates the payment due to the producer.  Decisions made in the current year can influence 
payments under the program, so expression [1] above is relevant in considering incentives under 
the proposed program.  The decisions that influence the current year reference margin [2] have 
already been made by the time it comes into use as a reference.  However, activities in the 
current year under [1] influence next year’s reference margin defined by [3]; thus, [1] and [3] 
above are relevant in understanding incentives under the proposed program. 
 
The payment function above shows that a payment can be triggered if the current year 
production margin falls below the reference production margin.  Farmers may perceive an 
incentive to intentionally trigger a payment under the proposed program.  The rationale for this is 
that they can access government payments and meet cash flow needs from their own deposit.  In 
a sense, the proposed program allows the producer to experience a loss that is partially funded by 
government with no loss in cash flow, because of the cash flow on deposit that becomes 
accessible.  The primary factor mitigating this incentive (besides detection and enforcement from 
program administrative staff) is that the reference margin in the next year adjusts in response to 
current year production margin.  In other words, a farmer who intentionally triggered a payment 
under the program would see his or her reference production margin decrease in the future,  
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thereby decreasing future margin coverage.  However, the implication of the intentionally 
triggered production margin loss depends on the extent to which the next year’s production 
margin adjusts in response.  The sensitivity of the subsequent year’s reference margin to changes 
in the current year production margin can be determined by considering the effect of an 
incremental change in the current year’s production (through a change in output or a change in 
price) on the reference margin.   
 
The change in subsequent year reference margin [3] given by an incremental change in current 
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This shows that a one unit change in output in the current year changes the next year’s reference 
by an amount proportional to one-third of the per-unit production margin, or by zero. 
 
The change in subsequent year reference margin given by an incremental change in price in the 
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                   [5] 
Thus, a one unit change in the price of the output changes the next year’s reference production 
margin by an amount proportional to one-third of output. 
 
In general, one would expect qt > pt – c’(qt), so the reference production margin next year is 
more sensitive to adjustments in price than output.  
 
From the standpoint of moral hazard, the implication of the foregoing is the following: 
•  A producer who is intentionally trying to trigger a payment will attempt to do so in such a 
way that there is minimal reduction in the reference margin. 
•  The sensitivity of next year’s reference margin to the current year reference margin is 
disjoint.  For large production margin losses that are not registered as a 5-year minimum, 
the impact on the reference is one-third of the loss.  However, if the loss is significant 
                                                 
15 Because a maximum or minimum function if not differentiable, we must deal with the incremental change in a 
piecewise fashion  
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enough to be registered as a minimum, then there is no change.  So the incentive is to make 
the current year’s production margin loss sufficient to be registered as a 5 year minimum. 
•  As shown above, the reference margin will ultimately be more sensitive to price decreases 
than output decreases.  So someone who is intentionally attempting to trigger a payment 
(and have a minimal impact on the reference margin) has every incentive to avoid good 
price risk management and use negative movements in price as means to register a 5-year 
minimum production margin. 
 
Incentives Under Multiple Products    
 
The approach applied above can also be used to determine whether there are incentives to engage 
in more risky enterprises.  To understand whether the proposed program will give the incentive 
to move from less risky to more risky outputs, we expand the framework above to consider two 
farm outputs; one relatively risky, q
1, and another relatively low risk, q
2.  Under this situation, 
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Inspecting the payment function above reveals little about any incentive to produce the risky 
product or the less risky enterprise.  If there is a loss in one product and not the other, the 
proposed program would issue a payment; if a loss were experienced in both products, a payment 
would be issued.   
 
The limiting case occurs when losses in one product are accompanied by a gain in the other 
product.  This would reduce the payment received under the proposed program, because it is 
whole-farm in nature.  At the same time, the traditional rationale for diversification is precisely 
to offset losses in one enterprise from gains in another.  Thus, the proposed program reduces the 
incentive for diversification on the grounds of risk spreading
16. 
 
The reference production margin formula for the next year under two enterprises is given by: 
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The subsequent year reference production margin formula is essentially the same as that 
identified in [3] above, with the change to reflect the two enterprises. 
 
                                                 
16 That does not imply that the proposed program is a disincentive to diversify; there are other reasons for 
diversification, such as synergy between enterprises, that this observation need not apply to.  
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To determine the impact of a change in the current year production margin from changes in 
output, we determine the impact of an incremental change in output in each product on next 























otherwise   0
) q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p   )} q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p { max   if  
3
) q ( ' p
) q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p )} q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p { min   if
3
) q ( ' p
3




























































































otherwise   0
) q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p   )} q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p { max   if  
3
) q ( ' p
) q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p )} q c(    ) q c(   -   q p     q p { min   if
3
) q ( ' p
3






































































c RMt [9] 
This result is analogous to [4] above.  In this case, the enterprise with the greater per unit 
production margin will give the greater incremental change in the reference margin (i.e. give the 
greater probability of registering the current year as the minimum).  The notion of a risky 
enterprise is such that it has a relatively high expected value (average) and relatively high 








t)].  Thus, a desire to 
intentionally trigger claims without changing next year’s reference margin would push farmers 
toward relatively risky enterprises.   
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1 t RM  [11] 
 
The interpretation is similar to [5] above- the incremental change in reference margin due to a 
change in price is proportional to one-third of the output.  If, for the riskier output, the percentage 
swing in price that is typically observed is greater than that for the less risky output, then the 
riskier output can more easily be used to trigger a payment without affecting the coverage under 
next year’s reference margin.  Thus, the effect of price change and the effect of output changes 
effectively say the same thing- that farmers attempting to intentionally trigger a payment without 
changing next year’s reference margin are more likely to be able to do so through relatively risky 




















Appendix II.  Alberta Spring Price Endorsement and Revenue Insurance 
Coverage Compared to MRI 
 
Alberta Agriculture Financial Services Corporation (AFSC) developed the Spring Price 
Endorsement (SPE) and Revenue Insurance Coverage (RIC) products to address losses in the 
value of crops within the growing season.  Both SPE and RIC and endorsements under multiple-
peril production insurance, with percentage loss coverage equal to that taken under production 
insurance.  The program operates in the following way: 
•  In late January, the SPE benchmark price is set for the coming crop year (based on 
expectations of future market conditions).  At the same time, the RIC price is set based on 
criteria including long-run average prices, loan rates under US farm programs, and 
production costs 
•  In late March, producers select coverage levels under crop insurance.  The producer’s 
coverage percentage under SPE/RIC is equal to the percentage coverage taken under crop 
insurance. 
•  In the fall, the producer’s yield and the fall price are realized.  The fall price is taken as the 
average of October daily futures price closes, adjusted using a fixed basis.    
•  SPE/RIC provides price coverage on the realized yield (not yield loss).  SPE covers 
decreases in price between the January reference price and the fall price, if the decline in 
price is greater than 10%.  The payout is capped at 50% of the January reference.   
•  RIC pays out 50% of the difference between the RIC reference and the fall price or the 
difference between the RIC reference and the January SPE reference price, whichever is 
smaller. 
•  A premium averaging about 7% of coverage is charged for SPE.  No premium is charged for 




Suppose that a given crop had a January SPE reference price of $3.00/bushel, an RIC reference 
of $2.80/bushel, and that a producer took 80% coverage with a reference yield of 150 bushels.  
Then, if the price in the fall fell to $2.50/bushel, and the yield was 120 bushels: 
•  SPE would cover 80% of the loss from $3.00 to $2.50 on 120 bushels, or ($3.00-
$2.50)*.8*120 = $48/acre 
•  There would be no RIC payment, because the SPE reference price was higher than the RIC 
reference price 
•  Multiple peril crop insurance would pay out 80% of the yield loss between 150 and 120 
bushels at the floating price 
•  Alternatively, if the RIC was higher than the SPE price, there would have been a payout of 
50% of the difference between the RIC reference and the SPE January reference in addition 
to the above. 
•  If the fall price had been higher than the SPE January reference but lower than the RIC 
reference, a payment for 50% of the difference between the RIC reference and the fall price 
would have been made on the actual yield. 
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SPE and RIC share a number of commonalities with MRI in Ontario.  First, RIC uses a long run 
average price (in addition to US farm program parameters and production cost estimates) to 
establish its reference, as does MRI.  Also, the payments under RIC are co-insured (rather than 
having an explicit premium) like MRI.  In contrast to MRI, the SPE reference price changes each 
year in a way that is not predictable, and a non-refundable premium is charged for it.  Also, there 
is no minimum price change in order for MRI to become effective.     
 
        
 
 
  